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1. Introduction
During the 1990s, there was an impressive level
of activity in mergers and acquisitions (M&As)1 in
the banking sector internationally. This activity
was particularly intense in the period 1995-1999,
when approximately two M&As took place each
day.2 M&As during this five-year period mainly
involved large banks, whereas interest had
focused on small banks during the previous five
years. The deregulation and integration of finan-
cial markets, improved supervision of banking
systems, technological advances and the develop-
ment of new IT systems all played a part in
increasing the number of M&As in this sector.
These factors led to greater competition among
banks, which as a result tried to improve their effi-
ciency, to expand the scale of their operations and
to widen the range of services provided.
M&As are one of the ways of developing these
strategies, though they do not automatically lead
to improved bank performance. M&As can lead to
enhanced efficiency in bank operations as staff is
reduced, other costs are controlled, portfolios are
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1 The term “merger” refers to the sale of all the assets of one or
more companies to another. Companies transferring their assets
are dissolved and their shareholders participate in the share capi-
tal of the new company. The term “acquisition” refers to the
acquisition by a company, on payment of a sum of money, of part
or all of the share capital of another company.
2 Besides banks, businesses in other sectors of the economy also
went ahead with M&As. The year 2000 is an example, when the
total value of M&As worldwide exceeded 3.5 trillion dollars. In the
period 1985-1995, the value of M&As in the financial sector
accounted for approximately 45% of the total value of M&As, with
M&As among banks alone covering 30%.
diversified, income is increased, etc. In addition,
M&As allow banks to become considerably larger
and increase their expertise concerning new prod-
ucts and markets. This makes it possible for them
to take advantage of economies of scale and
scope (synergies).
In the EU, the strategy which banks are pursuing in
principle involves strengthening their position in
the domestic market (see Athanasoglou, 19983),
so as to be in a better position to face competition
from other European banks as well as from the US
and Japan. However, the permanent loss of certain
income, especially that due to the adoption of the
euro, coupled with a severe reduction in other
income, was not accompanied by any correspond-
ing cut in expenses. As a result, efficiency fell to a
lower level and made M&As inevitable in many
cases.4 Nonetheless, M&As were less widespread
in the EU than in the US and Japan. This was due
to the substantial growth in the EU of banks which
provide a wide range of financial services and as a
result are relatively large in size.
In Greece, the deregulation of the banking system
in the mid-1980s and the resulting high levels of
bank profitability led to the establishment of a
number of small private banks.5 At the same time,
state-controlled banks made efforts to modernise
and improve their efficiency. However, M&A
activity within the Greek banking market began
somewhat late and was comparatively limited in
scale. The main determinants behind M&As in
Greece during the second half of the 1990s were
the country’s forthcoming accession into the euro
area and the substantial drop in income this
would entail, the introduction of new technology
which favours M&As among banks and the need
to face possible competition from foreign banks.
Over the last ten years or so, a lot of research has
attempted to resolve the issue of whether M&As
between banks help to improve the efficiency of
the bank which comes into existence as a result,
and also to what extent economies of scale exist
which this new bank can exploit.
This article examines the effect of M&As in the
Greek banking market over the last years on the
cost and profit efficiency of financial institutions,
and also looks at whether economies of scale
have been exploited. In order to assess the
impact of M&As on bank performance, the
notion of efficiency and how M&As can lead to
improved efficiency are both examined in Section 2.
Section 3 gives a brief overview of studies con-
cerning the effects of M&As. In Section 4, the
results of this study on the Greek banking market
are presented and an initial assessment is given
of the impact of M&As both on cost and profit
efficiency and on economies of scale. Finally, in
Section 5, the conclusions reached from the
study are summarised.
2. Reasons behind mergers and acquisitions
The reasons which give rise to a larger banking
concentration via M&As usually fall into two cate-
gories (Berger et al., 1999): firstly, those which
concern bank shareholders, whose major concern
is to maximise the value of their shares, and, sec-
ondly, those which concern bank managers or
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3 This is also the strategy pursued in the US and Japan, albeit to
a lesser extent.
4 It is worth noting that, during the period 1996 - 2000, approxi-
mately 80% of the total number of bank M&As in the EU took
place in four countries (Germany, Italy, France and Austria), see
ECB (2000).
5 Both commercial and co-operative banks.
public authorities (e.g. the Government), who, as
a rule, do not share the same motives with share-
holders.6
Banks can maximise the value of their shares in
two main ways, i.e.: (a) by increasing their effi-
ciency and (b) by increasing their degree of
monopoly power in the market. M&As can help to
improve efficiency and simultaneously strengthen
a bank’s monopoly power as they lead to greater
concentration in the market.
Efficiency has a wide meaning which can cover
different aspects of banking activity. It extends
from the definition of cost and/or profit efficiency
which concerns the short-term period to techno-
logical efficiency concerning the long-term period.
A bank is considered efficient on the cost side (X-
efficient) if it minimises its cost for given prices of
productive factors and for a given level of services
provided. Alternatively, a bank is considered effi-
cient on the profit side if it maximises its profits
for a given combination of productive factors and
the price of services provided. These definitions of
efficiency focus on the way in which the produc-
tive factors of the bank are combined, and the
result of this process reflects the effectiveness of
bank management (in achieving the best possible
use of the resources it has at its disposal).
Technology and the size of the bank are taken as
given (see Group of Ten, 2001).7 By contrast,
technological efficiency relates to the economies
of scale and scope of services provided. A bank is
technologically efficient if it acquires the optimum
size and produces the best possible combination
of services with given prices for the productive
factors it uses.8 As economies of scale and scope
of services provided depend on technology and
also on factors such as the preferences of bank
customers or the regulatory framework within
which the bank operates, it is only reasonable to
expect changes in the size of the bank and the
structure of its assets in order for it to benefit fully
from these economies. One of the ways that this
can be achieved is through M&As.
In studying the possible benefits which can be
obtained from M&As, it is important to distin-
guish between improving cost efficiency and sim-
ply reducing cost (see Rhoades, 1998). A simple
reduction in cost can be achieved by cutting the
number of bank employees, closing branches,
merging administrative offices, etc., as a conse-
quence of the merger. If such cost-cutting mea-
sures are accompanied by a corresponding fall in
the total assets of the bank or in its income, then
what has actually been achieved is simply a
reduction in the size of the bank, not an improve-
ment in its efficiency. However, if cost reduction
is greater than the reduction in assets or income
for the bank, chiefly as a result of restructuring
and reallocating its resources (human, financial
and technological), then efficiency will be
increased (see Altunbas et al., 1997).
The extent of a bank’s cost inefficiency is mea-
sured on the basis of the deviation of its cost from
the theoretical minimum cost, a figure which is
empirically proxied by the cost of the most effi-
cient bank. According to Berger and Mester
(1997), inefficiency factors which increase the
The effect of mergers and acquisitions on bank efficiency in Greece
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6 Bank managers may decide on a merger with another bank for
personal reasons such as greater prestige, increased salaries, etc.
7 Cost/profit efficiency is connected with the banks’ short-term
cost curve and with short-term changes in relative prices of the
services provided.
8 It is clear that technological efficiency is linked with the banks’
long-term cost curve, while economies of scope refer to long-term
changes in the mix of banking services provided.
cost above this minimum level include the subop-
timal response of the bank to changes in the rela-
tive prices of its inputs and the use of a larger
quantity of inputs than is optimal for the produc-
tion of bank services.
Turning now to technological efficiency, M&As
allow banks to increase their size and thereby
secure access to technology which can make
cost-cutting possible, or to allocate fixed cost over
a broader base, thereby reducing the average cost
of providing banking services and improving their
profitability (see Group of Ten, 2001). Economies
of scale appear in small banks, and they may con-
tinue to exist in much larger banks, as it has been
found in many countries that the average cost
function for banks is U-shaped and is relatively
flat at its lowest part. Benefits from the exploita-
tion of economies of scale disappear when the
bank exceeds a particular size, at which point neg-
ative economies of scale become apparent due to
problems which arise in the management of large
organisations.
3. Consequences of M&As between banks:
brief overview of empirical research
The literature which relates to the impact of
M&As on cost and profit efficiency of banks can
be divided into that which uses an analysis of indi-
cators based on balance sheet and profit and loss
account data and that which uses an analysis of
cost or profit functions.
Many researchers agree that M&As between
banks had a limited impact on cost (excluding
interest expenses). In the US, there is no con-
sensus on the existence of positive effects on
cost from M&As. In particular, most findings
from research on cost efficiency covering the
1980s and the early 1990s ranged from negative
to positive, but were insignificant (see Berger
and Humphrey, 1992). Only limited positive
effects on the income side were reported in cer-
tain other studies that used indicators in their
analysis (see Linder and Crane, 1992).9 By con-
trast, studies covering recent years, which were
also based on an analysis of indicators, lend
support to the belief that a remarkable improve-
ment is evident in cost efficiency, not only in
small banks (see Berger, 1998) but also in large
banks, provided that the acquiring bank has
committed itself to cut cost (or to make its man-
agement more efficient) and the bank which is
being taken over is relatively efficient (see
Rhoades, 1998).10
However, cutting cost does not always lead to
increased profits, even for large banks in the US.
This can be explained by the fact that large banks
often have a relatively high number of non-per-
forming loans and find it difficult to meet the
demand from small businesses for banking ser-
vices (see Linder and Crane, 1992). In addition, it
appears that technology can lead to a fall in the
level of production which is required to minimise
average cost. As a result, even small banks can
offer certain services as cheaply as large ones.11
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9 Positive results in this period were only observed in mergers of
very small banks (see Boyd and Graham, 1998).
10 In this study, out of a total of 9 M&As which were examined,
improved cost efficiency was observed in only four cases. The great-
est cost reductions were due to staff cuts and reduced expenditure
on computer cost and software. Note that in these four cases, cuts
in the number of bank employees reached approximately 50%.
11 After 1995 in the US, small banks (with assets of less than 
$10 billion) showed expenses per customer which were approxi-
mately 20% lower than those of large banks. By contrast, profits
per customer were comparatively higher (see Economist, 1998).
Advances in technology are one of the factors
which have led to M&As of large banks, due to
the high fixed cost required by modern technol-
ogy. Nonetheless, as the size of banks increases,
they are better able to manage cost, but they find
it more difficult to generate income efficiently
(see Berger and Mester, 1997, and Chamberlain,
1998).
As for profit efficiency, studies of the 1980s and
the first half of the 1990s (see Akhavein et al.,
1997 and Berger, 1998) indicate a remarkable
improvement accompanied by greater risk differ-
entiation (substitution of the banks’ holdings in
securities with loans, increased external finance
due to lower interest rates, etc.). The studies also
showed that the improvement in profit efficiency
is much greater for smaller banks than for large
ones (see Berger and Mester, 1997).
It is worth noting that, in the 1980s, medium-
sized banks in the US were relatively more effi-
cient. In general in the US, total cost inefficiency
in the banking sector ranges between 20% and
30% approximately (see Berger, 1998 and
Hanweck and Shull, 1999). Against this margin,
the improvement in total efficiency achieved as a
result of M&As is approximately 5%.12 Addition-
ally, profit inefficiency ranges between 24% and
67% (see Hanweck and Shull, 1999). For the EU
banking sector, estimates (covering the 1990s) of
cost and profit inefficiency stand at 13-24% and
24-50% respectively (see Huizinga et al., 2001).
In more detail, results of empirical research for
the EU for the 1990s conform generally to those
for the US. In other words, benefits were derived
from M&As between banks of the same size, but
the magnitude of the benefit was not the same for
every country in the EU. More specifically, M&As
which took place in the period 1988-1993 within
EU countries are not thought to have brought any
benefits concerning cost and profit efficiency.
M&As between banks of the same size or cross-
border M&As are an exception to this (see
Vennet, 1996). If the study of the effect of M&As
is restricted geographically to France, Germany,
Italy and Spain for 1988, it can be seen that ben-
efits were realised in terms of cost for all banks,
even large ones, in all four countries (see Altunbas
and Molyneaux, 1996). However, these results
are not confirmed by a simulation study of the
cost function, which showed an increase in total
cost. An exception to this were the M&As that
took place between German and Italian banks
(Altunbas et al., 1997).
Exploiting economies of scale appears to be the
most widespread source of potential benefits
from M&As, both in the US and the EU (see
Berger and Mester, 1997, Altunbas and Moly-
neux, 1996, Group of Ten, 2001 and Huizinga,
2003). The increase in size of a bank as a result
of an M&A enables it either to reduce its fixed
cost per unit of output or to adopt technologies
which will improve its use of capital equipment
and labour, resulting in increased productivity of
these factors, lower average cost and higher prof-
itability.
The average cost function of banks shows the
usual U shape (see Hughes and Mester, 1998,
and Berger et al., 1999). However, in estimates of
this function, the minimum cost corresponds to
banks of average size. This means that
The effect of mergers and acquisitions on bank efficiency in Greece
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12 According to the studies previously mentioned which used
both cost functions and financial indicators.
economies of scale no longer exist when the
bank begins to reach a certain size, while, when
it has grown beyond that size, negative
economies of scale may arise, probably due to
difficulties in the management which large banks
suffer from. These results have been confirmed in
many cases by evidence relating to the 1980s and
the 1990s.13 In particular, in the case of M&As
between large and small banks, no improvement
in cost and profit efficiency has been noted and
the mergers have been attributed either to the
desire on the part of managers of large banks to
increase the bank’s size or to the belief that a
bank which comes into existence as a result of a
merger will be “too big to fail.” As to M&As
between small banks, the improved performance
of the new bank is attributed to the exploitation
of economies of scale, while the positive results
of M&As between large banks are explained by
the improvement in the operating efficiency of
their management, especially as far as cost and
the risk reduction ensured by broadening the
total range of services offered are concerned (see
Vennet, 1996).14
As for cross-border M&As, it has been observed
that these lead to a small fall in cost only in cases
where one of the two banks has a relatively high
capital intensity and the other has a relatively high
labour intensity (see Altunbas et al., 1997).
Measuring economies of scope proves to be
extremely difficult, as, in theory, the reference
point must be a firm which produces one product
in order for the cost or income function to be cal-
culated. Generally, it has been found that M&As
between banks lead to economies as a result of
synergies, but that these economies are limited
(see Allen and Rai, 1996).
4. Empirical analysis for Greek banks
In this paper, financial indicators are used to study
the impact of M&As on the cost and profit effi-
ciency of banks in Greece and on economies of
scale. The analysis is based on information taken
from bank balance sheets and profit and loss
accounts.15
The impact of M&As between Greek commercial
banks (see Table 1) on their cost and profit effi-
ciency is examined first. More specifically, to esti-
mate this impact, the margin for improvement in
cost and profit efficiency in the period before the
M&As must be calculated and compared with that
in the period after the M&As, so that the extent of
any eventual improvement can be ascertained.
With this aim in mind, three methods can be
applied. Each method complements the others
and as a result they all allow us to deal with cer-
tain shortcomings associated with the use of indi-
cators (difficulty in keeping certain factors con-
stant —the ceteris paribus assumption— etc). The
methods are as follows:
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0412
13 Estimates based on cost functions showed that, for European
banks, there is a negative correlation between margins for the
exploitation of economies of scale and the size of the bank (see
Huizinga, 2003).
14 However, recent studies have shown that, for large banks,
margins may exist for the exploitation of economies of scale (see
Vennet, 2002).
15 The use of econometric models here is not feasible due to the lim-
ited number of observations. The benefits derived from M&As may
also be measured on the basis of an evaluation of the reaction of stock
markets to announcements of specific M&As. Using this approach, if
the merger is to bring any benefit, then the stock market value of the
bank coming into existence as a result of an M&A must be greater
than the sum of the stock market value of the individual banks which
are merging. However, the approach adopted in this paper, which is
based on the analysis of financial indicators, is considered to measure
the actual performance of banks for a relatively long period, rather
than short-term expectations of investors in the stock market. As a
result, it is more reliable than an analysis based on bank share prices.
For a fuller analysis of this issue, see Piloff and Santomero (1998).
Firstly, analysis of the developments of certain cost
and profit indicators and of their dispersion between
groups of banks classified according to their size.
Secondly, calculation of the banks’ cost and profit
(in)efficiency in comparison with the bank with
the best performance.
Thirdly, comparison of bank performance con-
cerning cost and profits for individual merger
cases during the period before and after the
merger with the performance of banks which did
not participate in any M&A.
In addition, the existence of economies of scale
and their exploitation because of the merger are
examined.
4.1 The impact of M&As on cost and profit effi-
ciency of Greek commercial banks
4.1.1 Calculation of performance indicators for
banks and of their dispersion
In this section, income, cost, profit and productiv-
ity indicators are calculated for bank groups
according to their size for the period prior to the
The effect of mergers and acquisitions on bank efficiency in Greece
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T a b l e  1
Mergers and acquisitions of banks in Greece in the period 1997-2002
Bank(s)Bank/Securities Company Assets1Assets1
Note: The date of the merger/acquisition is based on its registration in the Registry of Sociétés Anonymes of the Ministry of Development (Article 74 of Law 2190/1920,
which was supplemented by Article 12 of Presidential Decree 498/1987). The merger of Telesis Securities S.A. and the Dorian Bank is an exception, as, in this case, the
date used is that of the exchange of shares. 
1 Level of assets (in billion drachmas) at the end of the year prior to the merger; for the merger of the Bank of Athens and EFG Eurobank: asset level at 31.7.1998.
2 Merger by absorption of Eurobank by the Bank of Athens and renaming of the latter to EFG Eurobank, Government Gazette 1503/17.3.99.
3 Merger by absorption of Egnatia Bank by the Bank of Central Greece and renaming of the latter to Egnatia Bank, Government Gazette 6357/3.8.99.
Source: Bank of Greece.
1997
10.10.97 EFG Eurobank 305 Interbank 197
23.10.97 Piraeus Bank 188 Chase Manhattan (Greek branches) 72
22.12.97 National Real Estate Bank 2,192 National Mortgage Bank 124
1998
02.10.98 National Bank 9,803 National Real Estate Bank 2,516
27.10.98 Piraeus Bank 319 Credit Lyonnais Grèce 76
1999
12.03.99 Bank of Athens2 117 EFG Eurobank 945
29.06.99 Piraeus Bank 670 Nat. Westminster (Greek branches) 386
13.07.99 Telesis Securities S.A. 16 Dorian Bank 85
30.07.99 Bank of Central Greece3 178 Egnatia Bank 263
04.10.99 EFG Eurobank 1,290 Bank of Crete 401
2000
26.04.00 Alpha Credit Bank 5,904 Ionian and Popular Bank 1,991
16.06.00 Piraeus Bank 1,525 Macedonia-Thrace Bank 830
Xios Bank 676
07.09.00 EFG Eurobank 2,575 Ergobank 2,186
2001
30.11.01 EFG Eurobank-Ergasias 5,245 Telesis Investment Bank 302
2002
20.12.02 National Bank 16,304 National Investment Bank 
for Industrial Development 397
Year
Absorbed bank(s) Acquiring bank 
M&As (1994-1997) and after (2000-2002), and
the dispersion of these indicators. The compari-
son of average performance and its dispersion for
each bank group between the two periods is con-
sidered to offer an adequate picture of the impact
of M&As on individual groups and on the devia-
tion between the best and the worst performer
within each group.
More analytically, indicators of income (exclud-
ing interest income), as well as of operating
expenses as a percentage of total bank income
and the return on equity indicator (ROE)16 are cal-
culated. Similarly, productivity indicators for
labour, capital and total assets are calculated (see
Appendix for the definition of indicators). The
above indicators have been constructed sepa-
rately for each of the four size groups into which
Greek commercial banks have been classified on
the basis of their average assets during both peri-
ods.17 The size brackets for the period 1994-1997
were set (in bill. drachmas) at 0-200 for Group 1,
201-400 for Group 2, 401-2,000 for Group 3 and
2,001- for Group 4. During the second period,
2000-2002, the brackets were revised upwards
by 50%, in line with the corresponding increase
in the average level of nominal GDP between the
two periods 1994-1997 and 2000-2002, i.e. they
were set at 0-300, 301-600, 600-3,000 and
3,001- respectively.18 Note that Group 1 does not
appear in the table with the results for the second
period, as no bank is included in the correspond-
ing size bracket due to the substantial growth in
the size of banks, which partly reflects the M&As
that took place.
For each group, the average for each indicator has
been calculated, together with the size of the indi-
cator for the 25% of banks showing the best and
the worst performance for this indicator and the
percentage deviation from (the average of) the
indicator for the best and the worst 25%, which is
the measure of dispersion utilised.
Bank performance in terms of income, operating
expenses and profitability for the periods 1994-
1997 and 2000-2002 is presented in Tables 2 and
4. A comparative examination of these two tables
shows that the performance of banks in Group 4
(which includes all banks which have resulted
from M&As, with the exception of one bank
which is included in Group 3), was comparatively
better in terms of return on equity and, mainly, in
terms of cost. Thus, M&As appear to have had a
beneficial effect overall on the performance of
banks which merged.
In addition, an examination of the dispersion of
performance within Groups in the period 1994-
1997 reveals a greater dispersion of profitability
than of the other two indicators, which is wider for
Groups 1 and 4. This dispersion appears to be
associated with that of cost and income indicators,
except in the case of Group 3, which is entirely a
reflection of the dispersion of the cost indicator.
This reveals the existence of significant margins for
improved profit efficiency in all groups but mainly
in Groups 1 and 4. It must be emphasised that,
during this period, the Greek banking market was
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0414
16 To calculate this indicator, average equity over two successive
years is used, and not end-of-year equity. This is because profit is
a flow generated during the year and as a result is more closely
linked with the average stock of equity.
17 Such a classification of banks into groups is dictated among
other things by the effort to keep constant the impact of other fac-
tors which affect the development of these indicators, since the
analysis based on indicators is univariate.
18 Had the revision of the brackets been made on the basis of the
development of the banks’ average assets, the resulting brackets
would have included the impact of M&As.
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T a b l e  2
Greek commercial banks: performance and measures of dispersion according to level of assets, 
1994-1997
(Period averages)
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%*
Best
25%*Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Average assets (in billion drachmas)
Group 1: (0 – 200) Group 2: (201-400)  Group 3: (401-2,000) Group 4: (2,001- )
Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage deviation from the average. 
1 For a definition of the indicator, see the Appendix to the text.
* In this case, the indicators refer to a range of 50%.
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.
Non-interest income
(% of total income) 42.8 51.6 31.8 40.1 45.3 31.1 39.6 40.0 39.4 49.5 64.1 25.8
(20.6) (–25.7) (13.0) (–22.4) (1.0) (–0.5) (29.5) (–47.9)
Operating expenses
(% of total income) 79.9 65.7 100.1 73.6 60.6 79.9 56.0 34.7 79.9 66.8 47.3 82.8
(–17.8) (25.3) (–17.7) (8.6) (–38.0) (42.7) (–29.2) (24.0)
Return on equity1 9.9 18.2 –5.4 16.5 27.5 3.9 33.8 64.6 9.2 18.0 43.5 3.9
(83.8) (–154.5) (66.7) (–76.4) (91.1) (–72.8) (141.7) (–78.3)
Indicators
T a b l e  3
European commercial banks: performance and measures of dispersion according to level of assets,
1994-1997
(Period averages)
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Total assets (in billion dollars)
Group 1 : (0-5) Group 2: (6-20) Group 3: (21-50) Group 4: (51- )
Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage deviation from the average. 
1 For a definition of the indicator, see the Appendix to the text.
Source: Group of Ten (2001), pp. 250–1.
Non-interest income
(% of total income) 19.2 23.7 14.2 24.6 32.1 15.1 20.2 31.9 13.3 30.8 37.3 23.9
(23.4) (–26.0) (30.5) (–38.6) (57.9) (–34.2) (21.1) (–22.4)
Operating expenses
(% of total income) 63.1 57.5 68.7 61.6 53.4 70.4 55.6 34.4 69.3 65.5 58.0 73.8
(–8.9) (8.9) (–13.3) (14.3) (–38.1) (24.6) (–11.5) (12.7)
Return on equity1 7.1 8.8 5.4 7.4 9.7 4.7 7.2 9.0 5.6 8.2 9.9 4.8
(23.9) (–23.9) (31.1) (–36.5) (25.0) (–22.2) (20.7) (–41.5)
Indicators
characterised by the establishment of new banks
and the fall in the degree of concentration, as mea-
sured by the Herfindhal-Hirschman (H-H) index
(1993: 1,153, 1997: 950).19
The cost and profit efficiency shown by Greek
commercial banks may be compared with that of
European commercial banks during the same
period.20 These results appear in Table 3. In par-
ticular, it can be seen that Greek banks, when
compared with European banks, showed higher
return on equity for all groups. Cost for Groups 1
and 2 was higher, while for Groups 3 and 4 it was
at approximately the same level.21 In addition, the
return on equity indicator for European banks
shows a smaller dispersion than for Greek banks
for all the size brackets. This dispersion among
European banks should be attributed to income
rather than cost. It therefore appears that there
was greater margin for improvement on the
income side and comparatively less margin on the
cost side, which had already been favourably
affected by the M&As that had taken place.
By comparing the dispersion of performance of
Greek commercial banks in the two periods under
examination, it becomes clear that M&As have
contributed to the improvement of cost and profit
efficiency. Indeed, Table 4 shows that, in Group 4,
all the performance indicators, particularly return
on equity, show a reduced dispersion in compar-
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20 It must, however, be emphasised that throughout the period
under examination, bank M&As in Europe took place earlier.
21 For the relation between size brackets of Greek and European
banks, see Section 4.2.
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Greek commercial banks: performance and measures of dispersion according to level of assets,
2000-2002
(Period averages)
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%*
Best
25%*Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Average assets (in billion drachmas)
Group 2: (301-600) Group 3: (601-3,000) Group 4: (3,001- )
Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage deviation from the average. 
The upper and lower limits for each group have been revised for this period on the basis of the rate of change in nominal GDP. Group 1 no longer includes any com-
mercial bank due to the growth in bank size.
1 For a definition of the indicator, see the Appendix to the text.
* In this case, the indicators refer to a range of 50%.
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.
Non-interest income
(% of total income) 37.0 42.1 29.6 35.7 37.2 34.3 37.6 44.5 25.4
(13.8) (–20.0) (4.2) (–3.9) (18.4) (–32.4)
Operating expenses
(% of total income) 90.6 63.4 228.8 75.6 60.8 90.0 58.0 55.4 63.6
(–30.0) (152.5) (–19.6) (19.0) (–4.5) (9.7)
Return on equity1 –0.2 13.3 –24.8 6.7 13.5 –1.7 17.1 21.7 11.4
(6,750.0) (–12,300.0) (101.5) (–125.4) (26.9) (–33.3)
Indicators
ison with the 1994-1997 period. Note that, during
the three-year period 2000-2002, the degree of
concentration within the banking market
increased (H-H index 1999: 986, 2002: 1,164).
The bank performance indicators for Group 3 pre-
sent a mixed picture, i.e. improved cost efficiency
and a small deterioration in profit efficiency. By
contrast, cost and profit efficiency for banks in
Group 2 show a substantial decline.
In order to get a better understanding of the
improvement observed in profit efficiency, the
impact of M&As on the existing margins for
improvement in labour, capital and total assets
productivity on the part of banks was also exam-
ined. M&As can help to increase productivity in
the short term through factors such as changes
in the regulations relating to the internal organ-
isation of the bank (including improved incen-
tives and internal audit procedures), risk differ-
entiation (e.g. shift in the bank’s portfolio out of
securities and into loans) etc. The results of the
calculations presented in Tables 5 and 6 and in
Chart 1 indicate that M&As helped to improve
labour and capital productivity in Group 4
(which includes almost all the banks which
came into existence as a result of M&As), but
made no contribution towards improving total
assets productivity. They also helped to limit the
dispersion of labour productivity in Group 4,
particularly in the top 25% of banks in this
group. By contrast, this group showed no
improvement in the dispersion of capital and
total assets productivity.
The effect of mergers and acquisitions on bank efficiency in Greece
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T a b l e  5
Greek commercial banks: performance and measures of dispersion according to level of assets, 
1994-1997
(Period averages)
Worst 
25%
Best 
25%Average
Worst 
25%*
Best 
25%*Average
Worst 
25%
Best 
25%Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Average assets (in billion drachmas)
Group 1: (0-200) Group 2: (201-400)  Group 3: (401-2,000) Group 4: (2,001- )
Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage deviation from the average. 
1 For a definition of the indicator, see the Appendix to the text.
* In this case, the indicators refer to a range of 50%.
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. 
Labour productivity 33.5 54.5 25.6 37.7 80.3 27.8 48.9 60.0 43.0 59.8 112.4 51.8
(62.7) (–23.6) (113.0) (–26.3) (22.7) (–12.1) (88.0) (–13.4)
Average salary  
at constant prices 6.4 3.6 7.1 6.1 5.9 7.0 6.6 5.9 6.9 8.0 6.9 10.2
(–43.7) (10.3) (–3.4) (14.6) (–10.1) (5.2) (–13.8) (27.5)
Capital productivity 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.2
(8.7) (–13.0) (5.1) (–4.4) (17.4) (–10.2) (14.6) (–7.7)
Assets productivity 13.7 16.4 9.2 14.2 16.6 12.7 12.6 13.6 11.9 11.7 12.7 9.6
(19.7) (–32.8) (16.9) (–10.6) (7.9) (–5.6) (8.2) (–17.9)
Profit margin 9.6 19.6 0.6 10.7 14.7 8.1 21.2 46.8 7.4 10.6 27.7 2.5
(104.2) (–93.8) (36.9) (–24.6) (120.8) (–65.1) (161.3) (–76.4)
Indicators1
4.1.2 Assessment of the degree of cost and profit
(in)efficiency
So far, the analysis has been based on the compar-
ison of financial indicators, such as cost, income
except from interest, and profitability, as well of as
their dispersion, before and after the M&As. The
dispersion of cost and profitability indicators shows
the gap that exists between the best and the worst
performances. However, in order to evaluate the
degree of cost and profit (in)efficiency, a compari-
son with the best performer is required. The gap
between each of the banks (or group of banks) and
the best performing bank is a measure of the for-
mer’s (in)efficiency. This method offers a satisfac-
tory measure of (in)efficiency. Alternatively, this
may be calculated on the basis of estimates of cost
and profit functions.22
Cost (in)efficiency (on the basis of operating
expenses as a percentage of total income) and
profit (in)efficiency (on the basis of return on
equity) were measured for both periods, before and
after M&As, and also for the individual groups of
banks which have already been mentioned, as well
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0418
22 Any measurement of (in)efficiency arrived at using the method
which employs financial indicators may be significantly affected if
the bank showing the best performance is an outlier of the banks
in the sample. However, this is not the case in this study, at least
for the main performance indicators.
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Greek commercial banks: performance and measures of dispersion according to level of assets,
2000-2002
(Period averages)
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Worst
25%*
Best 
25%*Average
Worst
25%
Best
25%Average
Average assets (in billion drachmas)
Group 2: (301-600) Group 3: (601-3,000) Group 4: (3,001- )
Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage deviation from the average. 
The upper and lower limits for each group have been revised for this period on the basis of the rate of change in nominal GDP. Group 1 no longer includes any com-
mercial banks due to their enlargement.
1 For a definition of the indicator, see the Appendix to the text.
* In this case, the indicators refer to a range of 50%.
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.
Labour productivity 43.1 52.5 29.3 40.9 51.1 34.5 76.4 82.6 62.7
(21.8) (–32.0) (24.9) (–15.6) (8.1) (–17.9)
Average salary 
at constant prices 9.4 7.7 10.7 9.8 9.7 9.9 12.9 10.8 14.7
(–18.1) (13.8) (–1.0) (1.0) (–16.3) (14.0)
Capital productivity 1.4 1.8 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.5
(28.6) (–35.7) (12.5) (–6.3) (18.8) (–6.3)
Assets productivity 6.8 8.9 5.5 9.0 9.6 8.6 7.9 8.6 2.6
(30.9) (–19.1) (6.7) (–4.4) (8.9) (–67.1)
Profit margin 5.6 26.3 –35.8 18.0 32.0 7.4 26.4 32.3 23.0
(369.6) (–739.3) (77.8) (–58.9) (22.3) (–12.9)
Indicators1
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as for all banks. The relevant findings are presented
in Tables 7 and 8.23 Examination of the results for
the period 1994-1997 shows the following:
Firstly, all banks show a high level of cost ineffi-
ciency. This is mainly due to total staff cost, and in
particular to the number of staff employed. More
analytically, cost inefficiency shows a noticeable
fall between Group 1 and Group 3 and a rise
between Group 3 and Group 4. The latter is partic-
ular marked as far as staff cost is concerned. By
contrast, cost inefficiency as measured on the basis
of labour cost (real average wage) falls between
Group 2 and Group 1, but then rises again. In all
the above entioned cases, cost inefficiency in
Group 4 is higher than for all banks.
Secondly, profit inefficiency for all banks is very
high (70%), which can be explained both by the
already mentioned cost inefficiency and by profit
inefficiency in terms of, mainly, labour productiv-
ity and, to a lesser degree, capital and total assets
productivity.
Thirdly, profit inefficiency falls impressively
between Group 1 and Group 3, rising again con-
siderably in Group 4. This relationship between
profit inefficiency and the size of the bank reflects
the relationship between cost and the size of the
bank, rather than the corresponding relationship
of productivity.
Table 8 shows cost and profit inefficiency of
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0420
23 With cost indicators, inefficiency is measured in terms of the
upward deviation of the indicator in question from 100 (repre-
senting the bank with the best performance), whereas for profit
indicators the measurement is made in terms of the downward
deviation.
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Relative indicators of cost and profit efficiency of Greek commercial banks 
(comparison with the best performing bank1): 1994-1997
Average assets (in billion drachmas)
All banks
Group 4
(2,001-  )
Group 3
(401-2,000)
Group 2
(201-400)
Group 1
(0-200)
1 The best performance equals 100.
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.
∞) Cost efficiency:
— Operating expenses (% of total income) 230.3 212.1 161.4 192.5 177.8
— Staff cost (% of total income) 224.4 218.0 169.8 239.5 226.3
— Average salary at constant prices 120.9 115.3 123.8 150.9 142.1
µ) Profit efficiency:
— Non-interest income
(% of total income) 66.8 62.6 61.8 77.2 73.0
— Return on equity 15.3 25.5 52.3 27.9 30.0
— Labour productivity 27.1 30.5 39.6 48.4 44.1
— Capital productivity 80.2 79.1 84.2 75.6 76.7
— Assets productivity 82.5 85.5 75.9 70.5 72.3
— Profit margin 20.5 22.9 45.3 22.6 25.0
Indicators
Greek commercial banks on the basis of the best
performing bank in the period following the
M&As (2000-2002). Examination of the table
shows that:
Firstly, the cost inefficiency of all banks is reduced
significantly compared with the period 1994-1997
when calculated on the basis of operating expenses
or staff cost. However, it increases when calculated
on the basis of real average wages.
Secondly, the reduction in cost inefficiency is evi-
dent in all the groups of banks, particularly in
Group 4, which includes almost all the M&As in
the banking sector.
Thirdly, profit inefficiency for all banks remains at
a high level (38%), even though it has been
reduced to a large extent. This fall is due to the
drop both in cost inefficiency and in inefficiency
measured on the basis of labour productivity and,
to a lesser extent, on the basis of productivity of
capital and total assets.
Fourthly, the picture shown by the profit ineffi-
ciency of all banks is exclusively the result of the
performance of Group 4, since in the other two
groups an increase in inefficiency was observed.
The improved performance in Group 4 can be
attributed to the same reasons mentioned for all
banks.
4.1.3 Analysis of individual cases of bank M&As
on the basis of indicators of change in
relative cost and relative profitability
Table 1 shows that in the period 1997-2002, 11
M&As took place between Greek commercial
The effect of mergers and acquisitions on bank efficiency in Greece
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T a b l e  8
Relative indicators of cost and profit efficiency of Greek commercial banks 
(comparison with the best performing bank1): 2000-2002
Average assets (in billion drachmas)
All banks
Group 4
(3,001- )
Group 3
(601-3,000)
Group 2
(301-600)
1 The best performance equals 100.
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.  
∞) Cost efficiency:
— Operating expenses (% of total income) 165.0 137.7 105.6 108.9
— Staff cost (% of total income) 155.7 141.8 127.9 129.3
— Average salary at constant prices 122.1 127.3 167.5 163.1
µ) Profit efficiency:
— Non-interest income
(% of total income) 81.9 79.0 83.2 83.0
— Return on equity -0.8 26.2 66.8 62.1
— Labour productivity 52.0 49.3 92.2 87.6
— Capital productivity 70.0 80.0 80.0 80.0
— Assets productivity 70.8 93.8 82.3 82.3
— Profit margin 15.7 50.6 74.2 71.1
Indicators
banks. In order for us to have a direct evaluation
of the relationship between individual cases of
bank M&As and cost and profit efficiency, our
analysis should focus in each case on looking at
how banks which merged performed before and
after the merger and comparing this with the per-
formance of banks which have not taken part in
any M&A. This change in performance will reflect
the impact of M&As and not a change in the eco-
nomic environment. For this purpose, we use an
indicator of the change in relative operating cost
(total cost and its components) or relative prof-
itability due to M&As (see Kwan and Wilcox,
1999), which is defined as follows:
RP =  –Χa – –Χ Ïa–  –Χb – –Χ Ïb , (1)
where:
RP = indicator of change in relative perfor-
mance: cost (RPc) or profits (RPp)
b, a = refer to the period before and after the
mergers, respectively
–Χb= average of cost or profitability indicator
for merging banks during the period
before the merger
–Χa= the corresponding indicator for the bank
which resulted from the merger in the
period after the merger
–Χ Ïb, 
–Χ Ïa= the above indicators for banks which
have not taken part in an M&A.
On the basis of relationship (1), we have:
(a) an improvement in cost efficiency when:
RPc < 0
(b) an improvement in profit efficiency when:
RPp > 0
In each case of M&A which is examined, a common
set of indicators is calculated, which includes four
cost and two profitability indicators. The cost indi-
cators (total cost less interest expenses, staff
salaries, expenses for fixed assets24 and other
expenses) have been calculated as the ratio of the
respective expenses to average total assets,25 in
order to pinpoint any improvement in cost efficiency
rather than simply show the reduction in cost. As for
the calculation of profit efficiency, two measures of
profitability were used, return on assets (ROA) and
return on equity (ROE). The first measure reflects in
principle the ability of a bank to create profits from
disposable assets. It, however, overestimates prof-
itability since it is affected by the bank’s off-balance
sheet activities. Alternatively, ROE measures return
on the equity of shareholders of the bank, but is
affected by management decisions involving both
the proportion of equity to the bank’s loan capital
and the total level of the bank’s capital. These two
indicators are linked by the relationship:
–P = –P . –A , (2)
E A E
where:
P = profits (before tax)
E = equity
A = total assets
The ratio A/E in relationship (2), which is often
referred to as the “equity multiplier,” measures
the leverage of the bank and is shown in Table 9.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0422
24 This refers to depreciation of fixed and intangible assets.
25 See also footnote 16.
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1 For a definition of these indicators, see Section 4.1.3 of the text.
2 Includes an equal number of years before and after the year of the merger.
3 Ratio of assets to equity.  
Source: Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.
T a b l e  9
Indicators of change in relative operating cost and relative profitability as a result of mergers and
acquisitions of Greek commercial banks1
Operating cost
Expenses 
for fixed
assetsStaff salaries
Profitability
ROE(A/E)3ROA
Other
expenses
Total  
non-interest
expensesPeriod2
A. 1996-1997 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.01 0.12 2.14 2.37
B. 1997-1998 –2.36 –1.21 –0.29 –0.86 –1.12 –1.93 –15.42
C. 1995-2002 –1.44 –1.54 –0.21 0.32 0.27 8.78 13.04
D. 1998-1999 1.18 0.29 0.25 0.64 –0.95 3.96 –9.98
E. 1999-2000 0.76 0.23 0.12 0.40 1.60 1.60 17.16
F. 1994-2001 0.48 0.30 0.11 0.10 –0.25 –5.31 11.68
G. 1997-2002 –0.77 -0.52 -0.09 -0.17 –0.37 7.71 10.96
H. 1997-2002 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.16 3.29 5.27
Cases of merg-
ers and acquisi-
tions
Indicators of change in relative cost and prof-
itability have been calculated for 8 of the 11 cases
of Greek commercial bank M&As. In 2 of the 3
other cases, the available data for the periods
before and after the mergers were not compara-
ble, as new M&As took place immediately after-
wards involving the same banks. In the remaining
case, data were insufficient. The results of calcu-
lating the above indicators for the 8 M&As
referred to above are presented in Table 9. In 4 of
these cases, the indicators were calculated over a
period of three (or four) years before and after the
merger, while in the other cases the period before
and after the merger was limited to one year.26
Table 9 shows that 3 of the 8 cases of M&As, (B,
C and G) involved a decrease in the relative cost
indicator (RPc < 0), i.e. there was an improve-
ment in cost efficiency, and 6 cases (A, C, E, F,
G and H) involved an increase in the relative
return on equity indicator (ROE), while just four
cases (A, C, E and H) involved an increase in rel-
ative return on assets (ROA) (RPp > 0), i.e.
there was an improvement in profit efficiency
(see Charts 2 and 3).
In all cases of improved cost efficiency, this was
mainly the result of a fall in the staff cost and
involved M&As among small and medium-sized
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0424
26 M&As case studies carried out in the US showed that approx-
imately half of any improvement in efficiency becomes evident
after a period of one year, and all of the improvement is achieved
within three years (see Rhoades, 1998).
banks (1994-1997: Groups 1 and 2), while M&As
which involved larger banks (Groups 3 and 4)
resulted in a deterioration in cost efficiency. As for
profit efficiency, it has been observed that, of the
6 cases where this improved, cost contributed to
the improvement in only 2 cases, (C and G), while
in the other cases (A, E, F and H) it was factors
other than cost which were behind the improve-
ment, namely the differentiation of services pro-
vided by banks, not only to depositors but also to
borrowers, and improved productivity.
4.2 Correlation between size of bank and
economies of scale
In order to ascertain the existence of economies of
scale and the extent to which they are exploited
through M&As, the correlation between the size of
banks and their operating cost is examined for the
period before and after the M&As, i.e. the periods
1994-1997 and 2000-2002.27 Table 2 and Chart 4B
show that, in the period 1994-1997, operating
expenses as a percentage of total income fall from
Group 1 to Group 3 and rise from Group 3 to
Group 4. In particular, operating expenses as a
percentage of income fall from 79.9% in Group 1
to 73.6% in Group 2 and 56% in Group 3.
Thereafter, they increase to 66.8% in Group 4. This
means that, in this period, economies of scale
appear to exist to the extent that the size of a bank
grows from small (Group 1) to medium (Group 3).
By contrast, large banks (Group 4) are charac-
terised by negative economies of scale.
This behaviour of cost in relation to the size of
Greek banks during the period under examination
was similar to that which was observed in the
case of other European banks (see Table 3, Chart
4B and footnote 13). Of course, the average size
of European banks which corresponds to the low-
est cost is approximately seven times that of
Greek banks, reflecting the relative size of the two
banking markets. Table 2 and Chart 4C also indi-
cate that Greek banks’ return on equity rises as
we move to Group 3, but falls sharply in Group 4,
thereby confirming the conclusions noted in con-
nection with the correlation between cost and the
size of the bank.
The relationship between size and cost in Greek
commercial banks in the period 2000-2002 is pre-
sented in Table 4 and Chart 4B. In particular,
operating expenses show a continued fall at an
increasing rate between Group 2 and Group 4.
This fact highlights the existence of economies of
scale throughout the whole size range of Greek
banks during this period, in contrast with the pre-
vious period 1994-1997, when, as already men-
tioned, Group 4 presented negative economies of
scale.28 This result is attributed basically to M&As
which, in effect, took place in the period after
1997, although it cannot be ruled out that other
factors may have played a role, such as the intro-
The effect of mergers and acquisitions on bank efficiency in Greece
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27 As noted in Section 2, to pinpoint and evaluate economies of
scale, it is essential to assess the cost of banks which use the opti-
mum combination of productive factors and how this cost
changes with the size of the banks. Given that this presupposes
an estimation of cost functions, the results of any analysis based
on indicators must be considered as indicative only. For a similar
assessment of economies of scale using indicators, see Group of
Ten (2001).
28 Voloudakis (2002) uses labour, assets and total productivity
indicators (the weighted total of the other two indicators), which
he calculates for the year 1999 by category of bank size in order
to investigate the existence of economies of scale. He concludes
that small to medium-sized banks enjoy economies of scale,
whereas, by, contrast, medium-sized to large banks experience
negative economies of scale. His results are not confirmed in this
paper as far as labour productivity is concerned, but are con-
firmed for assets productivity (see Tables 5 and 6 and Chart 1).
Note, however, that in this study labour productivity is defined as
the ratio of total gross income at constant prices to the number of
staff employed by banks, while Voloudakis uses total gross
income at current prices to calculate the indicator. 
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duction of new technology, increased bank liquid-
ity due to harmonisation of reserve requirements
in Greece with the system in force in the
Eurosystem, etc.
By comparing the two periods 1994-1997 and
2000-2002 (see Chart 4), it can be seen that in the
first period the larger banks managed through
successful M&As to exploit existing economies of
scale. In addition, by increasing in size, they man-
aged to use technologies which contributed to
cost reduction and were also able to spread total
fixed cost over a larger base and thus to reduce
average cost and increase profitability. It should
be remembered that these results are not due to
the growth in the Greek banking market which
followed the general increase in economic activity
of the country during the period under examina-
tion, as the banks’ size brackets, as noted above,
have been adjusted in line with the growth rate of
nominal GDP. A feature of cost developments is
the fact that operating expenses as a percentage
of total income in Group 4 fell by 9 percentage
points, whereas in Groups 2 and 3 rose by 17 and
20 percentage points respectively. Return on
equity rose as banks increased their total assets.
Reflecting the negative relationship between cost
and bank size, return on equity rose from almost
zero in Group 2 to 7% in Group 3 and more than
doubled to 17% in Group 4.
5. Conclusions
M&As in Greece began to take place in the second
half of the 1990s in view of the country’s acces-
sion into the European Monetary Union and the
trend towards consolidation of financial institu-
tions internationally against the backdrop of
increasing integration of financial markets. This
paper has examined the M&As which occurred in
the banking sector, the main reasons behind
them, and their effect on bank efficiency and the
scale of banks’ operations. We hope that the
results of this study will facilitate understanding of
developments in the banking market in recent
years, assessing the impact of M&As and fore-
casting future trends.
To minimise the effect of any weaknesses inher-
ent in the use of financial indicators to analyse
M&As and also to ensure that safer conclusions
can be drawn, three methods have been used to
assess the impact of M&As on the cost and profit
efficiency of Greek commercial banks. In addition,
the existence of economies of scale and the mar-
gins which may exist in exploiting them have been
looked at.
In the period 1994-1997, Greek banks showed
substantial scope for improvement in their cost
and profit efficiency. The margins for improve-
ment in this area were greater for small and large
banks. These margins concerned not only cost but
also income. It should be noted that this period
was marked by a fall in the level of concentration,
and thus a rise in the level of competition in the
banking market. The picture Greek banks show
during the period under examination is similar to
the picture for European banks, although the lat-
ter exhibited less margin for improvement in
profit efficiency, profits being chiefly derived from
income. By using various bank performance indi-
cators (according to the size of the banks) and
looking at their dispersion, it becomes clear that
the M&As which took place in Greece up until
2000 led to an improvement in cost efficiency
and, in particular, in profit efficiency for the new
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banks which came into existence as a result of
these M&As during the period 2000-2002. Labour
productivity contributed positively to this devel-
opment.
These results are also confirmed by a comparison
of the banks’ performance with that of the best
performer. Indeed, in the period before the
M&As, Greek banks as a whole suffered from rel-
atively low cost efficiency. This was mainly due to
the number of staff employed rather than to salary
levels. They were also characterised by low levels
of profit efficiency, reflecting both cost and labour
productivity. Also, relative profit efficiency
showed considerable improvement when the
M&A involved small to medium-sized banks, and
deterioration when they involved medium-sized
to large banks. This reflects exclusively the corre-
sponding relationship between cost and size. The
M&As which took place had a positive effect on
the cost and profit efficiency of the banks which
resulted from them, by capitalising on the existing
margins for improvement. However, it appears
that scope exists for further improvement in effi-
ciency, although the concentration of the banking
system increased during the period 2000-2002.
Out of the individual cases of M&As examined
(eight in total), the majority  led to improved profit
efficiency, while three led to improved cost effi-
ciency. However, when the return on equity was
used as the profitability indicator, an improve-
ment in both cost and profit efficiency was
recorded in only two cases of merger, and in only
one case when the return on assets was used as
the indicator. Note that the two cases where
improvement in both cost and profit efficiency is
observed involve small banks.
Regarding economies of scale, it can be seen that,
before the M&As, economies of scale were found
in small to medium-sized banks, with large banks
experiencing negative economies of scale. The
M&As which took place are estimated to have led
banks which merged to exploit such economies.
The findings of this study agree substantially
with similar findings from research concerning
the banking sector in EU countries and the US
which covers the second half of the 1990s.
Indeed, if account is taken of the difference in
average size between Greek and European (or
American) banks, certain benefits derived from
M&As in terms of cost efficiency and, mainly,
profit efficiency become evident. It can also be
seen that the most successful M&As involved
small-scale banks. Also, it appears that an
important motivation for the M&As which took
place was the desire to take advantage of
economies of scale.
Finally, as far as the improved profit efficiency
observed in the period 2000-2002 is concerned, it
is felt that the extent to which this improvement
may have been influenced by the increased level
of bank concentration during this period should
be the subject of further research.
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APPENDIX
1. Definition of indicators
The definition of the financial indicators used for
this research is as follows:
– Return on equity (ROE): the ratio of net profits
before tax to average equity (%).
– Return on assets (ROA): the ratio of net profits
before tax to average assets (%).
– Labour productivity (million drachmas/number
employed): the ratio of total gross income,
deflated by the consumer price index (CPI), to the
number of employees.
– Average salary at constant prices (million
drachmas/number employed): the ratio of staff
cost, deflated by the consumer price index (CPI),
to the number of employees.
– Productivity of capital: the ratio of total gross
income to total non-labour cost.
– Total assets productivity: the ratio of total gross
income to total assets (%).
– Profit margin: the ratio of net profits, before
tax and provisions, to total cost (%).
2. Sources of statistical data
– Balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of
commercial banks, drawn up according to the
Banking Sector Chart of Accounts.
– Group of Ten (2001) for European banks and
– NSSG (for data on GDP and the CPI).
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Monetary system
and macroeconomic
policy in Greece:
1833-2003*
Sophia M. Lazaretou
Bank of Greece
Economic Research Department
1. Introduction
Ever since the time of the Renaissance, i.e. since
the birth of the national civil state in today’s
sense, the army and the currency have been the
twin pillars of each state entity. As a result, a cur-
rency is not simply one of the key pillars of the
economic system but also a national symbol. An
economy built on firm foundations and demon-
strating a sound macroeconomic performance is
sure to achieve and maintain monetary stability.
Monetary stability helps goods and services mar-
kets, and above all the financial system, to func-
tion smoothly, leading ultimately to economic
growth. In the past, many countries sought to tie
their currency to a precious metal or peg it to the
currency of the strongest economy in their geo-
graphical region (see DeCecco, 1996, Bordo and
Jonung, 2000). Their willingness to join a “mone-
tary stability club” was dictated by the need,
firstly, to reduce exchange rate fluctuations in
commercial transactions among themselves, sec-
ondly, to reduce credit risks and, thirdly, to
ensure credibility in pursuing anti-inflationary
policies (see Bordo, Edelstein and Rockoff, 1999,
Flandreau and Maurel, 2001, Meissner, 2002).
This article describes the economic development
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of the modern Greek state and the macroeco-
nomic policy pursued from the perspective of
monetary and fiscal developments. Greece’s
monetary system was, quite naturally, affected by
international monetary developments. Mainly,
however, it was affected by fiscal disturbances,
which in turn were caused by wartime expendi-
tures to defend the country at times of global or
local armed conflict, and also by the gradual
widening of the country’s geographical borders
and increased population following the addition
of new territories and the influx of refugees from
Asia Minor.
The article is organised as follows: The first part
(Sections 2-6) examines fiscal and monetary
developments in the period before World War I
(WWI). At the time of the traditional gold standard,
the Greek State suffered from a weak fiscal system
and monetary isolation. It was not until 1910 that
Greece first pursued consistently a gold standard
policy, just four years before the international gold
standard collapsed. The second part (Section 7)
deals with the inter-war period, a time of transfor-
mation for Greek society and its economy.
Following international practice, Greece set up an
independent central bank and pegged its currency
to sterling, a gold-based currency. The third part
(Section 8) looks at the collapse of the real and
monetary sectors of the Greek economy during
the Occupation period in World War II (WWII) and
at efforts made towards the monetary restructur-
ing of the country. The fourth part (Section 9)
analyses Greece’s miracle growth during the
Bretton Woods period. The fifth part (Section 10)
examines the policy on the sliding depreciation of
the drachma and the halt in the growth of the
economy after 1974, while the final part (Section
11) deals with the path towards EMU.1
2. The New State and its legal tender
In 1827, when Ioannis Kapodistrias was elected
first Governor of the Greek State,2 financial trans-
actions were mainly carried out using Turkish and
foreign currency such as the Spanish distilo. There
was no Greek currency until 1829. At the same
time, the international monetary system was
based on the bimetallic system of France. The
French monetary authorities were ready to
exchange gold for silver at a rate of 15.5 parts of
silver to 1 part of gold. There was no limit to the
amount that could be exchanged, as they held
large reserves in both metals. Thus, this rate
became the international rate, simultaneously sta-
bilising the relative prices of gold and silver and
the parities of all currencies that were either on a
gold or on a silver standard. In Europe, Great
Britain alone had maintained a de jure gold stan-
dard since 1821, when the Bank of England had
been obliged by law to redeem banknotes for gold
coins, and a de facto gold standard since 1717,
when the Royal Mint set the price of silver at a
much lower level than its international market
price, resulting in the withdrawal of silver coins
from circulation. By contrast, the United States
maintained a silver standard, and the US Mint val-
ued silver at a higher rate (15 to 1) compared with
its international rate.
In Greece, a national monetary system was
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1 During the Lisbon Summit in June 2000, ECOFIN decided on
Greece’s acceptance as a member of the euro area as of 1st
January 2001. In January 2002, euro notes and coins began to
circulate, replacing the national currencies in the euro area.
2 The Greek State included the Peloponnese, Mainland Greece,
the Cyclades, Euboea and the Sporades Islands, with a total of
some 800,000 inhabitants. It was recognised as an independent
state by the London Protocol of 1830.
established for the first time in 1829 and was
based on silver. The monetary unit was the
phoenix, the first Greek currency.3 However, just
two years later the government was forced to
suspend convertibility of the currency and issue
banknotes in order to finance the increased bud-
get deficits.
With the accession of Otto to the throne, the mon-
etary system changed. In February 1833, bimet-
allism was introduced as a new monetary standard
and the drachma as the new legal tender. As men-
tioned in the decree of 8th February 1833 (re:
“Amendments to the monetary system”), one of
the main reasons behind the monetary reform was
the need to replace the underweight phoenix with
the heavier drachma. The drachma was a silver
coin weighing 4.029 grammes of pure silver. It
was also planned to mint gold coins. The gold
twenty-drachma coin (the Ottonian) weighed
5.199 grammes, i.e. 0.25994 grammes of pure
gold per drachma. Therefore, the gold content of
the gold drachma was 15.5 times less than the sil-
ver content of the silver drachma and, as a result,
the ratio of the two metals matched the interna-
tional ratio, i.e. 1:15.5
Given the limited quantity of drachmas in circula-
tion,4 foreign coins were allowed by law to circu-
late freely in order to facilitate transactions.5 Most
of these coins were damaged, with a denomina-
tion much higher than their purchasing value. The
“bad” currency quickly displaced the silver
drachma. Holders of foreign coins exchanged
them for drachmas, which they then melted down
for the precious metal. Thus, the drachma soon
became the “ideal currency,” which was used as
an “accounting unit for foreign currencies and
things of value.” (Kechagias, 1875, p. 8).
3. Fiscal difficulties and funding of economic
growth: the National Bank and the
exclusive privilege of issuing banknotes
Until the mid-19th century, the economy of
Greece was based on agriculture, a sector which
had been strengthened after the confiscation of
Ottoman assets. The main forms of economic
activity were trade, shipping and the handicrafts.
Income from shipping and the resettlement in
Greece of rich Greek expatriates and Philhellenes
from abroad were the only sources of capital
inflow. Moreover, recourse to foreign borrowing
to secure funds was impossible. The inability to
repay the foreign loans of 1824-25 and 1832 dam-
aged the country’s creditworthiness and for a long
time deprived Greece of access to European
money markets.6
Monetary system and macroeconomic policy in Greece: 1833-2003
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3 A monetary system had been proposed from mid-1828. The
phoenix was introduced as the official currency one year later, in
July 1829 (see Kougeas, 1992, Kokkinakis, 1999).
4 Coins made of precious metals were only minted during the
first three years of Otto’s reign. Only a very small number of gold
coins were minted, though considerably more silver ones were
produced. The foreign loan granted in 1832 was one of the factors
behind the efforts to establish a national monetary system.
However, the Greek State’s later paucity of reserves made it
impossible for it to continue minting coins made of precious met-
als. Due to the complete absence of silver drachmas, large num-
bers of coins were minted using copper almost every year to allow
transactions to be carried out (see Stassinopoulos, 2000).
5 29 silver and 16 gold coins. See the decree of 8th February 1833
re: “The exchange rate of foreign currencies against the new
Greek currency”.
6 In 1824, the country borrowed 472 thousand pounds sterling
from the London Stock Exchange, and a further loan of 1.1 million
pounds sterling followed in 1825. Even though the loans were
secured to continue the Struggle for Independence, the money
borrowed was eventually spent on funding the civil war of 1824-
1825, or was squandered abroad or embezzled by foreign specu-
lators. See Gervinus (1863), Gennadios (1878), Andreades (1904).
In 1826, repayment of the debts was suspended. In 1832, a loan
of 60 million drachmas was secured, with the Great Powers stand-
ing as guarantors. The purpose of the loan was to enable Greece
to introduce bimetallism. The Greek government suspended
repayment of the loan in 1843.
The country’s isolation from the European money
markets and the urgent need to find funds
demonstrated the necessity of a national banking
institution. The new financial institution would
not only help to fund the State, but also offer
immediate financial assistance to restructure agri-
culture, trade and industry.7 The founding of the
National Bank of Greece (NBG) in 1841 was the
result of protracted negotiations between Otto’s
government and foreign capital creditors. The
operation of the bank played a decisive role in
steering market interest rates. The interest rate on
mortgages fell to 10%, from a minimum of 12%
(which was the official rate), and a maximum of
30-40% (which was the market rate, particularly
in the provinces).
The new bank was involved in two main opera-
tions, issuing and commerce. The bank had the
exclusive privilege of issuing “banknotes payable
to the bearer upon request,” which were fully
and readily convertible into metallic coins in cir-
culation. At the same time, it accepted private
deposits in banknotes or metallic coins and pro-
vided loans to individuals and the State. It held
reserves in precious metals (gold and/or silver)
and interest-bearing deposits in foreign exchange
with central banks abroad which were directly
convertible into metal.8 In other words, the Natio-
nal Bank acted as a “general banking services”
institution and, de facto, as the central issuing
bank.
The State contributed to the National Bank’s
equity capital and exercised control over its activ-
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7 For the role of the National Bank in monetising the Greek
economy, see Thomadakis (1985).
8 For a detailed description of the operations of the National
Bank, see Valaoritis (1902).
ities via a commissioner.9 In exchange for the
State’s participation and control, the bank was
granted the privilege of issuing banknotes, a par-
ticularly profitable process.
Throughout the duration of Otto’s reign, very few
loans were granted by the National Bank to the
State, as Otto pursued a tight expenditure policy
in an effort to balance the budget (see Chart 1).
However, after the fall of the Bavarian dynasty at
the beginning of the 1860s, the State began to
become overindebted to the NBG (see Chart 2).
At a time when the Greek State was unable to
raise funds from international capital markets,
borrowing from the National Bank was the usual
practice to cover public expenditures. The gov-
ernment required increasingly large advances,
while the National Bank charged an interest rate
that was more than double the lending rates pro-
vided by the international markets, i.e. 7%-8%
compared with 2.5%-4.5%. Of course, loans from
the National Bank to the State were not without
warranty. The bank’s branches were given the
role by the government of collecting various types
of public revenues, and the money collected was
used to service public debt.
Therefore, with an interest income rate of 7%-8%
on government loans, the National Bank was in a
position to pay a rate of around 3%-5% on time
deposits, much higher than the international
rates. The profit margin was considerable. Until
Monetary system and macroeconomic policy in Greece: 1833-2003
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9 The National Bank had been established as a “private limited
company” (articles 1 and 28 of its statute). The State owned 1,000
shares out of a total of 5,000. However, after 1870, the State’s
role was limited solely to the presence in the bank of a state
commissioner. Following the sell-off of its shares, the State ceased
to be a shareholder in the bank.
the end of the 1880s, the bank enjoyed high
yields from its short-term lending, around 7%-8%
for discounts and 6%-9% for secured loans or
credit lines. Yields on long-term loans (mortgage-
backed loans or mortgage-backed credit lines)
were also high, at 8%-10%. The bank offered
depositors yields of around 5.5%-6% (savings
deposits) and 3%-5% (time deposits). These rates
were much lower than the yield on its loans, but
still much higher than rates on international mar-
kets. In this way, the bank was able to attract
funds both from the domestic and the foreign
market.
4. The search for an international monetary
refuge
In 19th century Europe, two nations were locked
in a struggle for political and economic leader-
ship: Great Britain and France. France had
adopted bimetallism, and set the parity of gold
and silver at 1:15.5 in 1803. This rate remained
stable until the beginning of WW1. Napoleon’s
dominance in Europe established the French franc
as an international currency in the continent and
underlined the need to adopt the French bimetal-
lic system. Even after the Napoleonic years,
France was for her neighbours the main importer
of their goods and their major creditor.10
The major discoveries of gold during the 1850s
and 1860s caused its market price to fall in rela-
tion to the price of silver. One consequence of
this was an inflow of gold and an outflow of silver,
resulting in silver coins being hoarded. The con-
sequent shortage of silver coins caused significant
difficulties in transactions. Thus, in 1865, four
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0438
Member countries Small number of countries with close geographical, historical and commercial links. 
Aims To establish uniform rules concerning the precious metal content of coins and to tackle fluctuations in the relative
price of the two precious metals, gold/silver. 
National currencies Parallel circulation of all the national currencies for domestic transactions. The monetary authorities of each
member were required to issue gold and silver coins of a purity and weight equal to a parity of 1:15.5.
French franc Used as the nominal anchor for the other currencies of the Union. International reserve currency.
Money supply There was neither a central monetary authority nor any agreement as to the number of notes issued by each
member. Control of the money supply remained with each of the national monetary authorities. 
Fiscal policy No prudent policy was set.
Change in standard 1874-1876 and 1878. Collapse of bimetallism and transition to the gold standard. Threat of inflation due to the fall
in the market price of silver. Limitations on the issue of silver currency. In 1878, the final suspension of minting
silver coins was agreed. 
Reason for change Devaluation of silver. Failure to co-ordinate national monetary policies and to exercise prudent fiscal policies.
Final year of existence De facto: 1914 (WWI).
T a b l e  1
Latin Monetary Union (LMU): special features
1865Year of establishment
10 The gold standard literature contains abundant historical and
empirical evidence pointing to Great Britain’s and sterling’s dom-
inant position at the time of the gold standard, and to the domi-
nance of France during the Latin Monetary Union (LMU). See,
e.g., Kindleberger (1993), Eichengreen (1985, 1990), Bordo and
Kydland (1995) and Bordo and Rockoff (1996).
countries, France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland,
agreed to cooperate and maintain the bimetallic
system. In Paris on 23rd December, they estab-
lished the Latin Monetary Union (LMU).11 The
ratio of 1:15.5 was set as the official parity rate
between the two metals, while the French franc
became the common monetary unit (see Tables
1 and 2).
In Greece, the first improvement in the domestic
economy can be dated to after the middle of the
19th century. The contribution of Greek communi-
ties abroad, one of the strongest forces in the
international economy at the time, was decisive
for the economic development of the country.
Greek shipping and trade witnessed rapid growth.
Chart 3 shows the development over time of per
capita income in Greece and its main compo-
nents. As can be seen, despite the significant
increase in the size of the population owing to
the gradual territorial enlargement of the country,
per capita income shows an upward trend in the
long run, mainly as a result of an increase in
GDP.
In the middle of the 1860s, Spain abandoned the
monetary system based on the distilo. At that
time, international trade transactions were made
in currency that was directly convertible into pre-
cious metal at a fixed rate, and for this reason
Greece needed to adopt an internationally
accepted monetary system. Under the “Law on
Currency” (April 1867), Greece signed up to the
LMU agreement, accepting the principle of bimet-
allism and pegging the gold drachma to the gold
French franc (rate 1:1). Minting the new drach-
mas was permitted as soon as the law came into
force. The new system was set to come into oper-
ation on 1st January 1869. However, the imposi-
tion of fiat money12 in December 1868, at a time
when conflict in Crete was looming and an insuf-
ficient number of the new drachmas had been
issued, forced the government to postpone the
Monetary system and macroeconomic policy in Greece: 1833-2003
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T a b l e  2
Member-countries of the LMU
France Founder member. In 1803, France set a fixed rate of 1:15.5 for gold to silver, laying the grounds for a stable
monetary system. It consistently adhered to the convertibility rule except on two occasions, once in 1848-50 (acute
social and political crisis) and once in 1870-78 (Franco-Prussian War). In 1865, France was at the forefront of efforts
to establish the LMU. In 1878, it adopted the gold standard. 
Italy Founder member. In 1862, Italy adopted bimetallism even though its monetary system was de facto a gold standard
one. However, in 1866, it suspended convertibility until 1884. In 1894, the country returned to a fiat money
standard and did not adopt fixed exchange rates until 1927.
Belgium Founder member. Belgium adopted bimetallism in 1832 (except for a brief episode in 1848). In 1878, it adopted
the gold standard and adhered to it until 1914.
Switzerland Founder member. Switzerland adopted bimetallism in 1850. In 1878, it turned to the gold standard, to which it
adhered until 1914.
Greece Signed the LMU agreement in 1867. Greece did not adopt a form of gold – French franc standard – until 1910, with
the exception of one unsuccessful effort to do so in 1885.
11 For the history of monetary unions and in particular the LMU,
see Redish (1993), Flandreau (1993), DeCecco (1996), Bordo and
Jonung (2000) and Fergusson (2000).
12 Fiat money, i.e. the circulation of currency (banknotes and
coins) which could not be exchanged for precious metals. In other
words, the central issuing bank was no longer obliged to maintain
a fixed ratio of reserves to precious metals and/or a fixed ratio of
gold-based foreign exchange to money in circulation.
implementation of the new system. Convertibility
was restored in 1870 once hostilities had ceased.
However, the delay in preparing for the adoption
of the new system, together with further armed
conflicts, forced the Greek monetary authorities
to suspend convertibility of the drachma perma-
nently.13 In the meantime, international monetary
conditions changed, with the collapse of bimet-
allism and the adoption of the gold standard by all
LMU countries.
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13 For an analysis of the historical events concerning the enforce-
ment and suspension of the metallic convertibility of the drachma,
see Lazaretou (1993, 1996) and Dritsas (1999).
5. Fiscal inadequacy and monetary isolation
Systematic attempts to industrialise the country
can be dated to the last quarter of the 19th cen-
tury. The economic policy of the Trikoupis gov-
ernments placed emphasis on the development
of the private sector and the introduction of new
technology into the production process, with
parallel attempts to free the economy from sti-
fling state control. It was at this time that the
first efforts were made to create infrastructure,
with roads being built, ports renovated, Lake
Kopaida drained and filled in, the Lavrio mines
brought into operation, the Corinth Canal con-
structed and the railway network developed.
These projects helped both to modernise the
country and to restructure the economy of the
new regions of Thessaly and parts of Epirus,
which had been transferred to the Greek State
in 1881. Increased agricultural production, chiefly
involving exportable goods, the introduction of
industry and the rapid growth of credit and
banks were the main features of the period.
Improved public transport, increased popula-
tion, borrowing from the National Bank and
abroad (after 1879) and economic euphoria in
Western Europe were all determinant factors of
the growth of the domestic economy.
Chart 4 depicts output fluctuations (GDP) as a
result of both temporary and permanent “distur-
bances”. The long-term trend in the output
growth reflects the permanent “disturbances”
associated, among other things, with technologi-
cal advances. The cyclical component reflects
temporary “disturbances” stemming from the
total demand side. As is evident in the chart, the
upward trend in output intensified during the
1880s and the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, a reflection of the benefits accruing from the
technological advances which marked this period
(railways, infrastructure works).
Despite large-scale public spending, governments
did not make any parallel efforts to reform the
budgets. Prior to WWI, taxes were imposed on
income from agriculture, building work, property
and profits from trade. Income from employment
was not taxed, nor was taxation imposed on per-
sonal income. Citizens were taxed on the basis of
objective criteria set by the government, and not
on the basis of their ability to pay taxes. The first
systematic attempt to reform the tax system was
made in 1919 with the introduction of tax on per-
sonal income. The lack of a uniform tax system for
all regions of the country, together with the low
tax rates, made the cost of collecting taxes high
and led to a loss of revenues.14
The successful composition of 1878 concerning
the foreign loans of 1824-1825 rebuilt Greece’s
creditworthiness. As a result, Greek government
bonds once again became negotiable on the
London Stock Exchange, and gold began to flow
into Greece (see Chart 5).15 However, only a small
part of the money borrowed was eventually used
to fund production. Most of the money was used
Monetary system and macroeconomic policy in Greece: 1833-2003
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14 For a detailed description of the tax system, see Angelopoulos
(1933) and Andreades (1916).
15 Until the final composition of 1878-79 with foreign creditors,
international money markets in London and Paris were closed to
Greece. To cover its emergency borrowing requirements, the
Greek State used the National Bank’s credit facilities. The latter
offered short-term advances with high insurance premiums to off-
set the risk. As a result, the bank’s interest rate on the loans was
between one and two percentage points higher than the interna-
tional interest rate.
to cover the State’s budget deficit and to pay off
the accumulated domestic debt.
In order for the country to participate in the LMU
from January 1885, it was essential to increase the
National Bank’s metal reserves, to carry out the
currency reform of 188216 and to reduce fiscal
deficits. However, the failure to control fiscal
deficits owing to the high cost of servicing debts
and the economic crisis which had started as a
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16 To achieve a rate of 1:1 between the drachma and the French
franc, the new drachma was designated as a currency unit. The
exchange rate of the new drachma to the old one was the equiv-
alent of 0.89 new drachmas for the debts owed by the State and
the private sector, and 0.90 for taxes, pensions, salaries and remit-
tances. However, the rate was 1:1 for everyday retail trade trans-
actions, which led to a rise in the price of basic goods.
commercial crisis at the end of 1884 threatened
the viability of maintaining fixed exchange rates.
Thus, Greece’s participation as a full member of
the LMU lasted just nine months and ended in
failure.
6. From State bankruptcy to monetary stability
Following the end of the 1884-85 economic crisis
and Greece’s successful negotiation of a large for-
eign loan in 1887, the country’s creditworthiness
on international money markets improved. From
1889 onwards, foreign creditors willingly pro-
vided long-term loans to the Greek government
with small or no guarantees and at a low interest
rate. Nevertheless, the cost of servicing domestic
public debt together with the high level of primary
expenditures, much of which was paid for by for-
eign borrowing and was therefore a burden on the
budget in the coming years, perpetuated fiscal
deficits. As a result, the country for a long period
maintained a fiat money system.17
Chart 6 shows the path over time of banknote cir-
culation and its two main components: the gov-
ernment’s floating debt to the National Bank and
banknote circulation outside the financial system.
It should be noted that after 1886 there was an
increase in the government’s floating debt, indi-
cating the use of inflation as a financing instru-
ment of public borrowing requirements. Chart 7
plots the standard deviation of the monthly
changes in the National Bank’s total reserves and
total banknotes in circulation. It is worth noting
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and maintaining fixed exchange rates, see Barro (1987), Grilli
(1989), Bordo and White (1991) and Giovannini (1993). For the
Greek case, see Lazaretou (1995a) and Alogoskoufis and
Lazaretou (2002).
that, in periods of currency inconvertibility,18
divergent increases in banknote circulation were
accompanied by divergent falls in reserves.
In 1890, the country’s creditworthiness began to
suffer. The impending bankruptcy of Portugal in
Europe and Argentina in South America, com-
bined with the American dollar crisis, unnerved
foreign creditors, who had previously been grant-
ing generous unsecured loans to developing
countries at low interest rates. In December 1893,
the Trikoupis government unilaterally suspended
the repayment of foreign loans. Negotiations with
foreign lenders provided for the permanent pres-
ence of foreign experts in Greece to monitor eco-
nomic policy and tax collection and management
systems. Following defeat in the war between
Greece and Turkey in 1897, Greece was obliged
to accept the presence of the International
Committee for Greek Debt Management in
February 1898. This marked the start of a decade
of fiscal consolidation and monetary austerity.
However, the prudent regime imposed by the
International Committee proved to be short-lived.
The policy of setting strict limits on the issue of fiat
money was based on the assessment that there
was a “currency plethora” which needed to be
restrained.19 The inflexibility thus imposed on bank-
note circulation soon led to an excessive money
demand. At the same time, the rapid decline in
inflation caused strong revaluation pressures on
the drachma, which had negative repercussions on
the international competitiveness of the Greek
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economy (see Chart 8).20 The rise in the drachma
was particularly pronounced during the months
when agricultural produce was being exported. The
currency appreciation was made greater by the
inflow of gold, owing to the sharp rise in invisible
transfers during this period.21 The threat of a credit
squeeze was now apparent. The upward march of
lending rates during the first decade of the 20th cen-
tury is an indication of excess demand rather than
of excess money supply. In particular, the National
Bank’s discount rate varied between 5.5% and 7%,
just one percentage point lower than the corre-
sponding rate during the period of high inflation.
Other commercial banks’ interest rates were much
higher (8%-10%). The National Bank’s interest rate
on mortgage-backed loans was 7% in the Athens
area, and still higher away from the capital.
In order to avert inflationary pressures on the
drachma and to keep its exchange rate fixed at its
par value, the National Bank was given a legal
right22 to exchange drachmas for French francs or
gold without limit at the official parity of 1:1
(Valaoritis, 1911). More specifically, the National
Bank could purchase gold at par value and foreign
exchange at the rate of 1.005 drs./French franc,
and sell gold at the rate of 1.001 drs./French franc
and foreign exchange at the rate of 1.0055
drs./French franc. The gold points, which deter-
mined the fluctuation limits for the exchange rate
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rose by 4% within a year. In 1906, the annual rate of revaluation
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it was dealt with, see Demathas, Kalafatis and Sakellaropoulos
(1991). See also Tragakis (2001).
21 The first great wave of emigration to America occurred at the
end of the 1890s. The number of Greeks who left the country to
live abroad rose dramatically in the first decade of the 20th cen-
tury.
22 Law 3642 of 19th March 1910. For a more detailed description
of the law, see Damiris (1920), Farmakidis (1921) and Bank of
Greece (1978). For a critical analysis of how the law operated, see
Alogokoufis and Lazaretou (2002, ch. 5).
of the currency and were determined by the cost
of transferring gold from country to country, were
set at ±0.005 drachmas. This measure made it
possible to build up gold reserves, to curb any
trend towards revaluation of the currency above
its par value and to limit deflationary pressures on
the domestic economy. The monetary reform of
1910 led the country into the LMU and estab-
lished a form of French franc-gold standard.
In the years leading up to WWI, the Greek eco-
nomy witnessed very rapid growth (see Chart 4).
Domestic production and export trade rose sub-
stantially and the shipping industry, which
expanded its activities into transit trade for third
party countries, also made advances. The gradual
restoration of public confidence in the currency
led to a remarkable inflow of private capital, con-
siderably enhanced by remittances from Greek
emigrants abroad, shipping profits and increased
exports. Greater economic activity brought with it
an increase in the number of financial transactions
and led to the establishment of powerful new
credit institutions. The banking system was
marked primarily by intense oligopoly and the lack
of specialised banking organisations.23 The coun-
try’s reputation as a borrower improved consider-
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ably, resulting not only in the inflow of low-inter-
est foreign loans, but also in the trading of govern-
ment bonds on the Greek money market. One
sign of the country’s greater solvency was the suc-
cess of efforts to secure foreign loans in wartime,
which were used to cover military expenditures
incurred as a result of the Balkan Wars.24
However, the drachma’s “golden era” only lasted
from 1910 to 1914, although Greece did maintain
a fixed exchange rate until the end of the decade.
The outbreak of WWI brought an abrupt end to
peace in Europe. The traditional gold standard col-
lapsed after approximately forty years of success-
ful operation. In the summer of 1914, France,
Germany, Russia and Austro-Hungary suspended
their currencies’ convertibility into gold and
imposed controls on gold exports. High wartime
expenditures made money creation unavoidable
as a means of financing. As a result, every
European government, either de facto or de jure,
went on to abolish convertibility and allowed the
issue of paper money. The world economy
entered a phase of intense monetary and
exchange rate crisis and general commercial mis-
trust which lasted until the end of WWII.
Greece adopted a temporarily neutral position
until siding with the Entente Powers in June 1917.
During the period of neutrality, an inflow of for-
eign exchange, chiefly from shipping and remit-
tances from Greek emigrants in America, allowed
exchange rates to remain fixed at a time of war.
Thus, in 1915, the drachma abandoned the under-
valued French franc and was pegged firstly to ster-
ling and later to the dollar. After 1914, as Chart 9
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shows, wartime monetary expansion did not put
any pressure on the drachma’s nominal exchange
rate, chiefly because all belligerent countries had
imposed controls on gold outflows. However,
when Greece itself entered the war, the high cost
of military operations the country incurred during
the period from 1917 to 1919 obliged the govern-
ment to raise revenues exclusively by borrowing
from the NBG. The bank simply rolled the print-
ing press. This new money was not, however,
backed by foreign exchange (see Chart 10). In
August 1919, after the step fall in the level of for-
eign exchange reserves, the Greek monetary
authorities again reverted to floating rates.
7. The need to assign the issuing privilege
to an autonomous central bank
During WWI, all belligerent countries suffered
persistent inflationary pressures, which continued
after the end of the war. Monetary instability and
the extreme volatility of exchange rates in the
post-war period led to attempts to coordinate
economic policy among different countries and to
restore the gold standard. In practice, the inter-
war gold-exchange standard began to operate in
April 1925, when Britain returned to the gold
standard. The system collapsed in 1931 with the
devaluation of sterling and the withdrawal of
Britain owing to the fallout of the Great Stock
Market Crash of 1929.
The course of the Greek economy was once again
determined by wartime emergencies and impor-
tant territorial and demographic changes. Ten
years of war adventures (WWI, Asia Minor Cam-
paign) brought about serious economic and polit-
ical disruption.
The 1920s were marked by the restructuring of
Greece’s society and economy. Large infrastruc-
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ture projects were completed to increase agricul-
tural productivity, commerce increased tenfold
and industry grew quickly. High import tariffs
and the cheap supply of abundant labour follow-
ing the massive influx of refugees, together with
a huge drop in real wages because of high infla-
tion, were all determinant factors in the develop-
ment process. As Chart 3 shows, per capita
income, which had fallen during the war years,
began to increase again, reflecting the rapid rise
in GDP.
The 1920s were, however, a time of intense infla-
tionary pressures and large fluctuations in the
drachma exchange rate. Chart 9 plots the nominal
and the real exchange rate of the drachma against
sterling. The increased volatility of the nominal
rate of the drachma in the period leading up to
1923 was mirrored in the real exchange rate
volatility. Chart 11 shows the inflationary process.
During the war, the consumer price index showed
a strong upward trend, which became more pow-
erful at the beginning of 1920. The average annual
inflation rate from 1914 to 1919 was 25%. When
measured as the first differences of the logarithms
of the consumer price index, inflation reached
22.5% in 1915, 33.3% in 1916, 45.2% in 1917 and
37.3% in 1918. After a fall in inflationary pressures
in 1919 (–13.2%) and their subsequent resur-
gence in the following two years (13.3% and 6.2%
in 1920 and 1921 respectively), inflation rose
sharply to 66.4% in 1922 and 45.3% in 1923.
Between 1924 and 1926, prices continued to rise,
although the rate of increase slowed. In 1924,
inflation dropped to 8.5%. The average annual
inflation rate in the period 1920-27 stood at
22.2%.25
In 1927, a two-year stabilisation programme
came into operation. Its main features were the
devaluation of the drachma and the adoption of a
policy of monetary austerity and fiscal consolida-
tion (Tsouderos, 1928, Varvaressos, 1928, and
Zolotas, 1929). The programme was the most
important element behind the achievement of
monetary stability. In 1927, inflation was 7.4%,
while in the next two years it stabilised at a level
of around 1%. The downward trend in prices at
the end of the 1920s was reversed in 1932, with
prices moving upwards and inflation averaging
4.2% for the year.
Efforts to stabilise the situation were assisted by a
loan which the country negotiated with the
League of Nations acting as an intermediary.
Prerequisites for the loan were the founding of an
independent central bank and the restoration of
the drachma’s convertibility (see League of
Nations, 1927a, 1927b). The trend towards
restructuring the operations of central issuing
banks was a dominant one within the interna-
tional movement to reestablish the gold standard.
The existence in each country of a central issuing
bank, free from state intervention, whose duty
was to be the “banks’ bank” and “lender of last
resort” for the banking system, was considered to
be a safeguard for the protection of monetary sta-
bility and the smooth movement of capital inter-
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fact that the government took desperate measures to pay for its
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exchanged for Treasury bills. By implementing this measure, the
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1926, a second “forced loan” was issued: 75% of the value of the
banknotes continued to be legal tender and 25% was exchanged
for Treasury bills.
nationally.26 According to the central banking
orthodoxy at the time, an independent banking
institution named “The Bank of Greece” was estab-
lished, with the issuing department of the National
Bank splitting away and the remainder of the bank
becoming a fully commercial credit institution.
Greece returned to the gold standard on 14th
May 1928, the day that the Bank of Greece
began to operate and the de jure stabilisation of
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the drachma was achieved. Unlike 1910, the
link-up with sterling was not part of an effort to
achieve an ideal exchange rate. It took place,
rather, to ensure the de jure stabilisation of the
drachma at a level which was close to its market
exchange rate (375 drachmas, ±2.5 drachmas).
In this way, the deflationary disturbances of the
first decade of the century were averted. The
sole functions of the new bank were to ensure
the full and free convertibility of its banknotes
into gold-based foreign exchange at the officially
determined exchange rate, to determine the
lowest permitted level for the circulation of cur-
rency which could be converted into gold-based
foreign exchange and to limit fiscal deficit
financing.
The crisis in international monetary institutions in
September 1931 provoked serious monetary tur-
bulence in the country, resulting in Greece’s leav-
ing the gold-exchange standard seven months
later. However, the government’s insistence on
maintaining fixed exchange rates brought Greece
in June 1933 into a group of countries which had
retained a close link with gold (Gold Bloc). The
country stuck firmly with gold until September
1936, when the drachma joined the “Sterling
Area.”
With the imposition of the dictatorship on 4th
August 1936, strict exchange controls were intro-
duced. The bilateral commercial clearing system
was also introduced, which —in the atmosphere
of protectionism prevailing worldwide in the
1930s— sparked an increase in trade. Up until the
final days before the outbreak of WWII, the
drachma remained fixed against sterling with only
minor fluctuations, largely owing to the exchange
controls prevailing internationally.
8. WWII, Occupation and efforts towards
monetary reconstruction
At the time of its entry into the war, Greece had
succeeded in consolidating its domestic fiscal and
monetary system. Additionally, increased military
expenditures were covered by financial assistance
from Great Britain, which took the form of credit
facilities the Greek government could draw on
immediately and use as a “cover” to issue new
money. In this way, fiscal disturbances due to
emergency war spending did not undermine the
country’s monetary and exchange stability.
However, when the Occupation began, this all
changed completely. The Greek economy col-
lapsed, the country lost most of its productive
capacity and its currency ceased to function as
money.
The economy’s fixed capital, both in the primary
and secondary sectors and in the transport sector,
was almost entirely eliminated either by the hos-
tilities or on the orders of the Occupiers. The loss,
however, in human terms was also enormous, as
7% of the population perished. The destruction of
the country’s productive capacity caused a sub-
stantial drop in the national income. In 1941 the
national income, at 1939 prices, was just 1/3 of
what it had been in 1939.27
The economic policy pursued by the Occupiers
was equally catastrophic. It was based on the prin-
cipal of locally acquiring all the materials neces-
sary to supply the Occupying Forces. In addition,
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the Occupiers forced Greece to make an exces-
sively high contribution towards funding military
operations which were spreading throughout
Southeast Europe. Simultaneously, they took com-
plete control of the Bank of Greece28 and pro-
ceeded with a policy of uncontrolled mass-pro-
duction of paper money, thus financing their war
efforts by using inflation.
National production either went to satisfy the
needs of the enemy’s troops stationed in Greece
or was exported to countries which formed the
Axis Powers. The exports included basic foodstuffs
required by the local population, while imports
consisted of commodities needed to satisfy the
needs of the occupying forces. All this resulted in
acute problems in feeding the Greek population.
The Greek market faced stifling product shortages,
contributing to an explosion of inflationary expec-
tations and the emergence of hyperinflation at the
end of the Occupation (see Chart 12).29
As the population had absolutely no confidence in
the future purchasing power of drachma notes, it
turned en masse to hoarding the British gold
pound (“gold pull”), which took the place of
paper notes. While the drachma continued to be
“legal tender,” no one wished to hang on to
drachmas due to their rapid loss of value. Gold
was the main means of exchange and a store of
wealth, not only during the Occupation but also in
the early post-war period.
The Occupation resulted in the monetary and fis-
cal collapse of the country. By October 1944, the
final month of the Occupation, the price of the
British gold pound had risen by a factor of 1.6 bil-
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lion in comparison with its price in April 1941, the
cost of living index had risen by a factor of 2.3 bil-
lion and banknote circulation by a factor of 8.3
million. Inflation was soaring, while monetary and
political uncertainty hindered any upturn in eco-
nomic activity. Public revenues were minimal and
the tax collection system almost non-existent.
Public spending remained at very high levels
owing to increased spending on unemployment
benefit. Spending was paid for entirely by printing
new money, which further increased inflationary
pressures and resulted in the complete loss of
public confidence in the currency.
At the beginning of November 1944, as part of a
currency reform plan,30 the new drachma was
introduced, equivalent to 50 billion old drachmas,
in an attempt to restore confidence in the cur-
rency. Emphasis was also placed upon public
spending cutbacks, increasing tax rates and issuing
government securities. The effort, however, ended
in failure. The government did not ultimately suc-
ceed in curbing expenditure, imposing new taxes
and raising tax rates, nor did it manage to counter
effectively the problem of goods shortages.
Moreover, pre-war loans were not excluded from
the exchange of old drachmas for new drachmas,
resulting in the elimination of the domestic public
debt and a large proportion of private savings. In
addition, the political crisis acted as a further block
to efforts to achieve monetary stability.
A new stabilisation effort was made in mid-June
1945. The basic priorities of the programme were
to secure higher levels of foreign aid, to impose
controls on imports, wages and prices, to ban the
use of gold in money transactions and to devalue
the drachma against sterling and the dollar (Varva-
ressos, 1953). This effort, too, ended in failure.
Another monetary crisis struck the economy and
led to social turmoil and an intense political crisis.
With the signing of the Greek-British Agreement
for Economic and Technical Assistance in January
1946, a third effort towards stabilisation began.
The Greek government was obliged to restructure
its public finances radically, the drachma was
once again devalued and the March 1946 Law, re
“Establishment and Operation of a Currency Com-
mittee,” created a governing body, the Currency
Committee, which was based in the head office of
the Bank of Greece and which had the objective of
controlling the issue of new money, safeguarding
exchange rate stability and, above all, enforcing
strict guidelines concerning the supply of credit to
the economy.
This attempt to achieve stability was supported
substantially by increased foreign aid, particularly
from the Marshall Plan. However, the fall in infla-
tion was slow. The reason for this was the fact
that the Bank of Greece was trying to strike a bal-
ance between two conflicting goals: firstly, to sta-
bilise prices and, secondly, to supply credit effec-
tively in order to finance an upturn in economic
activity.
9. Greece’s economic miracle during the
Bretton Woods period
After the end of the Civil War, the Greek economy
entered a growth phase and took on a completely
new structure.31
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The monetary and credit policies pursued became
tighter and fiscal deficits began to decline. This
turnaround happened gradually but steadily
throughout the years from 1950 to 1952, and it
resulted in a dramatic fall in inflation and also in
the drachma’s successful participation in 1953 in
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.
The period up until the middle of the 1960s was
one of the rare periods in the country’s economic
history which was marked by very low inflation
(4% per year on average) and rapid economic
growth (approx. 7% per year on average). The
devaluation of the drachma against the US dollar
by 50% in 1953 (from 15,000 drachmas to 30,000
drachmas per dollar) made it possible to maintain
monetary stability and to ensure a high level of
competitiveness of Greek goods. The devaluation
was accompanied by measures to rehabilitate the
economy. These measures included a wide-rang-
ing liberalisation of Greek external trade, with the
relaxation of controls on trade flows and of many
administrative restrictions on the operation of the
markets. They also included limiting fiscal deficits
and reducing the rate of money growth. Moreover,
the monetary reform of May 1954 introduced a
new drachma, (equivalent to 1,000 old drachmas).
The decision to cut three zeros from all monetary
values ushered in a new period of low inflation and
restored public confidence in the currency.
Greek economic policy successfully concentrated
on the target of achieving monetary stability. The 
1 dollar = 30 drachmas exchange rate remained
fixed for approximately two decades. This was due
to many factors. First, the drachma joined the
Bretton Woods system, and consistent adherence to
its operating rules lent credibility to monetary poli-
cies being pursued and made it easier to lower infla-
tionary expectations. Second, bringing the fiscal
budget into balance, restructuring public spending
plans with a reduction in consumer spending and
increased investment spending all helped to
improve confidence in the monetary policy pursued.
Third, the containment of labour cost increases,
which rose only in line with increased productivity,
helped to keep domestic inflation down. Fourth, the
growth rate of money supply was kept low, due to
strict credit controls in the economy imposed by the
Bank of Greece and the Currency Committee. Fifth,
the very limited convertibility of the drachma
(together with the maintenance of controls on
import financing) reduced pressure from currency
speculators. Finally, the growth of trade internation-
ally, the downward trend of raw material prices and
global monetary stability all lent their weight to
domestic price stability and to the preservation of
the drachma fixed exchange rate.
Economic growth was assisted by developments
in the balance of payments. The part played by
invisible transfers and capital inflows was sub-
stantial in improving the balance. The rise in invis-
ible transfers was due both to increased levels of
tourism and shipping and to remittances from
Greeks living abroad.
The dramatic change in the composition of GDP
per production sector is an indication of the struc-
tural changes which took place in the economy
and society in Greece. This change in GDP reflects
corresponding changes in the composition of
employment. As can be seen in Chart 13, while 1/3
of the national product was derived from the pri-
mary sector in 1952, the secondary sector had, by
1974, taken its place, while the services sector
continued to contribute more than half of GDP.
However, global monetary instability following
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the collapse of the international Bretton Woods
standard and the termination of the dollar’s con-
vertibility into gold in August 1971, combined
with the expansionary economic policy pursued
during the period of the dictatorship, all acted
together to bring an end to this long period of
monetary stability and rapid economic growth.
10. Inflation and blocks on growth
With the restoration of democracy in 1974, it
became easier for social groups to present their
claims, establishing a democratic political system
which favoured redistribution of income and
wealth in favour of disadvantaged population
groups. The State played a more active role as a
producer and employer. Social models were
redrawn to resemble more closely those of west-
ern European nations.
Efforts to redistribute income and wealth, the
expansion of the State’s economic activities and
Greece’s accession into the EEC were the three
main elements of economic policy pursued dur-
ing the first decade of the post-dictatorship
period. Wealth redistribution and improved living
standards achieved via borrowing against future
generations led to large fiscal deficits. At the
same time, income transfers from the EEC mainly
went towards increasing personal income and
private consumption of imported goods. The
consequences of this policy were: labour costs
which increased above and beyond the increase
in productivity; high inflation; reduced competi-
tiveness of the economy internationally; and a
dramatic decline in private and public investment
and, ultimately, in the growth rate of the eco-
nomy. For more than twenty years after 1974,
Greece had a particularly low rate of economic
growth.32 Chart 14 shows the path over time of
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the growth rate from 1961 until today. In the
period following 1974, the growth rate of real
output was at least four times lower than in the
period 1961-1973.
The Greek economy also suffered from strong
inflationary pressures due to credit expansion and
the enormous rise in the international price of oil.
In 1973, a new dollar crisis led to a 10% devalua-
tion of the dollar. Greece, however, continued to
keep the drachma/dollar exchange rate fixed,
which caused the drachma to fall against all other
currencies. This fall, combined with rising oil
prices and an overheating economy, led to a sharp
rise in inflation, which reached 30%. The drachma
was finally unpegged from the dollar in 1975 and
its new exchange rate was set by the Bank of
Greece on the basis of the weighted average of a
basket of currencies. This all represented a sliding
drachma policy, aimed at offsetting the impact of
wage increases on the economy’s international
competitiveness. 
Economic growth was brought to a halt, while
inflation remained at very high levels. As is evi-
dent in Chart 15, Greece’s inflation differential
over that of the EU was high and positive through-
out the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.
Moreover, as can be seen in Chart 16, Greece’s
divergence from the EU growth rate was also sig-
nificant. At a time when Greece was facing large
budget deficits, unsustainable public debt, nega-
tive growth rates and persistent inflation, govern-
ments in Western Europe were implementing
tightened fiscal and monetary policies, their goal
being to bring inflation down and establish an
environment of monetary stability.
As early as the mid-1980s, it was clear that the
expansionary economic policy being pursued by
Greek governments could not be maintained.33
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0456
33 For the theoretical basis of this policy, see Alogoskoufis (1992)
and Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991). For its effectiveness in the
case of Greece, see Brissimis and Leventakis (1989).
A first crisis was observed in the balance of pay-
ments and led to the short-lived stabilisation pro-
gramme of 1985-1987. This programme was
based on limiting wage increases, but made no
attempt to reduce the size of the public sector and
the public debt. After the programme was aban-
doned at the end of 1987, wage increases again
accelerated and the economy slipped into a phase
of recession for two years in 1989 and 1990.
Combined with political uncertainty during that
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period, these developments made inflation and
fiscal deficits accelerate again and caused new
problems for the balance of payments.34
11. Greece in the euro area
The 1990s were a particularly important decade
for the Greek economy, described as the “decade
of convergence.” Greek governments made
efforts to counter the imbalances and distortions
of the domestic economy in order for it to partic-
ipate in the European Monetary Union.35 Greece
adopted a programme to tackle fiscal deficits,
abandoned the sliding drachma policy and took
some steps towards deregulating the economy.
Progress towards the single currency demanded
that all countries involved should undertake a
convergence programme which would meet spe-
cific fiscal and monetary criteria. Meeting the five
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty was an essential
prerequisite for a country to enter the euro area,
as this was considered to be the only way to
ensure the nominal convergence of participating
countries and to limit the risk of economic insta-
bility.
The convergence programmes provided for the
fiscal and structural adjustment of the Greek
economy.36 Bringing down inflation was the pri-
mary goal of the monetary policy pursued.
Abandoning the policy of sliding depreciation of
the drachma and limiting fiscal deficits, largely via
reduced interest rates on borrowing and
increased tax revenues, all played a part in bring-
ing inflation down to moderate levels during the
period from 1991 to 1994. In 1995, the Bank of
Greece set a specific figure (7%) as the final target
for the reduction of inflation, and, as part of an
interim target for the exchange rate, it sought to
limit the rate of the drachma’s depreciation
against the ECU to a percentage which would not
fully offset the inflation differential between
Greece and the other European Union countries.
For the first time in more than twenty years, infla-
tion fell to a single digit in 1995. The participation
of the drachma in the European Monetary
System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in
March 1998, following the devaluation of its cen-
tral exchange rate against the ECU, and its entry
into ERM II the following year, were conducive to
the process of reducing inflation.
Having achieved nominal convergence of its
economy with the economies of other countries
in the European Union, Greece has since 2001
been attempting to exploit the benefits of mone-
tary union. The focus of economic policy has
shifted to achieving real convergence in terms of
per capita GDP. Greece’s economy in recent years
has grown considerably (the GDP growth rate
was 3.8% in 2002 and is estimated to have
reached 4.0% in 2003). This is in contrast to the
very sluggish economic activity within the euro
area (0.9% and 0.4% respectively). Many factors
have played their part in the increase in the
domestic product: increased private consump-
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34 For an overview of fiscal developments, see Christodoulakis
(1994) and Manessiotis and Reischauer (2001). See also
Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992), Kapopoulos (1995) and
Siokis and Kapopoulos (2002) for an empirical analysis of the
impact of political fiscal cycles on economic performance. For an
empirical investigation into the relationship between fiscal policy
and inflation, see Demopoulos and Kapopoulos (2000) and
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1999). Finally, Gibson and
Lazaretou (2001) analyse the cyclical behaviour of the Greek infla-
tion process, while Hall and Zonzilos (2001) examine the deter-
minant factors behind price and wage inflation in Greece.
35 Garganas and Tavlas (2001) showed empirically that a policy
regime switch occurred in 1994.
36 The first convergence programme for the Greek economy was
approved by ECOFIN in 1993. It was revised in September 1994.
tion; greater investment, particularly investment
in major public projects and the Olympics, and
also in housing; as well as an increase in exports
of goods. However, inflation remains high,
although the differential between Greece and the
euro area is beginning to narrow (it is estimated
that the average annual increase in the Consumer
Price Index was around 3.5% in 2003, i.e. the
same as in 2002). This differential has, of course,
a negative effect on the price competitiveness of
the Greek economy.37
As regards the structural features of Greece’s
economy, the change which has taken place since
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1974 in the composition of GDP by sector of eco-
nomic activity is significant. The services sector
now provides more than 2/3 of GDP, while the
other sectors provide a smaller proportion, indi-
cating a corresponding change in the composition
of employment. Furthermore, based on the struc-
tural indicators for the Greek economy (see Chart
17), per capita GDP and productivity (GDP per
employee) remain below the EU average (70%
and 86% respectively).
Closing remarks
By joining the euro area economy, Greece has
entered a new era, marked not only by new
opportunities for growth but also by risks. These
risks stem from the delay in implementing struc-
tural changes and the poor competitiveness of the
domestic economy, which is now being called
upon to operate within the new competitive envi-
ronment of the globalised market.38 Deregulation
of the goods and services markets to improve
their efficiency, privatisation, more efficient use of
EU funding to bring about a substantial improve-
ment in social and economic infrastructure,
access to the information society and improve-
ment in the productivity of public administration
– all these are economic policy priorities in the
EMU era with the aim of achieving real conver-
gence.
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Given that inflation is defined as a systematic rise
in the general price level of an economy, achiev-
ing and maintaining price stability —a primary
objective of the European Central Bank— obvi-
ously presupposes that price changes are moni-
tored with a series of price-related indices.
Inflation in Greece is recorded with the Consumer
Price Index (CPI), which is compiled and pub-
lished by the National Statistical Service of Greece
(NSSG). Consumer price indices are used exten-
sively worldwide to measure price behaviour. The
Greek CPI is made up of the following 12 cate-
gories of goods and services:
1. Food and non-alcoholic beverages
2. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco
3. Clothing and footwear
4. Housing
5. Durable goods and services
6. Health
7. Transport
8. Communications
9. Recreation and culture
10. Education
11. Hotels-Cafés-Restaurants
12. Miscellaneous goods and services
These categories are further broken down into
sub-categories and groups of final goods and ser-
vices. These groups, which consist of more than
one good and/or service for which market prices
are collected, correspond to the most disaggre-
gate level for which weights, derived from a
breakdown of household consumption expendi-
ture, are available.
The CPI is calculated using a Laspeyres formula,
which gives each group of goods and services a
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relative importance or “weight” (quantity x price)
in accordance with the consumption pattern dur-
ing a specified base period:
Ι t = ∑
t
i=1
R ti Wi ,     i = 1,2,3,...,k
where:
Ι t is the general price index at time t,
Rti is the respective index for item (i) for which a
weighting coefficient is available,
Wi = ∑
poi qoi
poi qoi
is the weighting coefficient for item (i),
and poi and qoi are the respective price and quan-
tity of item (i) during base period (0).
The CPI, as a weighted average index, reflects gen-
eral inflationary trends. However, it is significantly
influenced by exogenous factors, such as weather
conditions (which affect the production of fresh
fruit and vegetables) or international oil prices, as
well as by factors that fall under government con-
trol, such as the rates charged by public utilities
and enterprises, indirect taxes etc. These effects
can result in temporary or more persistent
changes, which, whether positive or negative, are
nonetheless outliers and therefore do not neces-
sarily reflect the actual inflationary pressures in the
economy. As a result, the CPI does not always
accurately capture the trend in the general price
level, which reflects the equilibrium point between
supply and demand in a given economy.
Using the initial detailed CPI data, one can construct
a series of special indices1 that provide useful infor-
mation on the characteristics of inflation at a given
moment. The purpose of alternative inflation mea-
sures is to remove “noise” from the original CPI
data. This can be done in a number of ways, espe-
cially when there is sufficient information on the
size, the timing and the duration of the direct shocks
from exogenous factors that are responsible for any
unusual price changes for a given CPI item. Indirect
shocks, however, are difficult to measure: their size
can therefore only be roughly estimated with the
use of special econometric/simulation models.
The present article examines two main categories
of techniques. Those in the first category are
based on the idea that certain items whose prices
are particularly volatile are excluded from the CPI.
The second category, on the other hand, uses sta-
tistical methods to identify and exclude outliers,
such as the calculation of the “trimmed mean”
and the “median”. The indices examined here,
henceforth referred to as Trend Inflation
Indicators (TRIIs), are the following:
ñ “underlying” or “core” inflation (CPI less fresh
fruit/vegetables and fuel),
ñ the CPIX, i.e. the CPI excluding outliers,
ñ the weighted median,
ñ the 5% Trimmed Mean (TM-5),
ñ the 10% Trimmed Mean (TM-10),
ñ the 15% Trimmed Mean (TM-15), and
ñ the 20% Trimmed Mean (TM-20).
Two main methods were chosen to identify the
trend inflation indicators which better express the
inflationary tendencies in any economy. The first
and more widely used method evaluates the
respective CPI sub-indices on the basis of their
volatility. In other words, items, such as fresh
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1 Several such indices are published by the Bank of Greece
(Annual Report, Report on Monetary Policy, Bulletin of
Conjunctural Indicators).
fruit/vegetables and fuel, whose price behaviour is
particularly volatile and erratic by comparison
with the overall CPI are excluded. “Underlying” or
“core” inflation is a typical example of this cate-
gory of indicator, which can then be compared
with the all-items CPI.
The second method is based less on subjective
criteria. Rather than being limited to an ex ante
exclusion of certain CPI sub-indices, it places
greater emphasis on overall trend inflation and is
exclusively based on the symmetry or otherwise
of the distribution of price changes for all items in
the CPI. This method has the advantage of signif-
icantly reducing the risk of arbitrarily excluding a
given price series contained in the CPI, and can
therefore serve to estimate “true” or underlying
trend inflation. Statistical indicators based on this
approach include the weighted median and the
trimmed mean.2
The weighted median is often used as an alterna-
tive measure of inflation as it places greater
emphasis on the overall trend exhibited by all of
the CPI component prices, and attaches less
importance to extreme or non-representative
price changes (in contrast to the all-items CPI,
which is a weighted average). In order to better
illustrate this difference, let us look at an actual
example: In January 1999, the CPI rose year-on-
year by 3.7%. 93.5% of the prices of goods and
services included in the CPI rose by an average
4.6%, while the price of one single item, i.e. fuel,
which accounts for 6.5% of the CPI basket, fell by
12.8%. The median inflation rate, that is the price
change in the middle of the distribution of all
price changes, was 5.0%. The difference between
the changes identified by the mean (3.7%) and the
median (5.0%) depends on how symmetric the
price changes distribution contained in the CPI is.
When this distribution is skewed, the average
inflation figure can mislead us with regard to the
overall trend of inflation.
This discrepancy between the median and the
mean can be explained by the following economic
argument: The pricing policy of firms is largely
determined by their general inflation expectations,
and, of course, by changes in the firms’ own pro-
duction costs. In other words, anticipated inflation
is one of the primary factors that firms take into
consideration when adjusting their prices.
However, whenever there is a sudden change in
the rate of increase of one price series or one cost
factor, only the firms that are significantly affected
by the sharp changes in relative prices or costs will
in fact adjust their prices, since adjusting prices
entails a certain cost. This modifies the degree of
symmetry exhibited by the price change distribu-
tion, with the result that average inflation is not
necessarily representative of trend inflation.
The trimmed mean, like the median, is not affected
by extreme price changes. The price change distri-
bution for a given time period reflects two common
factors: (a) Firms raise their prices based on antici-
pated average inflation; they do not expect sudden
price changes and most of their price increases dis-
play inertia around the general inflation level. Their
price change distribution is, thus, roughly symmet-
ric. (b) However, as mentioned above, this price
change distribution can easily become asymmetric
around the mean, if the prices of certain products
change sharply. When calculating the trimmed
Alternative measures of inflation
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2 The weighted median and the trimmed mean are both widely
used in the international bibliography and also in practice as alter-
native measures of inflation.
mean, these extreme (positive or negative) changes
are dropped from both tails of the CPI-price change
distribution, implying that the corresponding CPI
items are each given a zero weight.
Methods of calculating trend inflation
indicators
The alternative measures of inflation can be based
either on an ex ante exclusion of specific items
from the traditional CPI or on the ex post exclu-
sion only of extreme price changes (regardless of
the group to which these specific items belong).
More specifically:
(a) “Underlying” or “core” inflation (CPI excluding
fresh fruit/vegetables and fuel)
The weighted average of price changes for all
items excluding fresh fruit/vegetables and fuel,
known as “underlying” or “core” inflation, is com-
piled for 180 goods and services and excludes
items such as fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, liquid
gas, heating oil and petrol. The index is then con-
structed by assigning weights to the price changes
of the remaining goods and services in the same
manner as in the all-items CPI.
(b) The CPI excluding outliers (CPIX)
The weighted average CPI excluding outliers is
compiled in a manner similar to the CPI, once the
extreme price changes and their respective
weights have been excluded. In order to deter-
mine which price changes are “extreme”, the fol-
lowing procedure is usually followed: The first
(Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles of the price change
distribution are calculated. The difference
between the two gives us the Interquartile Range
(IQR = Q3 – Q1), on the basis of which the lower
and upper limits are determined as follows:
Lower Limit or LL= Q1 – 1.5 x IQR
Upper Limit or UL= Q3 + 1.5 x IQR
Any price change that is smaller than the lower
limit or greater than the upper limit is considered a
potential outlier, and as such is excluded with its
respective weight from the calculation of the index.
(c) The Weighted Median
The weighted median is constructed by applying
the median formula for a data distribution, once
the distribution weights have been taken into
account. More specifically, the price changes are
ranked in increasing order with their respective
weights. The weighted median is then defined as
the 50th percentile of the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of price changes.
(d) The Trimmed Mean
The trimmed mean is compiled in the following
manner: The price changes of the goods and ser-
vices are ranked in increasing order. A number of
observed goods and services are then excluded
from both ends of the distribution, depending on
the trimming percentage. In the 5% Trimmed
Mean, for instance, a total of 18 goods and/or ser-
vices are trimmed from the 180 goods and ser-
vices contained in the Greek CPI. This means that
the 9 highest and the 9 lowest price changes in
the distribution are excluded (trimmed) from the
data used to calculate the mean (5% of the obser-
vations from the left side of the distribution and
5% from the right side). Analogously, in a 10%
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Trimmed Mean, the all-items CPI is trimmed to
exclude a total of 36 goods and/or services.
Greece’s CPI and price change distribution
characteristics
Chart 1 plots the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
against “underlying” or “core” inflation (CPI
excluding fresh fruit/vegetables and fuel) from
1990 to August 2003.
As shown in Table 1, the volatility of fresh fruit/veg-
etable and fuel prices has had a definite impact on
the general inflation level, as measured by the CPI.
A detailed study of the monthly distributions of
12-month price changes at different periods in
Alternative measures of inflation
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T a b l e  1
Developments in the CPI, underlying (or core) inflation and fruit/vegetable and fuel prices 
(1995-2002)
(Annual percentage changes)
Dec. ‘02Dec. ‘01Dec. ‘00Dec. ‘99Dec. ‘98Dec. ‘97Dec. ‘96Dec. ‘95
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
CPI 7.9 7.3 4.7 3.9 2.7 3.9 3.0 3.4
Underlying or core inflation 8.6 7.4 5.1 4.9 1.8 3.4 3.3 3.5
Fruit and vegetables –1.5 4.4 7.0 6.0 0.2 –3.8 39.6 –9.1
Fuel 4.4 8.2 –2.1 –15.1 24.0 18.6 –18.3 12.1
Indices
time clearly points to a continuous decrease in
inflation. Charts 2, 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the
monthly distribution of 12-month price changes
in December 2002, 1998, 1994 and 1990.
A histogram of the 12-month price change distri-
bution in December 2002 is presented in Chart 2.
This distribution is roughly symmetric, as evi-
denced inter alia by the fact that the change in the
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CPI (the mean) and the weighted median were
3.4% and 3.5%, respectively.
In contrast with December 2002, the months of
December 1998, December 1994 and December
1990, as shown in Charts 3, 4 and 5, present
either negative or positive skewness. More specif-
ically, the histogram of the price change distribu-
Alternative measures of inflation
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tion for December 1998 (Chart 3) shows negative
skewness. During that month, the change in the
CPI amounted to 3.9%, while the change in the
weighted median was 5.2%.
In December 1994, the change in the CPI was
10.7%, while the change in the weighted median
was 9.9%. As a result, the distribution of price
changes for that month, represented in Chart 4,
clearly displays positive skewness.
A similar pattern can also be discerned in the dis-
tribution of price changes for December 1990
(Chart 5), which is also skewed to the right. This
distribution also contains a large number of
extreme price changes, some of which approach
or even exceed 100%. During this particular
month, the change in the CPI and the weighted
median reached 22.9% and 20.3%, respectively.
Criteria used to assess the Trend Inflation
Indicators (TRIIs)
In order to compare Trend Inflation Indicators and
determine which one(s) best capture(s) trend
inflation, one first needs a benchmark against
which to judge each TRII. We use the moving
median of monthly changes in the CPI for a 19-
month period3 (Median-19) as our first bench-
mark series, and 19-month moving averages (MA-
19) as an alternative. Both benchmark series were
constructed over centred moving 19-month peri-
ods. This implies that they were smoothed so as
to be less sensitive to temporary price changes (as
detailed in the following paragraph) and, as a
result, are more suitable for comparison purposes
than for use as alternative Trend Inflation
Indicators.
The construction of the benchmark series is a
simple procedure. For example, for the median of
monthly CPI changes centred for 19-month mov-
ing periods, we calculate the median of the first
19 monthly changes in the CPI and place the
result at the centre of the first 19-month period,
i.e. in the 10th position. We then take the next
monthly change, i.e. the 20th, and disregard the
first. Continuing in this fashion, we move up each
time by one observation and calculate the corre-
sponding median, which we then place in its
appropriate position. After completing this proce-
dure for the entire time sample period, we can
then work with our new median benchmark
series, which, being substantially smoother than
the initial data, can serve as a benchmark for
assessing the various Trend Inflation Indicators.
The alternative moving average benchmark was
constructed in a similar fashion, taking the mean
rather than the median on each occasion.
Chart 6 plots the CPI against the median (Median-
19) and the moving average (MA-19) benchmark
series. These measures obviously smooth out the
CPI price change series and therefore are appropri-
ate benchmarks for trend inflation. The Mean
Squared Residual and the Correlation Coefficient
serve as statistical criteria. More specifically, the
Trend Inflation Indicator that obtains the lowest
Mean Squared Residual or the highest Correlation
Coefficient with the benchmark series is considered
to better express “overall” or “real” trend inflation.
In order to ensure direct comparability between
the TRIIs and the benchmark series, we recalcu-
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3 The main conclusions of this article do not change when bench-
mark series of different durations are used. The 19-month dura-
tion reported here presented the smallest standard deviation.
late the TRIIs using a simple linear regression, so
that they have the same mean as the benchmark
series. The benchmark series is used as the
dependent variable, and each of the TRIIs serves
as the independent variable.
In the case of the Mean Squared Residual criterion
(MSR), we calculate the deviations from the
benchmark series for each of the TRIIs, square
them and obtain the mean of these squared devi-
ations. The indicator with the lowest MSR was
considered best, with:
MSR = ∑(TRIIt − BSt)2 ⁄ n
where: where:
MSR is the Mean Squared Residual,
TRIIt is the Trend Inflation Indicator at a given time t,
BSt is the benchmark series at a given time t, and
n is the number of observations.
When using the Correlation Coefficient (r) as the
statistical criterion, we calculate the Correlation
Coefficient (r) between the trend inflation indica-
tor and the benchmark series in each case. The
indicator with the highest correlation coefficient is
considered best, with:
r = Corr(TRIIt,BSt).
Results
Using the Mean Squared Residual as the statistical
criterion and the Median-19 as the benchmark
series, we are able to conclude that the best indi-
cator of trend inflation for the January 1998-
August 2003 sample period was “underlying” or
“core” inflation (CPI excluding fresh fruit/vegeta-
bles and fuel), followed by the CPIX (CPI exclud-
ing outliers). The remaining indicators rank in the
following decreasing order of performance: the
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5% Trimmed Mean, the 15% Trimmed Mean, the
20% Trimmed Mean, the 10% Trimmed Mean, the
all-items CPI and, finally, the weighted median
(Table 2). The same performance ranking is also
obtained when the Correlation Coefficient (r) was
used as the statistical criterion.
When using the moving averages (MA-19) as the
benchmark series and either the Mean Squared
Residual or the Correlation Coefficient to assess
performance, we reach the conclusion that
“underlying” or “core” inflation (CPI excluding
fresh fruit/vegetables and fuel) once again fares
best, followed in second position by the 20%
Trimmed Mean (Table 3).
We then use both benchmark series (Median-19
and MA-19) to compare the January 1998-August
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T a b l e  2
Performance of trend inflation indicators using
the Median-19 as a benchmark series
(Jan. ‘98-Aug. ‘03)
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Underlying inflation 0.0399 0.8822
CPIX 0.0492 0.8522
TM-5 0.0528 0.8405
TM-15 0.0546 0.8344
TM-20 0.0555 0.8314
TM-10 0.0595 0.8179
CPI 0.0630 0.8061
Weighted median 0.0877 0.7159
Trend inflation
indicators
Correlation
coefficient
Mean squared
residual
T a b l e  3
Performance of trend inflation indicators using
the MA-19 as a benchmark series
(Jan. ‘98-Aug. ‘03)
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Underlying inflation 0.0282 0.8765
TM-20 0.0312 0.8626
TM-15 0.0313 0.8620
TM-5 0.0347 0.8456
CPIX 0.0356 0.8413
TM-10 0.0373 0.8329
CPI 0.0498 0.7685
Weighted median 0.0539 0.7464
Trend inflation
indicators
Correlation
coefficient
Mean squared
residual
T a b l e  4
Performance of trend inflation indicators using
the Median-19 as a benchmark series
(Jan. ‘93-Aug. ‘98)
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
TM-5 0.1622 0.9810
TM-10 0.1767 0.9793
Underlying inflation 0.1870 0.9781
CPI 0.2343 0.9725
TM-15 0.3122 0.9631
Weighted median 0.4039 0.9520
TM-20 0.4164 0.9505
CPIX 0.4269 0.9492
Trend inflation
indicators
Correlation
coefficient
Mean squared
residual
T a b l e  5
Performance of trend inflation indicators using
the MA-19 as a benchmark series
(Jan. ‘93-Aug. ‘98)
Source: Calculations based on NSSG data.
Underlying inflation 0.1544 0.9837
TM-10 0.1900 0.9799
TM-20 0.2394 0.9746
TM-30 0.3952 0.9578
CPI 0.4133 0.9558
TM-40 0.5570 0.9400
Weighted median 0.5919 0.9361
CPIX 0.6152 0.9335
Trend inflation
indicators
Correlation
coefficient
Mean squared
residual
2003 period, during which inflation was relatively
stable, with an earlier period of equal duration
(January 1993-August 1998), during which trend
inflation was on the decline (see Tables 4 and 5).
By comparing the results of Tables 4 and 5 with
those of Tables 2 and 3, we are again able to con-
clude that underlying inflation fares best as an
indicator of trend inflation, even for a period of
declining inflation.
Conclusions
As shown in the previous analysis, the all-items
CPI, though officially used to measure inflation, is
not always the best tool for measuring and
analysing trend inflation. This is due to the signifi-
cant bias in the CPI caused by the price develop-
ments of specific items and by the unusual or
extreme price changes presented at times by vari-
ous CPI components. We examined and compared
the behaviour of several other indicators, which
can be computed using the CPI data and which
proved useful in monitoring and analysing infla-
tionary tendencies. Our study showed that none of
the indicators examined could, by themselves,
indisputably and precisely capture existing infla-
tionary tendencies, and that a combination of indi-
cators should therefore be monitored concurrently.
From our analysis of the sample period data for
1998-2003, we were able to conclude that
“underlying” or “core” inflation (CPI excluding
fresh fruit/vegetables and fuel) fared best against
both comparison criteria, regardless of the
benchmark series used (median or moving aver-
age). The Bank of Greece has been studying and
monitoring underlying CPI for several years now
and, with the recent implementation of the HICP,
has also begun calculating the other indicators.
Alternative measures of inflation
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04 77
References
Bryan, M. F. and S. G. Cecchetti (1993), “Measuring
Core Inflation”, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper Series, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Cecchetti, S. G. (1996), “Measuring Short-run Inflation for
Central Bankers”, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper Series, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Coimbra, C. and P. D. Neves (1997), “Trend Inflation
Indicators”, Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin.
European Commission (2002), Quarterly report on the
euro area, Directorate General for Economic and
Financial Affairs.
Kevork, ∫. ∏. (1984), Statistics, Indices, Theory and Prac-
tice (in Greek).
Reserve Bank of Australia (1994), “Measuring ‘Under-
lying’ Inflation”, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin
(1994).
Roger, S. (1995), Measures of underlying inflation in
New Zealand, 1981-95, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/0478
Working Papers
(February - December 2003)
This section contains the abstracts of Working Papers authored by Bank of Greece staff and/or collabora-
tors and published by the Bank of Greece. The unabridged version of these publications is available in
print or in electronic format at www.bankofgreece.gr.
Contents
1. Empirical modelling of money demand in periods of structural change: The case of Greece
Sophocles N. Brissimis, George Hondroyiannis, P.A.V.B. Swamy and George S. Tavlas
2. Greek monetary economics in retrospect: The adventures of the drachma
Sophia Lazaretou
3. The dynamic adjustment of a transition economy in the early stages of transformation
Christos Papazoglou and Eric J. Pentecost
4. An indicator measuring underlying economic activity in Greece
Stephen G. Hall and Nicholas G. Zonzilos
5. Changes in financial structure and asset price substitutability: A test of the bank lending channel
Sophocles N. Brissimis and Nicholas S. Magginas
6. Capital flows and speculative attacks in prospective EU Member States
Heather D. Gibson and Euclid Tsakalotos
7. The importance of variance stationarity in economic time series modelling: A practical approach
Alexandros E. Milionis
8. The effect of dynamic hedging of options positions on intermediate-maturity interest rates
Th. Christodoulopoulos and Ioulia Grigoratou
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04 79
This paper examines the behaviour of the demand
for money in Greece during 1976Q1-2000Q4, a
period that witnessed many of the influences that
cause money-demand instability. During this
period there has been widespread innovation and
a transition from a highly regulated to an unregu-
lated financial system. The capital account has
also been opened, the last foreign exchange con-
trols having been lifted in May 1994.
In the empirical analysis, the demand for money
is estimated as a function of real income, the own
rate of return on money, and the spread between
T-bill rates and the own rate on money and infla-
tion. Quarterly data are used in the estimation as
well as two different empirical methodologies, vec-
tor error correction (VEC) modelling and second-
generation random coefficient (RC) modelling.
The paper discusses extensively the second
method, which has been developed theoretically
and empirically in recent years. Standard estima-
tion procedures often impose a number of restric-
tions, including the following: (i) estimated coeffi-
cients are constant; (ii) excluded explanatory vari-
ables are proxied by an error term and, are, there-
fore, assumed to have mean equal to zero and to
be mean-independent of the included explanatory
variables; (iii) the true functional form is known
(whether linear or nonlinear); and (iv) the vari-
ables are not subject to measurement error. The
RC method does not impose the above restric-
tions, but assumes that each of the estimated
coefficients is the sum of three terms: a bias-free
effect, an omitted-variables bias, and a measure-
ment error. The bias-free components of these
coefficients are the coefficients that would be
observed if there were no measurement errors,
no omitted variables biases, and the specification
of the functional form was true. Therefore, the RC
method differs from recursive VEC estimation
since the latter does not write off the past and
uses a specific functional form.
The coefficients of both the VEC and RC proce-
dures support the hypothesis that, because of
financial deregulation, the demand for money
becomes more responsive to both the own rate of
return on money balances and the opportunity
cost of holding money. In general, both proce-
dures also support the hypothesis that the income
elasticity of money demand declines over time as
a result of technological improvements in the pay-
ment system and the development of money sub-
stitutes which lead to economies of scale in hold-
ing money.
Published in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 2003, 65, 5, 605-28.
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Empirical modelling of money demand in periods of structural change: The case of Greece
Working Paper No. 1
Sophocles N. Brissimis, George Hondroyiannis, P.A.V.B. Swamy and George S. Tavlas
A country’s currency is perhaps one of the most
important economic institutions. It appears that
the interrelation between monetary and economic
power and stability is reciprocal. A strong and sta-
ble economy facilitates the achievement and main-
tenance of monetary stability; and, conversely,
monetary stability contributes to the smooth oper-
ation of markets and transactions and promotes
saving, investment and economic growth.
This paper provides some historical perspective
about the monetary and fiscal policies pursued in
Greece during the period from the 1830s until the
introduction of the euro. Since the formation of
the modern Greek State, government officials
have striven —sometimes with much effort— to
keep up with international monetary develop-
ments. This stemmed from the fact that they
understood that participation in a monetary club
of powerful economies by a peripheral, poor and
inflation-prone country with a weak currency and
an underdeveloped money market, like the
Greece of the time, could imply important bene-
fits for the national economy. First, membership
in a currency union or a fixed exchange rate
regime is associated with greater trade integration
since monetary uniformity reduces the transac-
tion costs of trade considerably. Second, strict
adherence to the specie convertibility rule enables
peripheral countries to establish credibility for the
nation’s economic policy and facilitates the reduc-
tion of inflationary expectations and their stabili-
sation at a low level. Third, the fiscal and mone-
tary discipline implied by the gold standard rule
reduces country risk and improves the country’s
international credit standing.
The paper divides the history of the drachma into
seven parts. The first part discusses Greek mone-
tary and fiscal developments in the pre-WWI
period. In the classical gold standard era, Greek
governments made repeatedly strong efforts, how-
ever unsuccessfully, to tie the drachma to the pre-
vailing international monetary regime. The first
time Greece consistently pursued a specie stan-
dard rule was in 1910, only four years before the
collapse of the classical gold standard. The second
part of the story reports on the experience of the
Greek economy as a full member of the LMU. The
third part concerns the inter-war period. After a
long wartime period marked by political and social
upheavals, monetary expansions and high inflation,
Greece again tried to follow international monetary
developments from the mid-1920s onwards. The
country joined the inter-war gold-exchange stan-
dard and the drachma was pegged to sterling. The
fourth part refers to the collapse of the monetary
and real sectors of the Greek economy during the
Occupation Period and presents the stabilisation
efforts in the aftermath of the German occupation,
while the fifth part concerns the golden era of the
drachma. In 1953 the drachma was first devalued
against the US dollar and then joined the Bretton
Woods system of fixed rates. The sixth part pre-
sents the policy of the depreciating drachma in the
post-Bretton Woods period. Finally, the last part
deals with the path towards EMU and the end of
the story of the drachma.
Working Papers
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Greek monetary economics in retrospect: The adventures of the drachma
Working Paper No. 2
Sophia Lazaretou
There are three stylised facts that characterised
transition economies in the early years of liberali-
sation: a fall in output, a sudden sharp rise in
inflation and a depreciation of the real exchange
rate followed by a slower, steady appreciation.
The fall in output has been largely attributed to
negative supply shocks and to a credit crunch that
led to the imposition of high real interest rates on
enterprises. The rise in inflation was attributed to
the early liberalisation of goods market prices,
whose rise was in line with world prices following
administered repression. The depreciation and
subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate
during transition was due to the initial inflation
shock followed by a gradual rise in productivity.
This paper attempts to provide a theoretical ratio-
nale for these stylised facts by setting out an
aggregate model of a representative transitional
economy. The model embodies some of the basic
characteristics of such economies. In particular, it
assumes an underdeveloped financial sector in
which the central bank sets the short-term inter-
est rate and there are few private capital inflows,
which, although not necessarily legally restricted,
are limited by fragile and thin financial markets
which carry a high risk premium for international
investors. Domestic residents can, however, use
foreign money for domestic transactions as a
means of hedging against high inflation as well as
the economic instability and uncertainty that are
characteristic of the early stages of the transition
process. Furthermore, the analysis assumes that
price liberalisation occurred in advance of finan-
cial liberalisation and structural reform. The
impact of three shocks is considered as a result of
the transition process: (a) an increase in real
wage, (b) a rise in the interest rate due to liberal-
isation, and (c) a reduction in core inflation.
The analysis indicates that all three disturbances
contributed to the occurrence of the three stylised
facts which emerged at the early stages of the
transition process. In particular, the reason for the
initial fall in output was largely due to the slow
speed of the supply-side reforms, which, as a
result, did not bring about productivity gains to
raise output. Overall, the analysis suggests that,
notwithstanding sufficient structural reform, rapid
price liberalisation has a depressing influence on
output in transition economies.
To be published in Journal of Macroeconomics,
June 2004.
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The dynamic adjustment of a transition economy in the early stages of transformation
Working Paper No. 3
Christos Papazoglou and Eric J. Pentecost
The conduct of effective economic policy requires
timely information. However, high-frequency
data, e.g. monthly data, which are very useful in
assessing the current state of the economy and
estimating short-term economic prospects, are
highly volatile and erratic. In any given month,
some indicators may rise, while others may fall,
even in related sectors of economic activity. The
construction of a coincident indicator as the single
‘’common component’’ of all the short-term indic-
ators used is of particular interest for economic
policy makers.
The purpose of this paper is to compile an indica-
tor of Greek underlying economic activity using
Greek economic data. The construction of the
Greek coincident indicator of underlying eco-
nomic activity is based on the methodology devel-
oped by Stock and Watson (1991) to assess US
economic activity; it was later used by Garrat and
Hall (1996) for the UK economy.
Using a state space formulation, the coincident
indicator is compiled as the common component
of various short-term indicators, on the basis of
the assumption that those indicators are affected
by the general level of economic activity. More-
over, at the same time the indicator incorporates
the effect of special factors related to specific sec-
tors of economic activity.
To estimate the coincident indicator of the Greek
economy, the following short-term monthly indi-
cators are used:
— the index of industrial output (National
Statistical Service of Greece, NSSG);
— the index of retail sales volume (NSSG);
— the volume of new buildings, proxied by the
number of permits issued, with a four-month
time-lag (NSSG);
— cement output (NSSG);
— non-oil exports (at constant prices, obtained by
deflating Bank of Greece balance of payments
statistics with the relevant sub-index of the
NSSG Wholesale Price Index);
— travel receipts - i.e. receipts from foreign visi-
tors (at constant prices, obtained by deflating
Bank of Greece balance of payments statistics
with the NSSG Consumer Price Index); and
— loans to the private sector (at constant prices,
Bank of Greece data deflated with the NSSG
Consumer Price Index).
In addition to the main monthly series presented
above, an implicitly-calculated monthly GDP
growth rate has been added to the short-term
indicators. This monthly rate plays a key-identify-
ing role in the compilation of the indicator
because it is a reference variable that can be used
to evaluate the relative weight of all the other
highly-volatile indicators in the overall indicator. It
is calculated using the inverted compound for-
Working Papers
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An indicator measuring underlying economic activity in Greece
Working Paper No. 4
Stephen G. Hall and Nicholas G. Zonzilos
mula (1+g)*(1/12), where g is the annual GDP
growth rate. It is constant during each calendar
year and is smoothed using a seven-month mov-
ing average.
The high volatility of short-term indicators attrib-
uted to non-systemic factors related to activity in
specific sectors is moderated by imposing the
appropriate weighting to the corresponding matri-
ces. The appropriate weighting is calculated as the
ratio of the sample mean (or variance) of each
variable expressed in monthly changes to the
sample mean (or variance) of the monthly GDP
growth rate for the sample period.
The advantage of the coincident indicator is that it
reflects the systematic information contained in
short-term indicators of activity and excludes
irregular influences which increase volatility and
make interpretation of the corresponding vari-
ables difficult.
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In this paper we investigate the existence of a
bank lending channel in the transmission of mon-
etary policy. This is a separate channel of mone-
tary transmission, which operates in addition to
the interest rate channel enhancing the effect of
monetary policy on the real economy. A part of
the empirical literature investigating the existence
of the bank lending channel adopts a macroeco-
nomic approach using aggregate (economy-wide)
variables to identify the channel. These studies
attempt to obtain indirect evidence for the exis-
tence of a lending channel through the examina-
tion of timing relationships between quantity or
price variables and measures of the monetary pol-
icy stance. The evidence they provide, however, is
inconclusive as they cannot distinguish shifts in
loan supply from shifts in loan demand.
Moreover, studies that use bank level data, in
order to identify movements in loan supply, are
not able to assess the importance of the channel
for aggregate economic activity.
In this study we investigate the existence of the
bank lending channel on the basis of the theoret-
ical framework proposed by Bernanke and Blinder
for the analysis of monetary transmission in the
case that bank loans and bonds are imperfect sub-
stitutes in banks’ and firms’ balance sheets. We
suggest a specification of this model that enables
us to identify a separate loan supply function, the
existence of which is a necessary condition for the
operation of the bank lending channel. The empir-
ical investigation is carried out by using multivari-
ate cointegration techniques in order to identify
the equilibrium relationships implied by the
Bernanke and Blinder model, as cointegrating
relationships.
We identify the equilibrium relationships of the
Bernanke-Blinder model from a vector error cor-
rection model (VECM) and test appropriate
restrictions that pertain to the existence of perfect
asset substitutability. The implications of the
model are tested for six major industrial countries
(USA, Germany, Japan, France, UK and Italy) on
the basis of a sample spanning the period from
the mid-1970s through the end of the 1990s.
Moreover, by conducting structural stability tests
of the estimated cointegrating relationships, we
examine whether changes in financial markets
over the last two decades have affected the
degree of asset substitutability and thus the
potency of the lending channel.
Our results indicate that in the US and the UK,
representing the “Anglo-Saxon type” of financial
market structure, the lending channel is inopera-
tive, while in Japan it is still important for mone-
tary transmission. The other three countries exa-
mined —Germany, France, Italy— are in between,
with the lending channel losing its potency in the
last decade.
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Changes in financial structure and asset price substitutability: A test of the bank
lending channel
Working Paper No. 5
Sophocles N. Brissimis and Nicholas S. Magginas
A key issue facing transition economies who are
prospective EU members is that of the exchange
rate policy they will pursue in the period between
EU and euro area entry. It is anticipated that ERM II
membership, which involves a commitment to a
pegged exchange rate, will be necessary for a
period of at least two years, in line with the
Maastricht Treaty and the obligations fulfilled by
current euro area members. An important factor
determining the ease with which this commitment
will be met is the extent to which the transition
economies experience large and variable capital
flows along with the determinants of these flows.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on
this issue by examining the capital flow experi-
ence of the prospective EU members. We show
that they have been experiencing fairly sizeable
capital flows since the early 1990s. The existing
literature on these flows either focuses on indi-
vidual economies or examines the determinants
of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Our con-
tribution is to focus on private capital flows
(excluding the more stable FDI flows), that is,
flows which may complicate the conduct of
macroeconomic policy; we test the sensitivity of
our results to the exclusion of FDI flows.
Furthermore we use a panel of countries, allowing
us to draw some broader conclusions about the
nature of such flows rather than concentrating on
the peculiarities of certain countries.
In order to explain capital flows, we estimate two
separate models. The first attempts to explain the
level of capital flows; the second model focuses
specifically on speculative crises by estimating the
probability of a country experiencing downward
speculative pressure. In both cases, we distin-
guish between the impact of what we refer to as
“domestic factors”, that is, macroeconomic
aggregates that are largely under the control of
the domestic authorities or at least are influenced
directly by their policies, and the effects of conta-
gion, either through economic fundamentals or
otherwise. If contagion from financial crises in
other parts of the region/world is a feature, then
this implies that, in spite of successful domestic
policies, the maintenance of the exchange rate
peg could be complicated by developments in
other countries which have spillover effects in the
domestic economy. The results of both models
suggest that, while domestic factors have a role to
play in explaining capital flows and downward
speculative pressure, this role is rather limited.
Moreover, there is clear evidence of contagion
effects. This suggests that macroeconomic policy
in the prospective EU members will be compli-
cated by capital flows in the run-up to euro area
membership.
To be published in Economics of Transition, 2004,
12, 3.
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Capital flows and speculative attacks in prospective EU Member States
Working Paper No. 6
Heather D. Gibson and Euclid Tsakalotos
Testing for non-stationarity in the level of a time
series is a standard preliminary procedure in
analysing time series and there is a plethora of
methodologies for this purpose. However, testing
for non-stationarity in the variance is sometimes
neglected in applied research. In this study, the
possible consequences of the presence of vari-
ance non-stationarity in stochastic models for
economic time series are examined. In particular,
it is shown that the presence of such kind of non-
stationarity leads to a wrong specification of uni-
variate ARIMA models. So an ad hoc methodology
for detecting and correcting for variance non-sta-
tionarity is suggested. Stabilising the variance, fol-
lowing this ad hoc approach, the number of the
parameters of an ARIMA model is vastly reduced.
Based on the above discussion, it is further argued
that the usual autocorrelation tests for the hypoth-
esis of weak form efficiency in financial markets
are inappropriate when based on the first differ-
ences of asset prices. Finally it is shown how the
analysis of extreme values (outliers) in economic
time series is affected by the presence of variance
non-stationarity.
Working Papers
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The importance of variance stationarity in economic time series modelling:
A practical approach.
Working Paper No. 7
Alexandros E. Milionis
According to recent data from the Bank for
International Settlements, the market for interest
rate derivative products has grown significantly.
In particular, the daily turnover of the euro-
denominated interest rate options market is now
similar to that observed in the equivalent market
for US dollar-denominated interest rate options.
Derivative products (and, to be more precise,
options) are not usually traded in organised mar-
kets but are offered almost exclusively over-the-
counter. Dealers in the euro-denominated interest
rate options market, acting as intermediaries, buy
and sell options on a continuous basis to accom-
modate their own needs and the needs of their
customers. The Bank for International Settlements
survey data reveal that dealers in this market sell
some 25% more options than they purchase and
are, therefore, exposed to the interest rate risk
inherent in the position created by absorbing this
excess demand.
This paper examines the effect on current inter-
mediate-maturity interest rates, i.e. on the
medium-term segment of the European yield
curve, of the action of dealers aimed at covering
themselves for the risk inherent in their net
options positions. Dynamic hedging consists of
buying (selling) extra quantities of the underlying
asset when its price increases (decreases). In
technical terms, this tactic is called “maintaining a
Delta neutral position”. The final effect of this tac-
tic is expressed as a positive feedback in the price
move of the underlying asset (and by symmetry to
its yield). For the purpose of our analysis, the
underlying assets are German government bonds
of three-, five- and ten-year maturity. It is worth
noting that the positive feedback effect is brought
about by the aforementioned tactic, implemented
in a purely mechanistic way, i.e. it is unrelated to
expectations of market participants about the
future level of interest rates.
The effect of the positive feedback on the
medium-term segment of the yield curve has
already been studied in relation to US dollar-
denominated interest rate options and the US
yield curve. The study of the issue in this paper is
the first of its kind for the European market, while
the results obtained are fairly similar for the two
markets. The data sample covers the period 1993-
2002. The size of the feedback effect is measured
by estimating an equation where the dependent
variable is the change in the five-year rate, while
the independent variables are the changes in the
three-year forward and five-year forward interest
rates with one lag, as well as the dependent vari-
able with one lag. In addition, the equation
includes an error correction term that is estimated
by employing the Johansen procedure. The coeffi-
cient on this term relates to the existence of a
long-run equilibrium relationship within which
short-term deviations take place due to positive
feedback effects.
A relatively small-sized positive feedback in the
direction in which yields are moving is found only
during periods characterised by significant
changes in interest rates. Furthermore, the size of
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The effect of dynamic hedging of options positions on intermediate-maturity interest rates
Working Paper No. 8
Th. Christodoulopoulos and Ioulia Grigoratou
the feedback increases considerably in periods
characterised by strong expectations of an interest
rate change. If this hypothesis holds, then short-
term movements of the yield curve should be
interpreted with caution when used to make infer-
ences about expectations of the evolution of eco-
nomic fundamentals. Also, under those circum-
stances the positive feedback effect can be fairly
value-subtractive, since it reinforces market
trends, and this should be taken into account in
portfolio risk management.
Working Papers
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Monetary policy and
financial system
supervision measures
(July 2003 - January 2004)
Monetary policy measures of the
Eurosystem
10 July, 31 July, 4 September, 2 October,
6 November and 4 December 2003
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
8 January 2004
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
12 January 2004
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
increase the allotment amount for each of the
longer-term refinancing operations to be conducted
in the year 2004 from €15 billion to €25 billion.
This increased amount takes into consideration the
higher liquidity needs of the euro area banking sys-
tem anticipated for the year 2004. The Eurosystem
will, however, continue to provide the bulk of liq-
uidity through its main refinancing operations.
Bank of Greece decisions concerning the
establishment and operation of credit
institutions and the supervision of the
financial system
1 July 2003
The rules of operation of the “EURO-HERMES”
System for the real-time settlement of payment
orders in euro are amended with the introduction
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of a new compensation scheme in cases of a
EURO-HERMES malfunctioning. Electronic money
institutions are excluded from participating in this
System.
2 July 2003
DVD Bank AG based in Frankfurt, Germany, is
authorised to establish and operate an agency in
Greece.
18 July 2003
— The provisions of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act No. 2438/6 August 1998 concerning the Board
of Directors, the Audit Committee and the Internal
Audit Department of credit institutions are modi-
fied.
— The National Bank of Greece is authorised to
establish:
ñ three new units in Albania;
ñ three new units in Romania; and
ñ four new units in Serbia-Montenegro.
23 July 2003
Bank of Greece provisions on the solvency ratio of
credit institutions established in Greece are codi-
fied into a single text. By the same text, emphasis
is put on the need to exercise supervision on a
consolidated and sub-consolidated basis and the
Bank of Greece is authorised to set specific require-
ments as to the monitoring and assessment of the
solvency ratio of credit institutions.
27 August 2003
Piraeus Bank is authorised to merge with the
Hellenic Industrial Development Bank through
absorption of the latter by the former.
2 September 2003
— Aspis Bank is authorised to acquire the two-
branch network of Grindlays Bank in Greece.
— EFG Eurobank-Ergasias is authorised to
increase its participation in the share capital of the
Romanian bank “Bank Post” from 36.25% to 53.25%.
— “Piraeus Leasing S.A.” is authorised to merge
with “ETBA Leasing S.A” through absorption of
the latter by the former.
26 September 2003
— The Bank of Greece authorises “Diners Club of
Greece S.A.” to convert to a credit company.
— Provisions concerning the submission of semi-
annual debtor lists by banks operating in Greece to
the Bank of Greece are codified and supple-
mented. The threshold for reporting to the Bank of
Greece a borrower’s overall outstanding debt with
a bank is €1,500,000 (on a consolidated basis).
10 October 2003
The National Bank of Greece is authorised to
acquire 81.7% of the share capital of Banca
Romaneasca S.A.” based in Bucharest, Romania.
29 October 2003
Piraeus Bank is authorised to increase its holding
in the share capital of its subsidiary “Marathon
Banking Corporation” from 53.68% to 79.19%.
The latter is authorised to acquire all the shares of
“Interbank of New York”.
18 November 2003
The National Bank of Greece is authorised to
establish 5 new units in Serbia-Montenegro.
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28 November 2003
“HSBC Republic Bank (Suisse S.A.)” based in
Geneva, Switzerland, is authorised to establish
and operate an agency in Greece.
2 December 2003
EFG Eurobank-Ergasias is authorised to merge
with Unitbank S.A. through absorption of the lat-
ter by the former.
8 December 2003
— Provisions governing the granting of autho-
risation by the Bank of Greece for the establish-
ment of credit institutions in Greece, as well as for
the establishment of domestic branches of credit
institutions incorporated in European Economic
Area (EEA) or non-EEA countries, are codified and
supplemented.
— The Bank of Greece is authorised by Law
3148/2003, which has transposed the Commu-
nity legislation on Electronic Money Institutions
into Greek law, to set prudential supervision rules
for such institutions.
11 December 2003
Alpha Bank is authorised to establish two new
units in Bulgaria.
Monetary policy and financial system supervision measures
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Decisions of the Bank
of Greece
R e: Codification of the provisions of Bank of
Greece Governor's Act 2054/18 March 1992, as
amended, on the solvency ratio of credit institu-
tions established in Greece (Bank of Greece
Governor's Act 2524/23 July 2003)
The Governor of the Bank of Greece, having
regard to:
a) the Statute of the Bank of Greece, in particu-
lar Article 55A thereof;
b) Article 1 of Law 1266/2 July 1982 “Authorities
responsible for the conduct of monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions” in conjunction with Article 12,
paragraph 1, of Law 2548/1997;
c) Law 1665/1951 “Banking operations and
supervision”;
d) Article 1 (paragraphs 1 and 3) of Law 1338/
12/17 March 1983 on the application of the
European Community law, as amended by
Article 6 of Law 1440/1984, Article 65 of Law
1892/1990 and Article 2, paragraph 2, of Law
2077/1992 on the ratification of the Treaty on
European Union, as well as Article 19 of Law
2367/1995;
e) Law 2190/1920, as amended;
f) Law 2076/1992 “Taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions, and other
related provisions”, as applicable;
g) Annex πÃ to Law 2155/1993 ratifying the
Agreement on the European Economic Area,
as amended;
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h) Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2054/18 March
1992 “On the solvency ratio of credit institutions
established in Greece”, as amended by Bank of
Greece Governor's Acts 2349/15 February
1995, 2387/6 May 1996, 2409/27 March 1997,
2479/27 August 2001, in particular Article 16
thereof, and 2512/30 December 2002;
i) Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2421/19
September 1997 “Investment services by the
Hellenic Industrial Development Bank”;
j) Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2397/7 Nov-
ember 1996 on the capital adequacy of credit
institutions, in particular the provisions of
paragraph 9 thereof on reporting, as amended
by Section ∂, paragraph 3, of Bank of Greece
Governor's Act 2494/27 May 2002;
k) Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the European Council of 20
March 2000, in particular Articles 1(4), 1(12)-
1(20), 1(27) and 40 to 47 thereof and Annexes
ππ, πππ Î·È IV thereto, codifying Directive
89/647/EEC/30 December 1989 as amended;
has decided to codify the provisions of Bank of
Greece Governor's Act 2054/18 March 1992 and
subsequent amendments thereto into a single text
and define as follows the solvency ratio of credit
institutions established in Greece:
SECTION ONE: SCOPE
This Act shall apply to all credit institutions estab-
lished in Greece, excluding the Postal Savings
Bank and the Deposits and Loans Fund. By a sub-
sequent Governor's Act, the Bank of Greece may
include in the scope of this Act one or both of the
exempted credit institutions.
SECTION TWO: DEFINITIONS
1. For the purpose of this Act:
a) “competent authorities” shall mean the
authorities empowered to supervise credit
institutions. The competent authority for
credit institutions established in Greece shall
be the Bank of Greece;
b) “Zone A” shall comprise all the European
Union (EU) Member States and all other
countries which are full members of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), as well as those coun-
tries which have concluded special lending
arrangements with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and are associated with the Fund's
general arrangements to borrow (GAB);
However, any country which reschedules its
external sovereign debt shall be excluded from
Zone A for a period of five years.
c) “Zone B” shall comprise all countries not in
Zone A.
d) “Zone A credit institutions” shall mean all credit
institutions authorised in the EU Member States,
in accordance with the relevant EU legislation,
including their branches in third countries, as
well as all private and public undertakings cov-
ered by the definition of credit institutions under
EU legislation and authorised in other Zone A
countries, including their branches;
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e) “Zone B credit institutions” shall mean all pri-
vate or public undertakings authorised out-
side Zone A and covered by the definition of
credit institutions in accordance with EU leg-
islation, including their branches within the
Community;
f) “non-bank sector” shall mean all borrowers
other than credit institutions as defined in
points d and e of this paragraph, central banks
and central governments, regional govern-
ments and local authorities, the European
Communities, the European Investment Bank
(EIB) and multilateral development banks as
defined in point g of this paragraph;
g) “multilateral development banks” shall mean
the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, the Inter-Ame-
rican Development Bank, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the Council of Europe Develop-
ment Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, the
Caribbean Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, the European Invest
ment Fund, the Inter-American Invest-ment
Corporation and any other establishment
that may be included in this definition in
future, according to EU legislation;
h) “full-risk”, “medium-risk”,”medium/low-risk”
and “low-risk” off-balance-sheet items shall
mean the items referred to in Section six, para
2b hereof and listed in Annex I to this Act;
i) “parent undertaking”, “subsidiary” and “group
(of undertakings)” shall mean the legal persons
described in Article 42e of Law 2190/1920, as
amended, and in Article 2 of Presidential
Decree 267/1995, as amended;
j) For the purposes of Section six, paragraph 1,
point b, and of Section eight, the concept of
“local authorities” shall include non-com-
mercial administrative bodies responsible to
central governments or to local authorities
and those non-profit undertakings owned by
central governments or local authorities or
authorities which, in the view of the compe-
tent authorities, exercise the same responsi-
bilities as local authorities. The concept of
“local authorities” shall also include
churches and religious communities having
the status of legal persons under public law,
insofar as they are empowered by law to
impose taxes. However, in the latter case,
the option set out in Section seven shall not
apply.
k) “recognised exchanges” shall mean ex-
changes that, in the view of the Bank of
Greece:
— function regularly,
— are governed by rules issued or approved
by the competent authorities of the home
country of the exchange, which define the
conditions for the operation of the
exchange, the conditions of access thereto
as well as the conditions that must be sat-
isfied by a contract before it can effectively
be dealt on the exchange,
— have a clearing mechanism that provides
for contracts listed in Annex III to be sub-
ject to daily margin requirements offering
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04 97
adequate protection in the opinion of the
Bank of Greece.
SECTION THREE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. The solvency ratio referred to in the following
paragraphs expresses own funds, as defined in
Section four of this Act, as a proportion of total
assets and off-balance-sheet items, risk-adjusted
in accordance with Section five.
2. The solvency ratios of credit institutions which
are parent undertakings shall be calculated on a
consolidated basis in accordance with paragraphs 2
and 3 of Article 6 of Presidential Decree 267/1995.
3. Further to the provision of the previous paragraph,
all credit institutions authorised in Greece shall each
calculate an unconsolidated ratio and, whenever
required by the Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions, a
subconsolidated ratio.
4. Without prejudice to credit institutions' com-
pliance with the requirements of the previous
paragraphs of this section, solvency ratios shall be
calculated not less than four times each year. The
Bank of Greece may require more frequent calcu-
lation of solvency ratios.
5. The Bank of Greece may, by way of arrange-
ments based on the principle of reciprocity, dele-
gate to the competent authorities of another
Member State its responsibility for supervising
the solvency of credit institutions that have been
authorised in Greece and are subsidiaries of credit
institutions the registered offices of which are
located in the said EU Member State.
SECTION FOUR: OWN FUNDS
For the purposes of this Act, own funds shall be
defined as in Bank of Greece Governor's Act
2053/18 March 1992, as amended. Such own
funds shall form the numerator of the solvency
ratio.
SECTION FIVE: RISK-ADJUSTED ASSETS AND
OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS
1. The total of the risk-adjusted values of the
assets and off-balance-sheet items mentioned in
the following paragraphs shall form the denomi-
nator of the solvency ratio.
2. Degrees of credit risk, expressed as percen-
tage weightings, shall be assigned to asset items
in accordance with the provisions of Sections six
and seven and taking into account, when applic-
able, the exemptions referred to in Sections eight
and ten.
3. In the case of the off-balance-sheet items listed
in Annex I, a two-stage calculation as prescribed
in Section six, paragraph 3 hereinbelow, shall be
used.
4. In the case of the off-balance-sheet items
referred to in Annex III, the potential costs of
replacing contracts in the event of counterparty
default shall be calculated by means of one of the
two methods set out in Annex II. Those costs shall
be multiplied by the relevant counterparty weight-
ings as per Section six, paragraph 1, except that
the 100% weightings as provided for there shall
be replaced by 50% weightings to produce risk-
adjusted values.
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SECTION SIX: RISK WEIGHTINGS
1. Asset items:
The following weightings shall be applied to the
various categories of asset items:
a) Zero weighting:
(1) cash in hand and cash equivalent items;
(2) asset items constituting claims on Zone A
central governments and central banks;
(3) asset items constituting claims on the
European Communities;
(4) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantees of Zone A central
governments and central banks or of the
European Communities;
(5) asset items constituting claims on Zone B
central governments and central banks,
denominated and funded in the national
currencies of the borrowers;
(6) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantees of Zone B central
governments and central banks, denomi-
nated and funded in the national cur-
rency common to the guarantor and the
borrower;
(7) asset items secured, to the satisfaction of
the competent authorities, by collateral
in the form of Zone A central government
or central bank securities, or securities
issued by the European Communities, or
by cash deposits placed with the lending
institution or by certificates of deposits or
similar instruments issued by and lodged
with the latter.
b) 20% weighting:
(1) asset items constituting claims on the
European Investment Bank (EIB);
(2) asset items constituting claims on multi-
lateral development banks;
(3) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantee of the European
Investment Bank (EIB);
(4) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantee of multilateral devel-
opment banks;
(5) asset items constituting claims on Greek
local authorities or secured, to the satis-
faction of the Bank of Greece, by collat-
eral in the form of securities issued by
Greek local authorities, and claims on
Zone A regional governments or local
authorities, without prejudice to the pro-
visions of Section seven below;.
(6) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantee, including collat-
eral in the form of securities, of Greek
local authorities and Zone A regional gov-
ernments or local authorities, without
prejudice to the provisions of Section
seven below;.
(7) asset items constituting claims on Zone A
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credit institutions but constituting neither
such institutions' own funds as defined in
Bank of Greece Governor's Act 2053/18
March 1992, as amended, for credit insti-
tutions authorised in Greece, nor own
funds in accordance with the relevant EU
legislation for credit institutions estab-
lished in Zone A;
(8) asset items constituting claims, with a
maturity of one year or less, on Zone B
credit institutions, other than securities
issued by such institutions, and recog-
nised as components or their own
funds;
(9) asset items carrying the explicit guaran-
tee of Zone A credit institutions;
(10) asset items constituting claims with a
maturity of one year or less, carrying the
explicit guarantee of Zone B credit insti-
tutions;
(11) asset items secured, to the satisfaction of
the competent authorities, by collateral
in the form of securities issued by the
European Investment Bank or other mul-
tilateral development banks;
(12) cash items in the process of collection.
c) 50% weighting:
(1) Loans fully and completely secured, to
the satisfaction of the competent author-
ities, by mortgages on residential prop-
erty which is or will be occupied or let by
the borrower;
'Mortgage-backed securities' may be
treated as loans referred to herein or in
paragraph 4 of Section ten, if the Bank of
Greece, having regard to the related legal
framework in force in Greece, considers
them equivalent to such loans in terms
of credit risk. Without prejudice to the
types of securities which may qualify or
may be approved for inclusion in this
point (1), 'mortgage-backed securities'
may include instruments within the
meaning of Article 2, paragraph 1, point a
(i), case aa of Law 2396/1996. In particu-
lar, the following conditions must be ful-
filled, according to the judgement of the
Bank of Greece:
i) such securities are fully and directly
backed by a pool of mortgage loans
which have the same characteristics
as the loans described in this point (1)
or in paragraph 1 of Section ten and
are fully performing at the time of
securitisation;
ii) a mortgage lien, with an acceptably
high degree of priority, has been
established on the underlying prop-
erty either directly by investors in
mortgage-backed securities or, on
their behalf, by a trustee or another
authorised agent in proportion to
investors' individual holdings in the
pool of securities.
(2) Prepayments and accrued income, where
a credit institution is unable to determine
the risk weighting corresponding to the
counterparty.
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d) 100% weighting:
(1) asset items constituting claims on Zone
B central governments and central
banks except when denominated and
funded in the national currency of the
borrower;
(2) asset items constituting claims on Zone B
regional governments or local authorities;
(3) asset items constituting claims with a
maturity of more than one year on Zone
B credit institutions;
(4) asset items constituting claims on the
Zone A or Zone B non-bank sectors;
(5) tangible assets as follows:
i) land and buildings;
ii) plant and machinery;
iii) other fixtures and fittings, tools and
equipment;
iv) prepayments for the above tangible
assets and tangible assets in course of
construction;
(6) holdings of shares, participations and
other components of the own funds of
other credit institutions which are not
deducted from the own funds of the
lending institutions;
(7) A weighting premium of 150% shall apply
to the sum of the part of the value of the
following asset items that exceeds 30% of
the own funds of credit institutions:
i) land and buildings,
ii) participations, forming part of the
investment portfolio of credit institu-
tions, in the share capital of undertak-
ings whose main activity is to acquire
or manage real estate, as well as in the
share capital of undertakings whose
main activity is to acquire holdings in
the former undertakings, other than
partcipations deducted from the own
funds of the credit institution.
(8) All other assets except those deducted
from own funds.
2. Off-balance-sheet items:
a) The methods set out in Annex II shall be
applied to the off-balance-sheet items listed in
Annex III, except for:
— contracts traded on recognised exchanges;
— foreign-exchange contracts (except con-
tracts concerning gold) with an initial
maturity of up to 14 calendar days.
b) The following treatment shall apply to off-bal-
ance-sheet items other than those covered in
paragraph a):
i) They shall first be grouped according
to the risk groupings set out in
Annex I. The full value of the full-risk
items, 50% of the value of the medium-
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risk items and 20% of the medium/
low-risk items, including the portion
of unpaid capital subscribed to the
European Investment Fund, shall be
taken into account, while the value
of low-risk items shall be set at zero.
ii) The second stage shall be to multiply
the off-balance-sheet values, adjusted
as described above, by the weightings
attributable to the relevant counter-
parties, in accordance with the treat-
ment of asset items prescribed in
paragraph 1 of this section and in
Section seven. In the case of asset sale
and repurchase agreements and out-
right forward purchases, the weight-
ings shall be those attaching to the
assets in question and not to the
counterparties to the transactions.
c) Where off-balance-sheet items carry explicit
guarantees, they shall be weighted as if they
had been incurred on behalf of the guarantor
rather than the counterparty. Where the
potential exposure arising from off-balance-
sheet transactions is fully and completely
secured, to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by any of the asset items recog-
nised as collateral in Section six, paragraph 1
point a), number (7) and point b) number
(11), weightings of 0% or 20% shall apply,
depending on the collateral in question. A
50% weighting shall apply to off-balance-
sheet items which are sureties or guarantees
having the character of credit substitutes and
which are fully guaranteed, to the satisfac-
tion of the Bank of Greece, by mortgages
meeting the terms set out in point c(1) of
paragraph 1 of Section six, subject to the
guarantor having a direct right to the encum-
bered property.
d) Where asset and off-balance-sheet items are
given a lower weighting because of the exis-
tence of explicit guarantees or collateral
acceptable by the competent authorities, the
lower weighting shall apply only to that part
which is guaranteed or which is fully covered
by the collateral.
SECTION SEVEN: SPECIAL PROVISIONS
1. Credit institutions authorised in Greece shall
apply a zero weighting on their asset items and
off-balance-sheet items which constitute claims
on regional governments or local authorities of
other EU Member States, or claims either
secured, to the satisfaction of the Bank of Greece,
by collateral in the form of securities issued by
regional governments or local authorities of other
EU Member States or guaranteed thereby, pro-
vided that those Member States apply a zero
weighting to such items.
2. The Bank of Greece may change the weightings
referred to in points b(5) and b(6) of Section six,
notifying the Commission of the European
Communities accordingly.
SECTION EIGHT: COLLATERAL IN THE FORM OF
SECURITIES ISSUED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES
1. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 of Section
seven, a weighting of 20% shall apply to asset
items which are secured, to the satisfaction of
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04102
the Bank of Greece, either by collateral in the
form of securities issued by Zone A regional gov-
ernments or local authorities or by deposits
placed with Zone A credit institutions other than
the lending institution, or by certificates of
deposit or similar instruments issued by such
credit institutions.
2. The Bank of Greece shall notify the
Commission of the European Communities of any
provisions adopted pursuant to paragraph 1.
SECTION NINE: SOLVENCY RATIO LEVEL
1. With effect from 1 January 1993, credit institu-
tions shall be required permanently to maintain
the ratio defined in Section three at a level of at
least 8%. The Bank of Greece may prescribe
higher minimum ratios, pursuant to the relevant
provision of Law 2076/1992, Article 18, paragraph
1a, as amended.
2. If the ratio falls below 8%, the Bank of Greece
shall ensure that the credit institution in question
takes appropriate measures to restore the ratio to
the agreed minimum as quickly as possible.
3. The Bank of Greece may, on an individual
basis, exempt certain credit institutions from the
obligation to calculate the solvency ratio, in accor-
dance with paragraph 3 of Section three.
4. The Bank of Greece, in the context of its
responsibility to supervise the maintenance of the
minimum agreed solvency ratio by credit institu-
tions, shall ensure that the parent undertaking
takes all the necessary measures for the appropri-
ate allocation of capital within the group.
SECTION TEN: TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
1. a) Until 31 December 2006, credit institutions
may apply a 50% weighting to loans which
are entirely and completely secured, to the
satisfaction of the Bank of Greece, by mort-
gages on offices or on multi-purpose com-
mercial premises located within the territory
of Greece or of other EU Member States that
allow a 50% weighting for such loans, sub-
ject to the following conditions:
i) a 50% weighting applies to the part of the
loan that does not exceed 50% of the
market value of the property in question.
For the purpose of this Act, 'market value
of office or of multi-purpose commercial
premise' shall mean the price at which
the property could be sold under private
contract between a willing seller and an
arm's-length buyer on the date of valua-
tion, it being assumed that the property
is publicly exposed to the market, that
market conditions permit orderly dis-
posal and that a reasonable period, with
regard to the nature of the property, is
available for the negotiation of the sale.
The market value of the property must be
calculated by two different and indepen-
dent (from the borrower and from the
lending credit institution) valuers, mak-
ing separate assessments at the time
when the loan agreement is concluded.
Specifically:
— If the office or the multi-purpose com-
mercial premise is located in an area
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which is subject to the system of
“objective prices” established by the
Ministry of Economy and Finance of the
Hellenic Republic for the derivation of
real estate values for taxation purposes,
one of the two valuations of the market
value of the property must be the value
calculated on the basis of those prices.
— The part of the loan to carry the 50%
weighting shall be determined on the
basis of the lower of the two valuations.
— The property shall be revalued at least
every twelve months or, for loans
exceeding neither €1 million nor 5%
of the own funds of the credit institu-
tion, every three years. If the property
is located in an area that is subject to
the system of “objective prices”, no
revaluation by an independent valuer
shall be required, while in all other
cases the revaluation can be made by
only one independent valuer.
ii) a 100% risk weighting applies to the part
of the loan that exceeds the limits set out
in (i);
iii) the property is either used or let by the
owner.
b) *
c) For the loans that will have been granted
before 31 December 2006, the 50% risk
weighting remains applicable until their
maturity, if the credit institution is bound to
observe the contractual terms.
2. A 50% weighting shall apply to property leasing
transactions concluded before 31 December
2006 and concerning assets for business use
located in the country of the head office of the
institution and governed by legal provisions
whereby the lessor retains full ownership of the
rented asset until the tenant exercises his option
to purchase.
SECTION ELEVEN: OTHER PROVISIONS
1. For credit institutions established in Greece,
the operations referred to in the Annexes may be
conducted to the extent that they are permitted in
accordance with the relevant Greek legislation in
force. The same shall apply to the case of para-
graph 2 of Section ten.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 of Section
ten, capital requirements for credit risk shall be
determined by the provisions of this Act.
3. a) Regarding reporting requirements, the pro-
visions of Bank of Greece Governor's Act
1313/9 June 1998, as amended, shall apply
(latest amendment by the provisions of
Section E, paragraph 3, of Bank of Greece
Governor's Act 2494/27 May 2002).
b) In reporting under paragraph (a) above,
credit institutions shall report separately the
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* The provisions of paragraph b), which read as follows: “If the
50% risk weighting is already applied on loans granted before 4
October 2001, the conditions laid down in (i), (ii) and (iii) shall be
immediately fulfilled, with the exception of the provisions regard-
ing the previously described procedure of valuation of the market
value of offices or of multi-purpose commercial premises, the
application of which shall have been concluded by 4 October
2002 at the latest”, are no longer applicable.
items referred to in paragraph 1(d), point
(7), of Section six.
4. With effect from the publication of this Act, the
provisions of Bank of Greece Governor's Acts
2054/18 March 1992, 2349/15 February 1995,
2387/6 May 1996, 2409/27 March 1997, 2479/27
August 2001, as well as the provisions of para-
graphs 2, 3 and 5 of Bank of Greece Governor's
Act 2512/30 December 2002 shall be repealed.
References to the Acts repealed as above shall be
construed as references to the present Act, being
a codification of the former.
The Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions is
hereby authorised to provide any further instruc-
tions and information relating to the application
hereof.
5. Annexes π, ππ and πππ shall form an integral part
of this Act.
*   *   *
R e: Codification and supplementation of the
Monetary and Credit Committee Decision 485/8/7
October 1991, as applicable, regarding the banks’
debtor reporting to the Bank of Greece on a semi-
annual basis (Banking and Credit Committee
Decision 159/6/26 September 2003)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having
regard to:
a) Monetary and Credit Committee Decision
485/8/7 October 1991, as applicable (last
amended by Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2523/2003), regarding the banks’ debtor
reporting to the Bank of Greece on a semi-
annual basis;
b) the advisability of codifying the above provi-
sions into a single text and treating on a con-
solidated basis the said reporting require-
ment;
has decided:
to codify and supplement as follows the Monetary
and Credit Committee Decision 485/8/7 October
1991, as applicable:
1. a) Credit institutions operating in Greece and
branches of credit institutions established
abroad shall report to the Bank of Greece,
on a semi-annual basis, their debtors (nat-
ural and/or legal persons) whose total out-
standing balance exceeds, per debtor, one
million five hundred thousand euro
(€1,500,000).
b) The following debtors shall be excluded
from the reporting requirement;
— central government;
— credit institutions;
— legal persons operating exclusively abroad,
provided they are not members of a group
of companies established in Greece;
— natural persons-non residents of Greece.
2. In order to determine whether a debtor is in
excess of the above ceiling (€1,500,000), the sum
total of each debtor’s liabilities towards the credit
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institution shall be taken into consideration. Such
total shall include any borrowing, letters of guaran-
tee in effect, liabilities stemming from leasing and
factoring contracts, debt securities, financial deriv-
atives as well as any other off-balance sheet items.
3. Even if a debtor reduces his/her outstanding
debt below the said ceiling after the first report,
he/she shall not be removed from the relevant list,
unless his/her overall debt, calculated as above,
falls below the amount of three hundred thousand
euro (€300,000).
4. The above data shall be reported on a consoli-
dated basis within two (2) months from the end of
every calendar six-month period. Particularly with
respect to 31 December 2003 data, the deadline
for the report shall be the 31st March 2004.
5. The Bank of Greece Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions is
hereby authorised to provide clarifications and
instructions regarding the compilation and sub-
mission of the above reports.
6. The following shall be hereby abolished:
a) Monetary and Credit Committee Decision
485/8/7 October 1991, as amended by:
i) Monetary and Credit Committee
Decision 540/14/17 March 1994,
ii) paragraph 1 of Section VI of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2485/31 January
2002, and
iii)Section C of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2523/2003; any reference to the said
Decision shall henceforth be considered
to refer to the present Decision.
b) Tables C4, C4a, C5, C5a and C6 of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 1313/9 June 1988, as
applicable.
*   *   *
R e: Codification and supplementation of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 1379/24 October 1988, as
applicable, regarding the requirements for granting
authorisation to a credit institution in Greece (Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2526/8 December 2003)
The Governor of the Bank of Greece, having
regard to:
a) Article 55A of the Statute of the Bank of
Greece;
b) Article 1 of Law 1266/1982 “Authorities
responsible for the conduct of monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”;
c) Law 1665/1951 “Banking operations and
supervision”, as applicable;
d) Law 2076/1992 “Taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions, and other
related provisions”, as applicable;
e) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2471/10 April
2001 “Specifying the minimum initial capital
of credit institutions”;
f) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 1379/1988, as
applicable, regarding the requirements for
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granting authorisation to a credit institution in
Greece;
g) the need to codify into a single text the pro-
cedure for granting authorisation to credit
institutions in Greece, as specified by Law
2076/1992 and Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 1379/24 October 1998, as applicable,
without prejudice to Law 2076/1992 being
applicable where appropriate;
has decided:
to codify and supplement as follows Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 1379/24 October 1988, as
applicable.
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CREDIT INSTITUTION
IN GREECE
In order for the Bank of Greece to authorise the
establishment and operation of a credit institution
(as defined in Article 2, paragraph 1 (a), of Law
2076/1992, as applicable) in Greece, in the form
of a société anonyme or a pure credit cooperative
under Law 1667/1986, as applicable, the follow-
ing procedure shall be followed:
1. The credit institution under establishment shall
deposit in cash with the Bank of Greece the total
amount of the initial capital required under Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2471/10 April 2001, as
applicable, before the Bank of Greece communi-
cates the decision granting authorisation. This
amount shall remain in deposit until the legal
entity of the credit institution has been officially
established.
2. The credit institution shall submit an application
to the Bank of Greece containing the following par-
ticulars along with the required supporting docu-
ments:
a) Identification of the natural or legal persons
which hold, directly or indirectly, at least
10% of the capital or voting rights of the
credit institution, or, when these share-
holders are less than ten, identification of
the ten (10) biggest shareholders. In the
case of shareholders that are legal entities,
the Bank of Greece may require identifica-
tion of the natural persons who directly or
indirectly are in control of such legal enti-
ties; at the same time, the credit institution
shall undertake the obligation to notify the
Bank of Greece promptly of any subse-
quent changes of the said natural persons.
In assessing applications for authorisation, the
Bank of Greece shall take favourably into account
the dispersion of the credit institution’s shares,
ensuring also in that case effective supervision in
respect of the credit institution’s sound and pru-
dent management.
The biggest shareholders and the persons who
directly or indirectly are in control of shareholder
legal entities shall be determined in accordance
with Article 2, paragraphs 9 and 10, of Law
2076/1992, as applicable, and Articles 7 and 8 of
Presidential Decree 51/1992, as applicable.
b) In respect of the biggest shareholders, the
following additional documents shall be
submitted:
i) A questionnaire available from the Bank
of Greece Department for the Supervision
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of Credit and Financial Institutions
(Form A for natural persons, Form B for
legal entities), duly filled in and signed.
ii) Copy of type A criminal record (for share-
holders that are natural persons).
iii) Non-bankruptcy certificate.
c) Declaration of the shareholders holding
more than 5%, stating the sources of the
funds with which they will acquire their
shares, as specified by current legislation
(Article 40 of Law 1806/1988). This decla-
ration shall be accompanied by certified
copies of the last three years’ income tax
returns and the respective tax payment
notifications. In the event of lawful exemp-
tion from the obligation to submit income
tax returns or if the funds to be used for the
acquisition of the shares constitute income
that was lawfully not included in the
income tax returns, the concerned parties
shall provide other equivalent proof, as
judged by the Bank of Greece, of the origin
of these funds.
d) Identification of two persons (of which one
shall be a Board of Directors member) who
shall be working exclusively at the credit
institution and shall be responsible for
defining its scope of activity.
e) Identification of the person in charge of the
Internal Audit Unit, in accordance with the
Banking and Credit Committee Decision
154/9/18 July 2003; and
f) Identification of a person responsible for
the credit institution’s compliance with
anti-money laundering legislation (Article
4, paragraph 10, of Law 2331/1995, as
applicable).
For the persons referred to in indents d,e,f, who
shall be working exclusively at the credit institu-
tion, the following documents shall be submitted
to the Bank of Greece before the credit institu-
tion’s start of operation, as evidence of their reli-
ability and suitability for their tasks so as to
ensure the sound and prudent management of the
credit institution, pursuant to Law 2076/1992, as
applicable:
i) the supporting documents referred to in
paragraph 2 (b) above;
ii) complete curricula vitae with informa-
tion on the above persons’ professional
background and previous experience in
equivalent positions in the financial sec-
tor;
iii) two letters of recommendation for each
person; these letters must not come
from shareholders, prospective Board
members or executives of the credit
institution to be established or its affili-
ated undertakings, within the meaning
of Article 42e of Law 2190/1920, as
applicable.
In exceptional circumstances, if, at the time when
the application is submitted to the Bank of Greece,
it is impossible to identify the persons referred to in
indents (e) and (f) of paragraph 2 hereinabove, the
Bank of Greece may grant authorisation conditional
upon the fulfilment of this requirement prior to the
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incorporation of the credit institution and subject to
the approval of the Bank of Greece Department for
the Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions.
g) Identification of the Board of Directors mem-
bers, distinguishing between executive and
non-executive members, along with the sup-
porting documents referred to in paragraph
2(b), indents (ii) and (iii), and paragraph 2(f),
indent (ii), for each member. In assessing the
application, the Bank of Greece shall evaluate
the professional qualifications and experience
of the non-executive members of the Board
of Directors on issues of internal audit and
accounting procedures, in accordance with
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2438/6 August
1998, as amended by Banking and Credit
Committee Decision 154/9/18 July 2003.
h) Draft Articles of Association.
i) A feasibility study, containing full and
detailed description of the business, bro-
ken down by type of activity and by type of
investment services, within the meaning of
Law 2396/1996, as applicable, to be offered
by the credit institution, as well as its busi-
ness plan for the first three (3) years of
operation. The study shall be based on a
research of the Greek financial market,
shall take into account the financial integra-
tion process within the European Economic
Area and shall refer to the geographical
area and the customer group to be targeted
by the credit institution. The feasibility
study shall also include:
i) Identification of the sources of financ-
ing and forecasts on the development
of balance sheet and profit & loss account
key items and of cash flows.
ii) Data on the expected path of the capi-
tal adequacy ratio during the first three
(3) years of the credit institution’s oper-
ation, under Bank of Greece Governor’s
Acts 2524/2003 and 2397/1996, as
applicable, specifying the methods
used for the assessment of credit, mar-
ket and operational risks.
iii) Detailed organisational and administra-
tive structure of the credit institution,
accompanied by its organisation charts,
specifically indicating the composition,
and the position within these charts, of
the Committees for internal audit and
risk management (Bank of Greece Gover-
nor’s Act 2438/1998, as applicable); also
the number and qualifications of the per-
sonnel staffing the institution’s units as
well as the selection criteria for any
external collaborators to which the
credit institution will outsource the pro-
motion of its products and services.
iv) Description of the marketing methods
that will be applied to the credit institu-
tion’s products.
v) Description of the accounting system
and auditing procedures.
vi) Description of IT systems (hardware,
software, network infrastructure) and
of the method for interoperability with
third parties’ IT systems, with special
emphasis on the mechanisms ensuring
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safe and continuous operation; also,
description of the credit institution’s
management information system.
vii) The Policy for the Security of IT Systems.
viii) The internal rules of the credit institu-
tion specifying the methods for rating
and classifying the credit standing of
customers, as well as the procedures to
be applied for the control of the institu-
tion’s branches abroad and subsidiaries,
in accordance with the provisions on
internal audit systems (Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2438/1998 and Law
2331/1995, as applicable) and the related
circulars of the Bank of Greece.
3. The Bank of Greece shall reserve the right to
request additional information and data for grant-
ing the authorisation.
In the event that any data or information provided
in compliance with this Act are inaccurate or mis-
leading, the Bank of Greece shall reserve the right
to revoke authorisation, in accordance with
Article 8 of Law 2076/1992, as applicable.
4. The information referred to in paragraph 2,
indents (a) to (g) above, shall also be submitted
during the operation of the credit institution in the
case of prospective shareholders of a qualifying
holding, as defined in Article 17 of Law
2076/1992, as applicable, as well as in the event
of a change either in the persons responsible for
the credit institution’s operation, for its internal
audit and for the implementation of procedures
under Law 2331/95, as applicable, or in the Board
of Directors members.
Credit institutions shall inform holders of securi-
ties convertible into equity that if, by exercising
their relevant right, they acquire a qualifying hold-
ing in the share capital or become major share-
holders of the credit institution, within the mean-
ing of paragraph 2 (a) of this section, they shall be
subject to the requirement to report particulars to
the Bank of Greece and to obtain approval
thereby, under Article 17 of Law 2076/1992 and
this Act.
In the context of its powers stipulated in the sec-
ond and third indents of Article 17, paragraph 1a,
of Law 2076/1996, as applicable, the Bank of
Greece may, at any time during the operation of
the credit institution, require identification of the
natural persons who directly or indirectly control
the  legal entities which are the credit institution’s
biggest shareholders, within the meaning of para-
graph 2(a) of this section.
µ. ESTABLISHMENT OF BRANCHES OF CREDIT
INSTITUTIONS HAVING THEIR HEAD OFFICE
OUTSIDE THE EEA
The establishment in Greece of branches by credit
institutions having their head office in a non-EU
country or a country that has not ratified the
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA)
shall be governed by Law 2076/1992 (Article 12)
and Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2461/5 April
2000, subject to the following terms and condi-
tions:
1. The credit institution shall submit an applica-
tion to the Bank of Greece.
2. For establishing up to four branches in Greece,
the credit institution shall deposit an initial capital
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at least equal to half of the initial capital each time
required for establishing a credit institution in
Greece in the form of a société anonyme. For more
branches, additional capital shall be required, up to
the minimum amount stipulated in Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2471/10 April 2001, as applicable,
on the establishment of a credit institution in
Greece in the form of a société anonyme.
3. The competent authority of the credit institu-
tion’s home country shall communicate to the
Bank of Greece:
a) the registered name of the credit institution
and the postal address of its branch in
Greece;
b) the particulars referred to in paragraph 2
(f), items (i) and (ii), of Section A above, in
respect of:
i) the two persons that will be in charge of
the management of the branch; these
must be residents of Greece and have
adequate professional qualifications and
experience;
ii) the person responsible for the credit insti-
tution’s compliance with Law 2331/1995,
as applicable, on the prevention and sup-
pression of money laundering;
c) the branch’s organisation chart and its
business plan, which shall include, inter
alia, the types of business that the branch
plans to engage in; this business must fall
within the scope of the authorisation
granted to the credit institution in its home
country;
d) information on the deposit guarantee
scheme applicable in the institution’s home
country, if such scheme also covers
deposits held with the branch in Greece;
e) the credit institution’s own funds and its
capital adequacy ratio;
f) its consent to the credit institution’s expan-
sion to Greece.
The credit institution shall also report any addi-
tional information and data that may be required
by the Bank of Greece in order to get an accurate
picture, for supervisory purposes, of the credit
institution’s business (e.g. information regarding
its financial soundness, capital adequacy against
credit and market risks, compliance with limits on
large exposures, adequacy of internal audit sys-
tems, etc.).
C. ESTABLISHMENT IN GREECE OF BRANCHES
OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS HAVING THEIR
HEAD OFFICE IN THE EEA
A credit institution established and operating in
another country within the EEA may operate in
Greece, provided that its home supervisory author-
ity has previously communicated to the Bank of
Greece the following particulars, in accordance
with Article 11 of Law 2076/1992, as applicable:
a) the branch’s address wherefrom written
information can be obtained;
b) the branch’s organisation chart and its
business plan, which shall include inter alia
the types of business that the branch plans
to engage in;
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c) the names of the persons in charge of the
management of the branch;
d) the credit institution’s own funds and its
capital adequacy ratio;
e) detailed information on the deposit guaran-
tee scheme applicable in the credit institu-
tion’s home country, if such scheme also
covers the deposits held with the branch in
Greece.
From the entry into force of this Act, Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 1379/1988, as amended
by Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 1590/21 July
1989 and Monetary and Credit Committee
Decisions 474/3/29 May 1991 and 494/2/26
February 1992, shall be repealed and any refer-
ence to them shall be construed as reference to
this Act.
*   *   *
R e: Rules for the prudential supervision of electronic
money institutions by the Bank of Greece (Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2527/8 December 2003)
The Governor of the Bank of Greece, having
regard to:
a) the Statute of the Bank of Greece, in partic-
ular Articles 55, paragraph 21, 55A, 55C and
55D thereof;
b) Article 1 of Law 1266/1982 “Authorities
responsible for the conduct of monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions”, in conjunction with Article 12
of Law 2548/1997;
c) Law 2076/1992 “Taking up and pursuit of
the business of credit institutions, and other
related provisions, as amended by Law
3148/2003 “Committee for the Accounting
Standardisation and Auditing, replacement
and supplementation of provisions on elec-
tronic money institutions”;
d) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2526/8
December 2003 “Codification and supple-
mentation of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
1379/1988, as applicable, regarding the
requirements for granting authorisation to a
credit institution in Greece” and the Mone-
tary and Credit Committee Decision 505/8/
1992 on the assessment criteria applied by
the Bank of Greece to the establishment of
new units by credit institutions, as applica-
ble;
e) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2524/2003
“Codification of the provisions of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2054/18 March
1992, as amended, on the solvency ratio of
credit institutions established in Greece”;
f) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2397/1996
“Capital adequacy of credit institutions”, as
applicable (last amended by Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2494/2002);
g) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2246/1993
“Supervision and monitoring of credit insti-
tutions’ large exposures”, as applicable;
h) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 1313/1988
on the Bank of Greece reporting require-
ments on credit institutions, as applicable;
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i) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2438/1998
“Operation principles and evaluation criteria
for the Internal Audit Systems of credit insti-
tutions and determination of competence
for credit institutions’ bodies pertaining to
the field of Internal Audit”, as applicable;
j) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002
“Informing credit institutions’ customers on
the terms and conditions applying to their
transactions”;
k) Monetary and Credit Committee Decision
595/2/27 June 1997 on imposing sanctions
to credit institutions in the event of a delay
in submitting supervisory information to the
Bank of Greece, as well as Governor’s Act
2484/2001 on retaining counterfeit euro
banknotes and coins;
l) Monetary Policy Council Act 50/31 July
2002 “Determining a framework for the
supervision of payment systems”;
m)the need to further specify the supervision
of electronic money institutions, on the
basis of the relevant authorisation under
Law 3148/2003;
has decided that:
I. Bank of Greece terms and conditions for grant-
ing authorisation to an electronic money institution
1. Electronic Money Institutions, as defined in
Article 2, paragraph 16, of Law 2076/1992, as
applicable, shall, prior to their start of operation,
apply to the Bank of Greece for authorisation,
complying with the procedure described in
Section A of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2526/8 December 2003;
2. The supporting documents and the feasibility
study accompanying the (pertinent to the afore-
mentioned general provisions) application shall
also specify the following:
a) the type of the electronic device where the
monetary value of the electronic money will
be stored (e.g. a microchip embedded in a
card or a computer memory);
b) the procedures and means for the operation
of the issuance-distribution-management of
the electronic money scheme;
c) the maximum storage capacity per elec-
tronic device;
d) the conditions of, and the threshold for,
redemption;
e) the anticipated, during the first three (3) years
from the Electronic Money Institution’s start
of operation, performance of the six-month
average balance of its total financial liabilities
related to outstanding electronic money.
ππ. Prudential supervision rules applicable to
Electronic Money Institutions
∞. Acquisition of qualifying holdings
1. Electronic Money Institutions shall obtain rele-
vant permission by the Bank of Greece prior to:
a) acquiring for the first time a “qualifying hold-
ing”, within the meaning of Article 2, para-
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graph 10, of Law 2076/1992, as applicable, in
the share capital of an undertaking conduct-
ing operational or other ancillary business
related to electronic money issued or distrib-
uted by the particular Electronic Money
Institution, if the value of this holding exceeds
2% of the Electronic Money Institution’s own
funds as recorded at the end of the preceding
calendar six-month period;
b) increasing an existing “qualifying holding”,
approved as above, if the cumulative value of
this increase within each calendar year
exceeds 5% of the Electronic Money
Institution’s own funds as recorded at the end
of the preceding calendar six-month period.
2. Electronic Money Institutions shall communi-
cate to the Bank of Greece (Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions)
any increases in qualifying holdings for which no
prior permission is required, as per the above
paragraph, within ten days from the acquisition of
such increased holdings.
µ. Own funds
For the implementation of Law 2076/1992, as
applicable, and the provisions herein, own funds
shall be considered as those defined in Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2053/18 March 1992, as
applicable, with the following adjustment:
With respect to the additional items (Tier 2)
referred to in Section C, Chapter I, of the above
mentioned Act, fixed-term cumulative preferential
shares and fixed-term subordinated loans as
defined in indents (i) and (ii) of paragraph 4
thereof shall not be taken into consideration.
C. Rules on investments
1. Electronic Money Institutions, in order to con-
form to the obligation derived from Article 20c,
paragraph 1,  of Law 2076/1992, as applicable, shall
invest exclusively in the following highly liquid
assets an amount at least equal to their financial lia-
bilities related to outstanding electronic money:
a) Cash in hand and cash equivalent items, as
well as asset items constituting claims on
Zone A central governments and central
banks and on the European Communities or
claims carrying the explicit guarantee of Zone
A central governments and central banks or
of the European Communities and a 0% credit
risk weighting, in accordance with Section 6,
paragraph 1(a), items 1 to 4 of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2524/23 July 2003;
b) Sight deposits held with Zone A credit insti-
tutions, attracting a 20% weighting, in accor-
dance with Section 6, paragraph 1(b) of the
aforementioned Act;
c) Negotiable debt instruments recognised as
“qualifying items” with a 20% risk weight-
ing, according to indent (d) of Section D,
Chapter A.I of Annex I to Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2397/1996, as amended and
partly supplemented with Annex II to Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2494/27 May
2002, provided that:
i) they are not issued by undertakings having
a qualifying holding in the Electronic
Money Institution, within the meaning of
Article 2, paragraph 10, of Law 2076/1992,
as applicable, or by undertakings included
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in the consolidated financial accounts of
the former undertakings, in accordance
with applicable law;
ii) they are not subordinated securities
included in credit institutions’ own funds.
2. To ensure sufficient liquidity throughout the
operation of the Electronic Money Institution,
apart from the obligation stipulated in paragraph 1
above, an amount of at least 20% of the sum of
the Institution’s total financial liabilities related to
outstanding electronic money plus any other out-
standing liabilities shall be covered by the
Institution’s holdings of sight deposits as referred
to in paragraph 1, indent (b) above and of securi-
ties eligible as collateral for the conduct of the
Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations.
3. The Bank of Greece reserves the right to
amend the rules on Electronic Money Institutions’
investments.
4. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article
20c, paragraph 5, of Law 2076/1992, as applica-
ble, on valuation, it is hereby specified that in par-
ticular for the calculation of the general position
risk and the exchange rate risk, as provided in
indents (c) and (d), paragraph 2, Section D of this
Chapter, the current market value plus any
accrued interest shall be used.
D. Hedging risk arising from investments made by
Electronic Money Institutions
1. Large exposures
With respect to Electronic Money Institutions’ asset
and off-balance sheet items, the provisions of Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2246/1993, as applica-
ble, shall apply with the following exceptions:
a) Indent (c), paragraph 4, of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2397/1996, as applicable,
whereby any excess of limits that arises
exclusively from trading book items is
allowed, shall not apply.
b) No exposures shall be allowed to natural or
legal persons which either have a qualifying
holding (within the meaning of Article 2, para-
graph 10, of Law 2076/1992, as applicable) in
the Electronic Money Institution or are among
its five (5) biggest shareholders, or to under-
takings controlled by such persons.
2. Hedging market risks
For the implementation of Article 20c, paragraph 3,
of Law 2076/1992, as applicable, Electronic Money
Institutions:
a) may use interest-rate- and foreign-exchange-
related financial derivatives which are trad-
able in the stock exchanges located in the
European Economic Area, the USA, Canada,
Japan, Australia or Switzerland and which
are subject to daily margin requirements.
They may also use OTC foreign-exchange
forwards with an original maturity of 14 cal-
endar days, provided that the counterparty
is a Zone A credit institution;
b) shall calculate the exchange rate risk in all
their activities according to the instructions
included in Section B, Annex I, of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2397/1996, as
applicable;
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c) shall assess their general position risk by
currency, in accordance with Table 2A of
Annex II of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2397/1996, as applicable, for their entire
portfolio of negotiable debt securities,
including their positions in derivatives
instruments;
d) shall submit for assessment to the Bank of
Greece (Department for the Supervision of
Credit and Financial Institutions) the meth-
ods of market risk calculation and hedging
they apply.
The sum total of the above calculations (para-
graphs b to d above) shall be deducted from the
Electronic Money Institution’s own funds, as cal-
culated according to Section B of this Chapter.
E. Rules for the Electronic Money Institutions’
internal audit
1. Electronic Money Institutions shall have an
internal audit system ensuring the effective and
safe operation of electronic money applications,
as provided for in Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2438/1998, as applicable.
2. The provisions of Monetary Policy Council Act
50/31 July 2002 “Payment systems oversight”
shall also apply to “electronic money schemes”.
F. Reporting to the Bank of Greece
1. Electronic Money Institutions shall report to the
Bank of Greece (Department for the Supervision of
Credit and Financial Institutions) on:
a) the total amount of their own funds;
b) the total amount of their financial liabilities
related to outstanding electronic money;
c) the average balance, for the preceding cal-
endar six-month period, of their financial
liabilities related to outstanding electronic
money;
d) data related to the general risk from posi-
tions in negotiable debt instruments referred
to in indents (a) and (c), paragraph 1, of
Section IIC hereof and in derivatives instru-
ments, by filling in Table 2A of Annex II of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2397/1996,
as applicable. An appendix to this table shall
quote the issuer of the instruments, along
with their book and market values.
e) data referring to their foreign-exchange
exposure, by submitting the relevant tables
contained in Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2291/1194, according to the instructions
set out in Section B of Annex I of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2397/1996, as
amended and supplemented with Section B
of Annex I of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2494/2002.
2. The above mentioned data shall be submitted
to the Bank of Greece (Department for the
Supervision of Credit and Financial Institutions)
within the deadlines stipulated in Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2494/27 May 2002, as applicable.
3. Electronic Money Institutions shall also report
to the Bank of Greece other data from their finan-
cial statements, according to the specific instruc-
tions of the Department for the Supervision of
Credit and Financial Institutions.
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III. Waiver
1. The Bank of Greece may, by means of an ad
hoc decision, waive the application of the provi-
sions of Law 2076/1992, as applicable, and of this
Act to an Electronic Money Institution, if it deems
that the waiver criteria stipulated in Article 20,
paragraphs 1 and 2, of the aforementioned law
are met. In any event, this waiver shall be without
prejudice to paragraphs 16 and 17 of Article 2
“Definitions”, paragraphs 1,2,4 and 5 of Article 4a
“Restrictions on electronic money issuance”,
Article 4b “Redeemability”, paragraph 1 of Article
20a “Terms and conditions for the establishment
and operation of electronic money institutions”,
Article 20e “Verification of conformity to the
obligations of electronic money institutions” and
paragraph 3 of Article 20f “Waiver” of the above
mentioned law.
2. The application for granting a waiver to an
Electronic Money Institution shall be submitted to
the Bank of Greece along with the following par-
ticulars:
a) Any business activity that the Electronic
Money Institution is engaged in, other than
electronic money issuance;
b) List with the undertakings affiliated, within
the meaning of Article 42e, paragraph 5, of
Law 2190/1920, as applicable, to the
Electronic Money Institution, wherein the
type of affiliation and the business scope of
these undertakings shall be detailed. The list
shall also contain separately any affiliated
undertakings conducting operational or other
ancillary business related to electronic money
issued by the Electronic Money Institution;
c) List with the undertakings that accept the
electronic money issued by the Electronic
Money Institution as a means of payment
but do not fall under the above mentioned
categories (a) and (b) The list shall also indi-
cate the location of such undertakings, as
well as any existing financial or business
relationship between them and the
Electronic Money Institution-issuer.
d) The particulars set out in paragraph 2,
Section I, hereof.
3. Any Electronic Money Institution to which a
waiver was granted according to this section shall:
a) Notify the Bank of Greece immediately on
any changes in the information submitted as
per paragraph 2 of this section.
b) Submit to the Bank of Greece, at the latest
within three months from the end of the first
and the second calendar six-month periods
of each year, a report on the total amount of
its financial liabilities related to outstanding
electronic money (as on 31 December and
30 June).
c) If the amount of the Electronic Money
Institution’s financial liabilities related to
outstanding electronic money exceeds:
i) the ceiling of three million euro
(€3,000,000) for a period of 20 days
within each calendar year or the ceiling
of four million euro (€4,000,000) for one
working day (in the event that the
Institution has been granted a waiver
according to the provisions of Article 20f,
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paragraph 1(a), of Law 2076/1992, as
applicable) or
ii) the ceiling of eight million euro
(€8,000,000) for one working day (in
the event that the institution has been
granted a waiver according to the provi-
sions of Article 20f, paragraphs 1(b) or
1(c), of Law 2076/1992, as applicable),
the waiver shall be revoked and the institution
which had been granted a waiver shall there-
after be governed by all the provisions applica-
ble to the authorisation of Electronic Money
Institutions.
IV. Establishment in Greece of branches of
Electronic Money Institutions having their head
office outside the EEA
1. In order for an Electronic Money Institution
having its head office outside the EEA to obtain
authorisation to establish a branch, the initial cap-
ital invested shall be at least equal to the capital
required for the establishment of an Electronic
Money Institution in Greece (currently amounting
to €3,000,000).
2. Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2461/2000, as
applicable, shall apply by analogy to the calcula-
tion of own funds and to compliance with pru-
dential supervision rules, as established by Law
2076/1992, as applicable, and this Act.
V. Other provisions
1. Electronic Money Institutions shall also be
subject to the provisions of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Acts 2501/2002 and 2484/2001,
Monetary and Credit Committee Decision
505/8/1992, as applicable, regarding the estab-
lishment of new branches abroad, and Monetary
and Credit Committee Decision 595/2/1997, as
well as Presidential Decree 384/1992 on the Chart
of Accounts for the Banking Sector.
2. The Monetary Policy and Banking Department
of the Bank of Greece is hereby authorised to pro-
vide clarifications and instructions related to the
application of this Act.
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04118
Statistical
section
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04120
Tables I. Prices and economic activity
1. Consumer price index 123
2. Wholesale price index 124
3. Industrial production index 125
4. Retail sales volume 126
5. Gross added value at basic prices
and gross domestic product at 
market prices 127
II. External transactions
1. Balance of payments 128
2. Effective exchange rate of the
euro calculated on the basis of
Greece’s external trade 129
3. Bilateral exchange rates of 
the euro 130-131
4. General government external
debt servicing 132
III. Monetary aggregates and interest rates
1. Monetary aggregates of the euro area 133
2. Greek contribution to the main 
monetary aggregates of the euro area 134
3. Deposits of domestic firms and
households with OMFIs, 
by currency and type 135
4. Domestic MFI loans to domestic
enterprises and households, 
by branch of economic activity 136
5. ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates 137
6. Greek government paper yields 138
7. Bank deposit and lending rates
in Greece 139
IV. Public finance
1. Borrowing requirement of central
government and public entities 140
2. Financing of borrowing requirement
of central government and public
entities 141
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04122
Statistical section
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 22   1/04 123
1999  . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.0 2.9 1.7 4.1 2.4 1.8 –1.7
2000  . . . . . . . . 3.2 2.0 2.0 3.4 2.8 1.9 1.4 26.8
2001  . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.7 5.1 9.2 –4.8
2002  . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.3 5.3 13.8 –1.7
2001 I  . . . . . . 3.3 3.8 3.8 2.9 3.9 1.9 –5.7 3.4
II  . . . . . . 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.6 7.4 2.4
IIπ  . . . . . 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.6 6.2 14.0 –4.4
IV  . . . . . 2.7 3.4 3.6 2.2 3.6 7.8 23.7 –18.7
2002 I  . . . . . . 4.0 3.4 3.3 4.0 3.9 9.9 43.2 –7.4
II  . . . . . . 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.0 4.4 4.7 9.0 –4.9
III  . . . . . 3.5 3.6 3.7 2.7 4.6 4.0 4.5 –0.4
IV  . . . . . 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 2.9 1.0 6.7
2003 I  . . . . . . 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.5 2.3 –5.4 15.9
II  . . . . . . 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.4 4.1 8.3 27.6 –2.4
III  . . . . . 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 4.1 6.1 19.2 0.9
2001 Jan.  . . . . 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.7 1.9 –4.2 5.8
Feb.  . . . . 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.3 4.0 1.7 –7.0 6.2
March  . . 3.0 3.7 3.9 2.3 4.1 2.1 –5.9 –1.5
Apr.  . . . . 3.5 3.7 3.9 3.1 4.1 2.5 –4.3 4.9
May  . . . . 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.3 4.6 8.1 5.3
June  . . . 3.9 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.7 6.8 20.8 –2.6
July  . . . . 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.9 6.4 16.4 –5.1
Aug.  . . . 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.6 5.9 11.8 –3.7
Sept.  . . . 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.3 6.4 14.0 –4.3
Oct.  . . . 2.8 3.5 3.7 2.2 3.7 6.5 14.3 –15.6
Nov.  . . . 2.4 3.6 3.8 1.4 3.9 6.8 17.1 —22.1
Dec.  . . . 3.0 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.3 10.1 39.6 –18.3
2002 Jan.  . . . . 4.4 3.2 3.3 5.2 3.3 12.9 59.0 –6.4
Feb.  . . . . 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.9 8.6 38.1 –10.3
March  . . 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.4 8.1 33.4 –5.5
Apr.  . . . . 3.8 3.5 3.4 4.0 3.6 7.2 26.7 –2.9
May  . . . . 3.8 4.3 4.2 2.4 4.9 3.0 –0.6 –6.8
June  . . . 3.3 3.8 3.9 2.5 4.5 3.9 2.2 –4.8
July  . . . . 3.3 3.5 3.7 2.7 4.4 3.9 1.7 –1.0
Aug.  . . . 3.5 3.6 3.6 2.9 4.5 4.2 6.1 0.5
Sept.  . . . 3.5 3.8 3.7 2.7 4.8 3.9 5.8 –0.8
Oct.  . . . 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.2 4.6 4.1 8.1 4.3
Nov.  . . . 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.1 4.5 4.0 6.3 4.0
Dec.  . . . 3.4 3.5 3.5 2.8 4.3 0.8 –9.1 12.1
2003 Jan.  . . . . 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.1 4.7 –1.4 –19.6 13.7
Feb.  . . . . 4.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.7 3.7 –0.5 18.6
March  . . 4.1 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.5 15.4
Apr.  . . . . 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 4.5 5.8 10.9 –1.9
May  . . . . 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.7 10.3 40.2 –3.7
June  . . . 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.6 4.2 8.9 34.6 –1.6
July  . . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.2 4.1 7.4 28.5 0.5
Aug.  . . . 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.8 4.0 5.6 17.0 1.6
Sept.  . . . 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 4.2 5.2 12.6 0.7
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dec.  . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.2 4.5 3.0 3.2 –1.4
T a b l e  I.1
Consumer price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Source: Calculations based on National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) data (CPI 1999=100).
General
index
General
index
excluding
food and fuel
General index
excluding fresh
fruit/vegetables
and fuel Goods Services
Sub-indices
Food and
non-alcoholic
beverages
Fresh fruit
and vegetables FuelPeriod
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Source: NSSG.
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 2.2 2.8 0.5 0.6
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 1.5 5.2 12.3 6.4
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 10.0 2.7 0.7 1.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 11.2 2.6 1.9 0.4
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 34.7 2.6 2.4 0.6
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 6.9 2.2 1.2 0.2
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 4.8 2.4 1.3 0.2
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 0.6 3.1 2.7 0.6
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 –2.5 3.6 1.1 1.5
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 19.6 1.9 –2.0 0.9
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 12.2 2.4 0.2 1.0
2001 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 –5.8 3.8 5.3 4.6
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 –0.3 4.1 3.3 3.9
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 0.2 3.6 2.6 3.5
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 2.6 4.2 4.2 3.0
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 7.4 4.2 3.1 2.7
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 17.1 3.6 3.0 2.8
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 17.1 3.3 2.1 2.6
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 6.7 3.1 0.4 1.9
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 13.1 2.2 –2.4 0.9
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.4 17.4 0.3 –5.2 –0.7
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.5 17.9 0.1 –5.1 –1.1
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 30.8 0.5 –1.7 –0.5
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 44.4 2.7 2.4 0.8
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 29.5 2.0 1.9 0.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 30.5 3.0 2.8 0.5
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 23.3 2.7 2.8 0.4
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.2 0.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –3.4 1.8 –0.3 0.0
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –0.7 2.3 0.5 –0.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 9.2 2.5 1.7 0.4
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 6.0 2.5 1.7 0.4
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 5.6 3.1 3.2 0.3
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 4.5 2.9 2.2 0.5
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –6.8 3.2 2.7 0.9
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 –14.2 3.5 1.4 1.4
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 2.5 4.1 1.9 1.6
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.9 3.0 0.0 1.4
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 6.5 1.8 –2.2 1.0
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 28.1 1.7 –3.3 0.9
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 26.6 2.2 –0.3 1.0
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 20.9 2.2 0.7 1.2
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 10.6 2.5 0.7 1.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 5.6 2.5 –0.7 0.9
T a b l e  I.2
Wholesale price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
General
index
Sub-indices
Final domestic products
for home consumption
Exported
products
(primary
and
industrial)
Final
imported
productsPrimary IndustrialPeriod
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T a b l e  I.3
Industrial production index (1995=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
Main categories of goods
Industry
Consumer
non-
durables
Consumer
durables
Capital
goods
Inter-
mediate
goodsEnergy
Electricity-
town gas-
water
supply
Mining-
quarrying
Manu-
facturing
General
index
1999 . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 –0.9 –6.0 11.9 6.7 –0.9 –1.4 12.0 0.0
2000 . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 5.1 13.4 11.5 12.3 6.2 7.3 12.7 1.9
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.8 –1.4 –0.3 –0.3 –1.0 5.1 –1.8 4.1
2002 . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.2 9.1 2.0 2.3 0.8 –5.1 –13.9 5.9
2001 III . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.3 5.3 0.5 1.1 0.6 –4.1 0.7 6.2
IV . . . . . . . . . . –0.2 –0.4 –8.7 1.9 2.3 –5.9 0.7 –6.0 3.7
2002 I . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 –0.7 12.6 0.2 1.8 –1.7 –16.1 –14.7 7.7
II. . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 2.9 10.7 5.8 5.0 3.4 –2.3 –13.7 7.2
III . . . . . . . . . . –0.2 –0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 –0.2 –1.6 –10.5 0.6
IV . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 2.9 14.4 1.6 2.5 1.5 0.2 –16.2 9.0
2003 I . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –1.4 –10.7 6.0 4.6 –0.3 –15.2 –4.5 –0.5
II. . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 0.3 –6.2 8.1 6.0 –1.8 1.0 –5.3 2.3
2000 Oct. . . . . . . . . 5.9 4.4 21.9 7.0 12.1 4.2 9.7 –2.4 0.9
Nov. . . . . . . . . 7.4 6.8 19.5 6.6 5.7 7.5 15.3 8.9 6.6
Dec. . . . . . . . . 5.5 5.5 –3.9 7.1 3.9 7.0 8.0 5.2 4.9
2001 Jan. . . . . . . . . . 4.0 8.7 11.0 –6.0 –6.1 9.6 42.3 13.6 3.8
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.9 7.9 0.5 –7.5 –7.7 3.5 45.3 15.6 4.8
March. . . . . . . –1.6 –1.1 –2.8 –2.6 –3.6 –1.2 11.4 –2.7 –3.1
Apr. . . . . . . . . –1.3 –2.2 –5.1 2.3 0.4 –3.9 –4.8 –9.0 1.9
May . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.1 –4.2 4.7 3.0 1.6 3.7 0.9 4.9
June . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.8 –4.5 –0.6 1.2 –3.4 –6.7 –10.4 6.8
July . . . . . . . . . 2.7 4.1 3.0 –0.4 0.2 –0.6 2.2 3.8 10.0
Aug. . . . . . . . . –0.2 –0.1 1.8 –0.8 0.1 –0.6 –19.8 –3.1 4.0
Sept. . . . . . . . . 3.2 2.6 10.2 2.9 3.0 2.7 1.1 –0.1 4.6
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.2 1.2 2.7 4.8 5.9 –0.4 –4.2 –0.8 3.4
Nov. . . . . . . . . 1.0 2.7 –7.3 –1.4 –0.3 –4.3 –1.5 –6.4 11.2
Dec. . . . . . . . . –4.1 –5.4 –24.4 2.3 1.4 –14.0 7.4 –9.5 –4.1
2002 Jan. . . . . . . . . . –1.4 –5.9 9.9 6.8 6.2 –8.3 –30.9 –25.1 8.1
Feb. . . . . . . . . –1.0 –0.9 17.0 –4.7 –2.3 1.1 –23.7 –11.1 8.4
March. . . . . . . 2.9 4.0 10.7 –1.5 1.4 1.4 6.0 –10.3 6.7
Apr. . . . . . . . . 8.3 9.2 9.0 5.7 5.2 12.9 4.1 –7.1 9.7
May . . . . . . . . 0.7 –0.4 11.5 1.4 1.0 –2.4 –6.8 –15.7 7.8
June . . . . . . . . 3.3 0.2 11.6 9.9 8.5 0.7 –4.2 –18.1 4.3
July . . . . . . . . . 2.7 0.6 3.7 7.3 5.5 0.5 –3.9 –13.2 4.6
Aug. . . . . . . . . –1.6 –2.9 7.7 –0.8 0.2 –1.0 –1.8 –18.3 –3.6
Sept. . . . . . . . . –1.7 0.3 –7.3 –5.6 –5.9 –0.2 1.0 –3.6 0.7
Oct. . . . . . . . . –1.2 –0.5 4.9 –4.1 –3.0 –0.6 –3.8 –10.6 2.0
Nov. . . . . . . . . 4.0 2.4 15.6 6.1 6.9 –0.8 –2.5 –14.6 9.9
Dec. . . . . . . . . 7.0 7.6 28.2 3.0 3.5 7.4 5.8 –22.2 16.5
2003 Jan. . . . . . . . . . 0.0 5.0 –6.1 –8.9 –7.7 9.9 –8.1 10.3 1.9
Feb. . . . . . . . . 0.9 –3.9 –16.5 17.3 12.9 –3.8 –19.8 –10.6 –1.5
March. . . . . . . –0.6 –4.3 –8.9 11.8 9.8 –5.2 –15.6 –8.0 –1.6
Apr. . . . . . . . . –1.3 –4.0 –2.0 6.2 6.5 –6.7 –14.2 –18.9 1.3
May . . . . . . . . 4.3 1.9 –7.9 13.8 12.0 –0.9 0.9 2.9 2.6
June . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.1 –8.2 4.8 0.4 2.3 17.4 1.5 3.0
July . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.8 –6.9 4.0 3.3 2.6 0.0 2.2 0.2
Aug.* . . . . . . . –0.3 –5.3 –4.6 10.3 8.9 –4.3 –4.2 –1.6 –8.2
* Provisional data.
Source: NSSG.
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Sources: NSSG and Eurostat. Revised index of retail sales volume (excluding VAT).
T a b l e  I.4
Retail sales volume (2000=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
General
index
Clothing and
footwear
Sub-indices
Furniture
and
fixtures
Books-newspapers-
office equipment
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 –1.2 5.2 7.7 0.1
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 7.4 13.3 11.5 8.3
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 2.3 3.3 4.7 5.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 4.5 2.8 4.4 5.2
2001 II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 3.0 2.5 5.9 6.6
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 1.2 3.7 0.6 2.5
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 –0.4 –0.7 4.8 6.2
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 –0.7 6.5 7.8 4.0
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 4.1 –0.7 1.8 7.4
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 7.6 0.9 5.7 6.3
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 7.0 3.9 2.9 3.3
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 7.7 –3.5 13.7 7.2
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 1.3 10.5 –1.7 11.5
2001 Apr.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 4.0 2.2 8.0 7.1
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 3.9 3.2 6.5 5.1
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 1.1 2.0 3.4 7.4
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9 1.7 4.6 0.0 2.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 0.7 5.5 –0.3 2.4
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 1.2 0.8 2.2 3.1
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –2.6 –1.4 2.7 4.4
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 1.6 –0.5 6.5 7.3
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 –0.2 –0.3 5.2 6.8
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –3.4 2.0 6.6 3.8
Feb.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 –1.8 10.8 10.0 6.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 3.4 7.2 6.8 1.7
Apr.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.9 –4.7 –3.2 1.7 2.2
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 10.8 2.1 –0.1 12.8
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 7.7 –0.6 3.6 7.7
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.6 1.6 1.9 7.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 9.7 –8.8 6.7 3.3
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 8.7 10.0 9.0 8.0
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 6.4 7.7 0.7 4.1
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 6.4 3.9 2.2 0.0
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 7.9 1.5 5.1 5.0
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 9.6 –4.2 19.8 11.6
Feb.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 7.0 –8.5 10.1 3.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 6.6 5.0 10.8 6.3
Apr.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.2 12.3 –8.0 21.2
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 –0.8 12.3 1.8 8.1
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 0.3 6.2 1.4 5.3
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 –0.1 5.5 2.0 3.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 9.1 12.5 6.9 12.6
Food-beverages-
tobacco
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T a b l e  I.5
Gross value added at basic prices and gross domestic product at market prices
Annual percentage change
(at constant 1995 prices)
Million
euro
1995
Source: NSSG/National Accounts (final data for 1998-1999 and estimates for 2000-2002), September 2003. For 2003, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Updated
Stability and Growth Programme (December 2003).
1.1 Primary sector (agriculture) 7,277 2.3 3.5 -4.2 -4.1 -1.3 …
1.2 Secondary sector 16,550 7.2 2.4 5.4 5.8 2.8 …
1.2.a Mining and quarrying 476 13.0 –17.9 23.2 2.2 8.6 …
1.2.b Manufacturing 9,572 5.3 1.3 4.6 3.3 3.0 …
1.2.c Electricity - town gas - water supply 1,751 6.8 13.4 4.8 0.3 2.9 …
1.2.d Construction 4,751 10.6 2.3 5.7 13.0 2.0 …
1.3 Tertiary sector 50,031 3.1 2.0 5.1 5.2 4.1 …
1.3.a Trade 10,018 3.6 –0.8 3.1 11.7 1.2 …
1.3.b Hotels - restaurants 4,821 3.7 –5.7 5.4 6.2 4.0 …
1.3.c Transport - communications 4,978 4.1 33.4 16.2 1.3 5.9 …
1.3.d Financial intermediaries 3,112 11.5 11.0 10.0 5.9 –0.3 …
1.3.e Real estate management and
other activities 12,577 2.5 –5.9 3.3 3.0 4.0 …
1.3.f Public administration - security 5,308 –0.6 0.9 –2.8 2.3 5.2 …
1.3.g Health 3,298 –0.7 –2.2 1.6 –1.2 9.6 …
1.3.h Education 3,855 1.2 –2.0 3.0 1.0 7.9 …
1.3.i Other activities 2,064 6.5 9.6 7.6 15.2 6.8 …
1.4 Gross value added 73,858 3.9 2.1 4.4 4.6 3.5 …
1.5 Imputed bank services –2,175 16.5 2.8 13.7 12.1 1.6 …
1.6 Gross value added at basic prices 71,683 3.6 2.1 4.1 4.3 3.6 …
2.1 Final consumption 70,655 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.3 3.2 2.7
2.1.a Private consumption 58,405 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.9 2.8 3.1
2.1.b Public consumption 12,250 1.7 2.1 2.2 –1.0 5.1 0.5
2.2 Gross fixed capital formation 14,867 10.6 11.0 8.0 6.5 5.7 9.7
2.2.a Residential 4,031 8.8 3.7 –4.3 4.8 8.8 6.0
2.2.b Non-residential construction 5,391 9.4 6.6 8.9 8.2 0.7 16.6
2.2.c Equipment 4,680 16.5 21.4 14.1 4.9 6.9 7.0
2.2.d Other investment 765 –14.0 –2.4 7.6 20.1 20.8 3.0
2.3 Stocks and statistical discrepancy (percentage of GDP) 252 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
2.4 Domestic final demand 85,774 4.6 3.8 3.7 2.9 3.8 4.2
2.5 Exports of goods and services 14,087 5.3 18.1 14.1 –1.1 –7.7 1.9
2.5.a Exports of goods 8,344 2.7 6.3 8.7 –1.6 –7.1 4.6
2.5.b Exports of services 5,743 7.7 29.0 18.2 –0.7 –8.1 0.0
2.6 Final demand 99,861 4.7 6.1 5.6 2.1 1.7 3.8
2.7 Imports of goods and services 19,934 9.2 15.0 8.9 –3.4 –4.7 3.0
2.7.a Imports of goods 18,084 9.4 8.5 7.6 –4.2 1.1 4.0
2.7.b Imports of services 1,849 8.5 52.9 14.4 –0.3 –26.6 –2.0
2.8 GDP at market prices 79,927 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.0 3.8 4.0
200320022001200019991998
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I CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (I.A+I.B+I.C+I.D)
I.A TRADE BALANCE (I.A.1– I.A.2)
Non-oil trade balance
Oil trade balance
I.A.1 Exports of goods
Oil
Other
I.A.2 Imports of goods
Oil
Other
I.B SERVICES BALANCE (I.B.1– I.B.2)
I.B.1 Receipts
Travel
Transport
Other
I.B.2 Payments
Travel
Transport
Other
I.C INCOME ACCOUNT (I.C.1– I.C.2)
I.C.1 Receipts
Compensation of employees
Interest, dividends, profits
I.C.2 Payments
Compensation of employees
Interest, dividends, profits
I.D TRANSFERS ACCOUNT (I.D.1– I.D.2)
I.D.1 Receipts
General government (EU transfers)
Other (emigrants’ remittances, etc.)
I.D.2 Payments
General government
Other
II FINANCIAL ACCOUNT (II.A+II.B+II.C+II.D)
II.A DIRECT INVESTMENT 1
By residents abroad
By non-residents in Greece
II.B PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 1
Assets
Liabilities
II.C OTHER INVESTMENT2
Assets
Liabilities
(General government loans)
II.D CHANGE IN RESERVE ASSETS 2
III ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
RESERVE ASSETS3
–5,729.6 –5,497.8 –5,805.3 –764.1 –953.7 –786.0
–18,025.1 –18,720.7 –18,595.0 –1,922.0 –2,115.2 –1,902.2
–15,485.3 –15,862.2 –15,282.8 –1,705.6 –1,728.4 –1,583.7
–2,539.8 –2,858.5 –3,312.2 –216.4 –386.8 –318.5
9,675.6 8,600.6 9,180.3 961.2 917.7 1,043.8
1,478.1 928.8 1,113.3 133.5 83.2 103.6
8,197.5 7,671.8 8,067.0 827.8 834.5 940.2
27,700.7 27,321.3 27,775.3 2,883.2 3,032.9 2,946.1
4,017.9 3,787.3 4,425.5 349.8 470.0 422.1
23,682.8 23,534.0 23,349.8 2,533.4 2,562.9 2,524.0
8,223.3 10,215.0 10,737.3 909.4 1,063.7 1,107.2
19,082.4 18,810.5 18,683.7 2,039.4 1,988.0 2,025.4
9,466.9 9,794.8 8,988.6 994.7 1,053.9 928.0
7,709.8 7,075.8 7,766.7 792.5 732.0 834.1
1,905.7 1,939.9 1,928.3 252.1 202.1 263.3
10,859.1 8,595.5 7,946.4 1,130.0 924.3 918.2
3,937.8 2,078.9 1,698.6 426.2 238.9 227.0
4,515.5 4,192.8 3,951.1 483.9 425.3 446.9
2,405.8 2,323.8 2,296.7 219.9 260.1 244.3
–1,631.6 –1,735.7 –2,306.3 –128.8 –148.7 –200.8
1,790.2 1,359.4 1,293.4 163.3 122.3 101.7
505.1 442.1 285.8 54.8 37.2 27.7
1,285.1 917.3 1,007.5 108.4 85.1 74.1
3,421.8 3,095.2 3,599.7 292.1 271.0 302.5
236.6 207.4 135.0 26.1 19.3 15.5
3,185.2 2,887.8 3,464.7 266.0 251.7 287.0
5,703.9 4,743.6 4,358.8 377.3 246.4 209.8
7,588.5 6,736.6 6,305.9 583.6 426.8 336.0
5,028.8 4,790.5 4,254.3 310.3 195.2 115.6
2,559.7 1,946.1 2,051.6 273.3 231.5 220.4
1,884.6 1,993.0 1,947.2 206.3 180.4 126.2
1,202.1 1,455.5 1,500.7 123.3 122.8 77.7
682.5 537.5 446.4 83.0 57.5 48.5
4,775.2 6,983.4 6,593.4 1,240.8 844.2 574.4
1,009.3 –473.6 –272.9 2.5 –48.6 398.6
–586.9 –472.4 –444.0 –53.9 –74.1 –10.5
1,596.1 –1.3 171.0 56.3 25.5 409.1
9,994.4 9,510.3 11,153.9 1,742.3 –225.8 –166.0
37.0 –1,292.6 –6,221.6 –373.0 –145.3 567.4
9,957.4 10,802.9 17,375.6 2,115.3 –80.5 –733.3
–12,038.5 –114.3 –8,197.6 –563.0 1,190.6 483.7
–5,871.9 –6,516.0 –5,379.0 –1,542.4 344.9 –1,791.8
–6,166.6 6,401.7 –2,818.6 979.4 845.7 2,275.5
–2,279.3 –3,003.8 –2,290.5 97.3 –317.7 –220.9
5,810.0 –1,939.0 3,910.0 59.0 –72.0 –142.0
954.4 –1,485.6 –788.1 –476.6 109.6 211.6
7,398.0 8,970 4,962
T a b l e  II.1
Balance of payments
(Million euro)
1 (+) net inflow, (–) net outflow.
2 (+) decrease, (–) increase.
3 Since Greece entered the euro area in January 2001, reserve assets, as defined by the European Central Bank, include only monetary gold, the “reserve position” in the
IMF, the “special drawing rights”, and Bank of Greece claims in foreign currency on residents of non-euro area countries. Conversely, reserve assets do not include claims
in euro on residents of non-euro area countries, claims in foreign currency and in euro on residents of euro area countries, and the Bank of Greece participation in the
capital and the reserve assets of the ECB.  
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
January - October October
2001 2002 2003* 2001 2002 2003*
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* The effective exchange rate is the value of a representative basket of foreign currencies, each of which is weighted on the basis of its importance in the  country’s
external trade. Up to end-2000, the effective exchange rate of the drachma was calculated weighting the individual bilateral exchange rates of the drachma against
the other currencies, as these rates were formulated in the foreign exchange market. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. In the present table, the
weighting of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the other currencies is calculated on the basis of the country’s non-oil external trade. This index should not be confused
with the effective exchange rate of the euro, which is calculated on the basis of the external trade of the euro area as a whole.
1 A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a depreciation.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  Iπ.2
Effective exchange rate of the euro calculated on the basis of Greece’s external trade*  
(Period averages) 
Index
(1990=100)
Previous
year
Percentage changes over:1
1995  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66.3 –3.5 –3.5 
1996  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65.5 –1.1 –1.1 
1997  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.3 –1.9 –1.9 
1998  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.5 –5.9 –5.9 
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 –0.9 –0.9 
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2 –6.2 –6.2 
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 –0.6 –0.6 
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.4 0.9 0.9 
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0 2.9 2.9
2001 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.1 1.7 –2.4 
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.7 –0.8 –1.2 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.8 0.3 –0.1 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 0.2 1.4 
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 0.0 –0.3 
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2 0.5 1.0 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6 0.7 1.4 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.8 0.4 1.6 
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.5 1.2 2.8 
II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 1.2 3.5 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.2 2.6 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 0.3 2.5
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.0 0.0 –0.3
Feb.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 –0.2 –0.2
March  . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 0.0 –0.4
Apr.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 0.1 0.0
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2 0.4 1.0
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.5 0.6 1.9
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.7 0.3 2.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6 –0.2 1.1
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6 0.1 1.1
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.7 0.2 1.2
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.8 0.2 1.8
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.0 0.3 1.8
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.3 0.6 2.4
Feb.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.6 0.4 3.0
March  . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.7 0.2 3.2
Apr.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.8 0.2 3.3
May  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 1.1 3.9
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 0.1 3.4
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.3 2.8
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.3 2.7
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0 –0.2 2.4
Oct.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 0.3 2.5
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.1 2.2
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5 0.7 2.6
Previous
periodPeriod
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Previous
period
Previous
period
Previous
period
Percentage
change over:
Percentage
change over:
Previous
period
T a b l e  II.3
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro* 
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages) 
* To 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
1995  . . . . . . 1.308 123.0 7.33 0.829
1996  . . . . . . 1.270 –2.9 –2.9 138.1 12.3 12.3 7.36 0.4 0.4 0.814 –1.8 –1.8 
1997  . . . . . . 1.134 –10.7 –10.7 137.1 –0.7 –0.7 7.48 1.7 1.7 0.692 –14.9 –14.9 
1998  . . . . . . 1.121 –1.1 –1.1 146.4 6.8 6.8 7.50 0.2 0.2 0.676 –2.3 –2.3 
1999  . . . . . . 1.066 –4.9 –4.9 121.3 –17.2 –17.2 7.44 –0.8 –0.8 0.659 –2.6 –2.6 
2000  . . . . . . 0.924 –13.3 –13.3 99.5 –18.0 –18.0 7.45 0.1 0.1 0.609 –7.6 –7.6 
2001  . . . . . . 0.896 –3.1 –3.1 108.7 9.3 9.3 7.45 0.0 0.0 0.622 2.1 2.1 
2002  . . . . . . 0.945 5.5 5.5 118.1 8.6 8.6 7.43 –0.3 –0.3 0.629 1.1 1.1 
2003  . . . . . . 1.131 19.7 19.7 131.0 10.9 10.9 7.43 0.0 0.0 0.692 10.1 10.1
2001 I  . . . . . 0.923 6.2 –6.5 109.0 14.1 3.2 7.46 0.1 0.2 0.633 5.3 2.9 
II  . . . . . 0.873 –5.4 –6.5 107.1 –1.7 7.6 7.46 –0.1 0.0 0.615 –2.8 0.8 
III  . . . . 0.891 2.0 –1.6 108.3 1.1 11.1 7.44 –0.2 –0.2 0.619 0.8 1.1 
IV  . . . . 0.896 0.5 3.0 110.6 2.2 15.8 7.44 0.0 –0.2 0.621 0.2 3.4 
2002 I  . . . . . 0.876 –2.1 –5.1 116.0 4.8 6.4 7.43 –0.1 –0.4 0.615 –1.0 –2.8 
II  . . . . . 0.919 4.9 5.3 116.5 0.4 8.8 7.43 0.0 –0.3 0.629 2.3 2.3 
III  . . . . 0.984 7.0 10.4 117.3 0.7 8.3 7.43 –0.1 –0.2 0.635 1.0 2.6 
IV  . . . . 1.000 1.7 11.7 122.5 4.4 10.7 7.43 0.0 –0.2 0.636 0.2 2.5 
2003 I  . . . . . 1.074 7.3 22.5 127.7 4.2 10.1 7.43 0.0 0.0 0.670 5.3 9.0 
II  . . . . . 1.136 5.9 23.7 134.7 5.5 15.6 7.43 –0.1 –0.1 0.701 4.7 11.6 
III  . . . . 1.124 –1.1 14.3 132.1 –1.9 12.7 7.43 0.1 0.0 0.699 –0.4 10.0 
IV  . . . . 1.189 5.8 18.9 129.5 –2.0 5.7 7.44 0.1 0.1 0.697 –0.2 9.6
2002 Jan.  . . . 0.883 –1.0 –5.9 117.1 3.3 6.9 7.43 –0.1 –0.4 0.61659 –0.6 –2.9
Feb. . . . 0.870 –1.5 –5.6 116.2 –0.8 8.5 7.43 0.0 –0.4 0.61160 –0.8 –3.5
March  . 0.876 0.6 –3.7 114.6 –1.4 3.9 7.43 0.0 –0.4 0.61577 0.7 –2.1
Apr. . . . 0.886 1.2 –0.7 115.8 1.0 4.9 7.43 0.0 –0.4 0.61407 –0.3 –1.2
May . . . 0.917 3.5 4.9 115.9 0.0 8.8 7.44 0.0 –0.3 0.62823 2.3 2.4
June  . . 0.954 4.1 11.8 117.8 1.6 12.8 7.43 0.0 –0.3 0.64373 2.5 5.6
July  . . . 0.992 4.0 15.3 117.11 –0.6 9.2 7.430 0.0 –0.2 0.63870 –0.8 5.0
Aug.  . . 0.978 –1.5 8.6 116.31 –0.7 6.4 7.427 0.0 –0.2 0.63633 –0.4 1.5
Sept.  . . 0.981 0.3 7.7 118.38 1.8 9.4 7.427 0.0 –0.2 0.63059 –0.9 1.2
Oct.  . . 0.981 0.0 8.3 121.57 2.7 10.7 7.430 0.0 –0.1 0.62994 –0.1 1.0
Nov.  . . 1.001 2.1 12.7 121.65 0.1 11.9 7.428 0.0 –0.2 0.63709 1.1 3.0
Dec.  . . 1.018 1.7 14.1 124.20 2.1 9.5 7.426 0.0 –0.2 0.64218 0.8 3.6
2003 Jan.  . . . 1.063 4.4 20.3 126.20 1.6 7.8 7.433 0.1 –0.0 0.65747 2.4 6.6
Feb. . . . 1.077 1.4 23.8 128.60 1.9 10.6 7.432 –0.01 0.0 0.66977 1.9 9.5
March  . 1.081 0.3 23.4 128.16 –0.3 11.8 7.427 –0.1 –0.1 0.68255 1.9 10.8
Apr. . . . 1.085 0.4 22.5 130.12 1.5 12.4 7.426 –0.03 –0.1 0.68902 0.9 12.2
May . . . 1.158 6.8 26.3 135.83 4.4 17.2 7.425 –0.01 –0.1 0.71322 3.5 13.5
June  . . 1.166 0.7 22.2 138.05 1.6 17.2 7.425 0.01 –0.1 0.70224 –1.5 9.1
July  . . . 1.137 –2.5 14.6 134.99 –2.2 15.3 7.433 0.11 0.0 0.70045 –0.3 9.7
Aug.  . . 1.114 –2.0 13.9 132.38 –1.9 13.8 7.432 –0.01 0.1 0.69919 –0.2 9.9
Sept.  . . 1.122 0.7 14.4 128.94 –2.6 8.9 7.427 –0.07 0.0 0.69693 –0.3 10.5
Oct.  . . 1.169 4.2 19.2 128.12 –0.6 5.4 7.430 0.04 0.0 0.69763 0.1 10.7
Nov.  . . 1.170 0.1 16.9 127.84 –0.2 5.1 7.437 0.09 0.1 0.69278 –0.7 8.7
Dec.  . . 1.229 5.0 20.7 132.43 3.6 6.6 7.442 0.07 0.2 0.70196 1.3 9.3
Period
Pound sterlingDanish kroneJapanese yenUS dollar
Previous
year
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
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T a b l e  II.3 (continued)
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* To 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
1995  . . . . . . 9.33 1.546 8.29
1996  . . . . . . 8.51 –8.8 –8.8 1.568 1.4 1.4 8.20 –1.1 –1.1 1.623 1.731
1997  . . . . . . 8.65 1.6 1.6 1.644 4.9 4.9 8.02 –2.2 –2.2 1.528 –5.9 –5.9 1.569 –9.4 –9.4 
1998  . . . . . . 8.92 3.1 3.1 1.622 –1.3 –1.3 8.47 5.6 5.6 1.787 17.0 17.0 1.665 6.1 6.1 
1999  . . . . . . 8.81 –1.2 –1.2 1.600 –1.4 –1.4 8.31 –1.8 –1.8 1.652 –7.6 –7.6 1.584 –4.9 –4.9 
2000  . . . . . . 8.45 –4.1 –4.1 1.558 –2.6 –2.6 8.11 –2.4 –2.4 1.589 –3.8 –3.8 1.371 –13.4 –13.4 
2001  . . . . . . 9.26 9.5 9.5 1.510 –3.1 –3.1 8.05 –0.8 –0.8 1.732 9.0 9.0 1.387 1.1 1.1 
2002  . . . . . . 9.16 –1.0 –1.0 1.467 –2.9 –2.9 7.51 –6.7 –6.7 1.737 0.2 0.2 1.483 6.9 6.9 
2003  . . . . . . 9.12 –0.4 –0.4 1.521 3.6 3.6 8.00 6.5 6.5 1.738 0.1 0.1 1.582 6.7 6.7
2001 I  . . . . . 9.00 4.6 5.9 1.533 1.1 –4.6 8.20 2.0 1.1 1.740 6.6 11.3 1.410 6.3 –1.7 
II  . . . . . 9.13 1.4 10.3 1.528 –0.3 –2.3 8.01 –2.3 –2.3 1.704 –2.1 7.5 1.346 –4.5 –2.6 
III  . . . . 9.42 3.2 12.1 1.506 –1.4 –2.5 8.01 –0.1 –1.2 1.737 1.9 10.1 1.376 2.2 2.5 
IV  . . . . 9.48 0.6 10.2 1.474 –2.2 –2.8 7.97 –0.5 –0.9 1.749 0.7 7.1 1.415 2.9 6.7 
2002 I  . . . . . 9.16 –3.4 1.7 1.473 0.0 –3.9 7.81 –2.0 –4.8 1.692 –3.3 –2.8 1.397 –1.3 –0.9 
II  . . . . . 9.16 0.0 0.3 1.465 –0.6 –4.1 7.52 –3.7 –6.2 1.666 –1.5 –2.2 1.428 2.2 6.1 
III  . . . . 9.23 0.8 –2.0 1.464 –0.1 –2.8 7.40 –1.6 –7.6 1.796 7.8 3.5 1.536 7.6 11.7 
IV  . . . . 9.09 –1.5 –4.0 1.467 0.2 –0.5 7.32 –1.1 –8.2 1.792 –0.3 2.4 1.570 2.2 10.9 
2003 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.0 0.3 1.466 0.0 –0.5 7.58 3.5 –3.0 1.809 1.0 6.9 1.620 3.2 16.0 
II  . . . . . 9.14 –0.4 –0.1 1.518 3.5 3.6 7.96 5.0 5.8 1.774 –1.9 6.5 1.589 –1.9 11.3 
III  . . . . 9.16 0.2 –0.7 1.545 1.8 5.6 8.25 3.7 11.5 1.709 –3.7 –4.9 1.553 –2.2 1.1 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.7 –0.9 1.554 0.6 5.9 8.22 –0.3 12.4 1.661 –2.8 –7.3 1.566 0.8 –0.2
2002 Jan.  . . . 9.23 –2.2 3.6 1.475 0.0 –3.6 7.921 –0.9 –3.8 1.709 –1.5 1.2 1.413 0.4 0.3
Feb. . . . 9.18 –0.5 2.3 1.477 0.2 –3.8 7.785 –1.7 –5.2 1.696 –0.8 –1.6 1.388 –1.8 –1.0
March  . 9.06 –1.3 –0.7 1.468 –0.6 –4.4 7.717 –0.9 –5.4 1.670 –1.5 –7.6 1.390 0.2 –1.9
Apr. . . . 9.14 0.8 0.3 1.466 –0.2 –4.1 7.622 –1.2 –6.1 1.654 –1.0 –7.3 1.401 0.8 0.8
May . . . 9.22 0.9 1.8 1.457 –0.6 –5.0 7.521 –1.3 –5.9 1.666 0.8 –0.9 1.421 1.4 5.5
June  . . 9.11 –1.1 –1.0 1.472 1.0 –3.3 7.405 –1.5 –6.7 1.678 0.7 2.0 1.462 2.9 12.3
July  . . . 9.269 1.7 0.1 1.462 –0.7 –3.4 7.405 0.0 –7.1 1.792 6.8 6.1 1.532 4.8 16.5
Aug.  . . 9.249 –0.2 –0.7 1.464 0.1 –3.4 7.428 0.3 –7.8 1.805 0.7 5.1 1.533 0.1 10.7
Sept.  . . 9.168 –0.9 –5.2 1.465 0.1 –1.8 7.362 –0.9 –8.0 1.793 –0.7 –0.6 1.543 0.7 8.2
Oct.  . . 9.105 –0.7 –4.9 1.465 0.0 –1.0 7.341 –0.3 –8.2 1.783 –0.5 –0.7 1.548 0.3 8.8
Nov.  . . 9.082 –0.3 –3.6 1.467 0.2 0.1 7.319 –0.3 –7.6 1.785 0.1 3.9 1.574 1.6 11.2
Dec.  . . 9.096 0.2 –3.6 1.468 0.0 –0.5 7.29 –0.3 –8.7 1.808 1.3 4.2 1.587 0.9 12.8
2003 Jan.  . . . 9.177 0.9 –0.5 1.462 –0.4 –0.8 7.34 0.6 –7.4 1.822 0.8 6.6 1.636 3.1 15.8
Feb. . . . 9.146 –0.3 –0.4 1.467 0.3 –0.7 7.54 2.8 –3.1 1.811 –0.6 6.8 1.630 –0.4 17.4
March  . 9.227 0.9 1.8 1.470 0.1 0.1 7.85 4.0 1.7 1.795 –0.9 7.5 1.594 –2.2 14.7
Apr. . . . 9.154 –0.8 0.2 1.496 1.8 2.1 7.83 –0.2 2.7 1.781 –0.8 7.7 1.585 –0.6 13.2
May . . . 9.156 0.02 –0.7 1.516 1.3 4.0 7.87 0.5 4.7 1.787 0.3 7.2 1.602 1.0 12.7
June  . . 9.118 –0.4 0.04 1.541 1.7 4.7 8.16 3.7 10.2 1.755 –1.8 4.6 1.580 1.6 8.1
July  . . . 9.186 0.7 –0.9 1.548 0.4 5.8 8.29 1.6 11.9 1.718 –2.1 –4.1 1.569 –0.7 2.4
Aug.  . . 9.238 0.6 –0.1 1.540 –0.5 5.2 8.26 –0.4 11.1 1.711 –0.4 –5.2 1.557 –0.8 1.5
Sept.  . . 9.068 –1.8 –1.1 1.547 0.5 5.6 8.20 –0.7 11.3 1.697 –0.9 –5.4 1.533 –1.5 –0.7
Oct.  . . 9.011 –0.6 –1.0 1.549 0.1 5.7 8.23 0.4 12.1 1.687 –0.6 –5.4 1.549 1.0 0.1
Nov.  . . 8.994 –0.2 –1.0 1.559 0.7 6.2 8.20 –0.4 12.0 1.634 –3.1 –8.5 1.536 –0.8 –2.4
Dec.  . . 9.023 0.3 –0.8 1.554 –0.3 5.9 8.24 0.6 13.0 1.663 1.8 –8.0 1.613 5.0 1.6
Period
Canadian dollarAustralian dollarNorwegian kroneSwiss francSwedish krona
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
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Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  II.4
General government external debt servicing
(Million euro)
1,572
4,443
–
6,015
2,003
2,686
–
4,689
2,180
5,109
124
7,289
INTEREST
AMORTISATION
of which:
Loan prepayments
T O T A L
Year
200220012000
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2000  . . . . . . . . 348.4 1,776.7 2,125.1 991.8 1,173.2 4,290.0 174.9 300.0 135.7 4,900.7 
2001  . . . . . . . . 239.7 2,022.9 2,262.6 1,088.8 1.316.3 4,667.7 218.5 398.0 145.9 5,430.2 
2002  . . . . . . . . 341.2 2,140.9 2,482.0 1,075.5 1,405.9 4,963.6 226.9 470.5 127.7 5,788.7 
2001 Jan.3  . . . . 336.1 1,739.8 2,075.9 1,036.1 1,228.1 4,340.1 211.4 327.9 139.0 5,018.3 
Feb.  . . . . 335.0 1,739.9 2,074.9 1,049.0 1,222.7 4,346.6 213.2 336.0 145.5 5,041.3 
March  . . 336.3 1,750.4 2,086.7 1,065.9 1,222.6 4,375.2 222.6 346.1 139.3 5,083.1 
Apr.  . . . . 336.2 1,783.8 2,120.0 1,067.8 1,225.5 4,413.3 221.4 354.1 140.0 5,128.7 
May  . . . . 332.9 1,807.1 2,140.0 1,069.0 1,225.3 4,434.3 233.8 363.0 135.0 5,166.1 
June  . . . . 333.0 1,847.4 2,180.4 1,066.2 1,234.0 4,480.6 221.5 360.5 145.2 5,207.8 
July  . . . . 328.0 1,829.6 2,157.6 1,073.2 1,237.9 4,468.7 223.4 369.6 140.4 5,202.1 
Aug.  . . . . 319.2 1,797.5 2,116.7 1,088.8 1,242.9 4,448.4 230.8 380.7 142.5 5,202.4 
Sept.  . . . 309.6 1,865.5 2,175.1 1,070.9 1,250.2 4,496.3 225.7 381.2 147.6 5,250.8 
Oct.  . . . . 295.5 1,866.7 2,162.2 1,074.7 1,262.2 4,499.1 235.1 392.3 149.5 5,275.9 
Nov. . . . . 279.7 1,916.0 2,195.7 1,077.6 1,276.6 4,549.8 225.9 400.8 152.2 5,328.6 
Dec. . . . . 239.7 2,022.9 2,262.6 1,088.8 1,316.3 4,667.7 218.5 398.0 145.9 5,430.2 
2002 Jan.  . . . . 246.5 1,976.8 2,223.3 1,081.0 1,335.0 4,639.3 216.2 416.6 141.8 5,413.9 
Feb.  . . . . 240.3 1,972.2 2,212.5 1,076.8 1,339.1 4,628.4 221.1 427.0 138.8 5,415.2 
March  . . 254.3 1,969.1 2,223.4 1,088.5 1,342.8 4,654.7 229.6 431.2 137.2 5,452.8 
Apr.  . . . . 261.7 2,001.1 2,262.8 1,092.1 1,335.8 4,690.7 228.1 437.5 134.7 5,490.9 
May  . . . . 273.8 2,001.2 2,275.0 1,099.6 1,337.8 4,712.4 234.8 442.6 144.0 5,533.8 
June  . . . . 285.7 2,048.4 2,334.1 1,074.9 1,343.2 4,752.2 229.6 439.2 132.8 5,553.8 
July  . . . . 296.6 2,015.9 2,312.4 1,083.7 1,346.2 4,742.3 228.8 450.3 125.5 5,546.9 
Aug.  . . . . 301.1 1,984.6 2,285.7 1,096.9 1,351.6 4,734.2 236.5 463.4 126.5 5,560.7 
Sept.  . . . 306.7 2,042.0 2,348.7 1,073.6 1,353.7 4,776.1 238.3 460.4 131.3 5,606.1 
Oct.  . . . . 313.9 2,024.9 2,338.8 1,093.7 1,361.9 4,794.4 235.6 462.7 133.7 5,626.3 
Nov. . . . . 321.4 2,076.4 2,397.7 1,086.3 1,374.2 4,858.3 229.6 477.1 131.1 5,696.1 
Dec. . . . . 341.2 2,140.9 2,482.0 1,075.7 1,405.9 4,963.6 226.9 470.5 127.7 5,788.7 
2003 Jan.  . . . . 312.1 2,104.4 2,416.6 1,077.2 1,429.5 4,923.3 233.0 534.9 109.2 5,800.4 
Feb.  . . . . 319.3 2,107.6 2,426.9 1,079.6 1,443.9 4,950.3 233.8 547.2 109.1 5,840.4 
March  . . 327.2 2,146.0 2,473.2 1,072.5 1,457.0 5,002.7 224.0 550.8 99.4 5,876.9 
Apr.  . . . . 336.4 2,164.5 2,500.8 1,077.3 1,465.1 5,043.2 230.5 563.0 124.0 5,960.7 
May  . . . . 343.8 2,193.8 2,537.6 1,096.2 1,473.2 5,107.0 231.4 571.1 105.0 6,014.5 
June  . . . . 351.0 2,229.8 2,580.8 1,059.3 1,487.3 5,127.5 214.9 571.0 97.6 6,010.9 
July  . . . . 361.5 2,199.0 2,560.5 1,062.7 1,498.4 5,121.5 220.1 585.5 91.2 6,018.3 
Aug.  . . . . 362.7 2,186.0 2,548.7 1,068.6 1,505.8 5,123.0 217.1 587.7 88.9 6,016.7 
Sept.  . . . 364.9 2,226.0 2,590.9 1,036.9 1,505.9 5,133.7 211.7 577.4 91.4 6,014.2 
Oct.  . . . . 371.3 2,224.6 2,595.9 1,049.1 1,511.2 5,156.1 224.9 582.8 101.3 6,065.0 
Nov.*.  . . 379.2 2,267.0 2,646.2 1,042.8 1,517.6 5,206.6 224.9 586.1 101.4 6,119.0
1 Monetary aggregates comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (Postal Savings Bank, Ministry of Finance) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents
excluding central government. 
2 M3 and its components do not include non-euro area residents' holdings of money market fund units, money market paper and debt securities with an initial
maturity of up to 2 years. 
3 Euro area-11 up to end-2000. Euro area-12 from 1 January 2001 onwards. 
* Provisional data.
Source: ECB.
T a b l e  III.1
Monetary aggregates of the euro area1
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End of period
Money
market
fund units
(8)
Money
market
paper and
debt
securities
with an
initial
maturity
of up to 2
years
(9)
M32
(10)=(6)+
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2000  . . . . . . . 61.2 13.3 47.9 2.0 28.9 18.5 15.4 0.2 126.2
2001  . . . . . . . 70.8 16.1 54.7 2.4 29.4 24.2 9.7 0.1 136.7
2002  . . . . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 2.3 28.9 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2001 Jan.  . . . . 59.5 12.5 47.0 2.0 28.1 21.0 14.7 0.2 125.5
Feb.  . . . . 59.4 12.4 47.0 2.0 27.4 22.6 13.7 0.2 125.3
March  . . 58.7 11.5 47.2 2.0 27.5 24.2 12.9 0.2 125.4
Apr.  . . . . 60.3 12.4 47.9 2.0 27.3 25.2 12.4 0.2 127.4
May  . . . . 59.7 11.8 47.9 2.2 27.1 26.1 11.8 0.2 127.1
June  . . . . 61.4 12.4 49.0 2.2 26.5 27.3 11.2 0.2 128.8
July  . . . . 61.8 12.5 49.3 2.2 26.1 28.6 11.2 0.2 130.1
Aug.  . . . . 62.3 12.3 50.0 2.2 25.8 28.5 10.9 0.2 129.8
Sept.  . . . 62.6 12.2 50.4 2.2 24.0 29.3 10.5 0.2 128.8
Oct.  . . . . 63.0 12.4 50.6 2.3 24.8 28.7 9.6 0.2 128.6
Nov. . . . . 64.6 13.2 51.4 2.3 26.3 26.8 9.4 0.1 129.5
Dec. . . . . 70.8 16.1 54.7 2.4 29.4 24.2 9.7 0.1 136.7
2002 Jan.  . . . . 69.2 14.3 54.9 2.4 26.5 23.9 9.8 0.1 131.9
Feb.  . . . . 68.9 13.8 55.1 2.4 27.3 23.0 9.4 0.1 131.1
March  . . 67.4 12.5 54.9 2.4 27.2 24.2 9.3 0.1 130.7
Apr.  . . . . 69.3 13.7 55.6 2.4 26.9 22.9 8.9 0.0 130.4
May  . . . . 69.0 13.3 55.7 2.4 26.6 22.8 8.9 0.0 129.8
June  . . . . 70.6 14.2 56.4 2.3 26.0 22.6 8.7 0.0 130.2
July  . . . . 70.8 14.3 56.5 2.3 26.0 22.5 8.9 0.0 130.6
Aug.  . . . . 71.3 14.1 57.2 2.3 26.3 22.8 8.9 0.1 131.7
Sept.  . . . 72.3 14.7 57.6 2.3 25.4 22.9 9.1 0.1 132.2
Oct.  . . . . 70.0 13.5 56.5 2.3 26.6 23.2 9.0 0.1 131.2
Nov. . . . . 69.1 13.3 55.8 2.3 27.3 22.0 9.1 0.2 130.0
Dec. . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 2.3 28.9 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2003 Jan.  . . . . 70.3 14.2 56.1 2.2 28.9 20.2 12.0 0.2 133.7
Feb.  . . . . 71.8 14.4 57.4 2.2 27.1 19.2 12.9 0.2 133.5
March  . . 72.5 14.9 57.6 2.2 27.3 16.8 14.1 0.2 133.2
Apr.  . . . . 72.7 14.6 58.1 2.2 28.7 16.3 14.4 0.3 134.7
May  . . . . 71.9 14.5 57.4 2.0 28.8 15.7 14.7 0.3 133.4
June  . . . . 74.9 16.7 58.2 2.1 29.7 13.5 15.7 0.4 136.3
July  . . . . 72.9 15.8 57.1 2.1 32.0 13.0 15.8 0.4 136.3
Aug.  . . . . 74.0 16.1 57.9 2.2 33.0 12.2 15.7 0.4 137.5
Sept.  . . . 74.9 17.1 57.8 2.1 32.7 12.0 15.6 0.4 137.7
Oct.  . . . . 74.0 16.2 57.8 2.1 33.3 11.8 15.6 0.5 137.3
Nov. . . . . 74.1 15.4 58.7 2.1 32.9 11.6 15.5 0.5 136.7
1 The Greek contribution begins upon Greece’s entry into the euro area (1 January 2001). For statistical reasons, however, the data on monetary aggregates were extended
to cover previous years as well.
2 The Greek M3 (and likewise any euro area national M3) can no longer be accurately calculated, since part of the quantity of euro banknotes and coins that have been
put into circulation in a euro area country is held by residents of other euro area countries and/or by non-residents. Due to these technical problems, the compilation of
the Greek M0, M1, M2 and M3 was interrupted in January 2003.
3 Foreign currency savings deposits and deposits redeemable at notice not associated with payment orders.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.2
Greek contribution to the main monetary aggregates of the euro area1
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End 
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2000  . . . . . . . . . . 90,737.8 73,720.2 17,017.6 11,007.0 50,917.8 28,813.0
2001  . . . . . . . . . . 101,809.5 79,566.0 22,243.5 13,385.2 58,323.1 30,101.1
2002  . . . . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2001 Jan.  . . . . . . . 88,672.8 71,364.1 17,308.7 10,004.0 50,097.1 28,571.6
Feb. . . . . . . .. 88,128.8 71,100.2 17,028.6 10,019.8 50,121.5 27,987.5
March  . . . . . 87,506.4 69,835.1 17,671.3 9,376.2 50,163.9 27,966.3
Apr.  . . . . . . . 89,005.3 72,383.4 16,621.9 10,149.5 50,991.1 27,864.7
May  . . . . . . . 88,126.9 71,588.8 16,538.1 9,522.3 51,161.0 27,443.6
June  . . . . . . . 89,219.5 73,009.8 16,209.7 10,132.4 52,280.3 26,806.8
July . . . . . . . . 89,196.9 73,484.2 15,712.7 10,146.2 52,527.7 26,523.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . 89,264.4 73,797.9 15,466.5 9,826.6 53,222.9 26,215.0
Sept. . . . . . . . 88,095.4 72,815.9 15,279.6 9,849.7 53,730.0 24,515.9
Oct.  . . . . . . . 89,382.6 74,146.8 15,235.8 10,125.1 53,972.1 25,285.4
Nov.  . . . . . . . 92,567.2 73,956.4 18,610.7 10,928.3 54,790.3 26,848.6
Dec.  . . . . . . . 101,809.5 79,566.0 22,243.5 13,385.2 58,323.1 30,101.1
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . 97,542.0 78,693.6 18,848.4 11,839.1 58,355.2 27,347.7
Feb.  . . . . . . . 98,302.4 79,029.9 19,272.4 11,356.7 58,674.4 28,271.3
March  . . . . . 96,741.8 77,970.2 18,771.6 10,267.5 58,309.6 28,164.7
Apr.  . . . . . . . 98,685.7 80,274.3 18,411.5 11,584.4 58,979.2 28,122.2
May  . . . . . . . 97,779.9 79,934.6 17,845.3 10,795.2 59,174.0 27,810.7
June  . . . . . . . 98,751.5 81,549.4 17,202.1 11,758.3 59,654.1 27,339.2
July . . . . . . . . 99,132.9 81,816.4 17,316.4 11,888.0 59,768.1 27,476.8
Aug.  . . . . . . . 99,924.1 82,255.7 17,668.4 11,656.2 60,475.4 27,792.5
Sept. . . . . . . . 101,076.4 84,497.2 16,579.2 12,328.6 61,820.2 26,927.6
Oct.  . . . . . . . 100,492.7 83,175.9 17,316.8 11,399.8 60,572.9 28,519.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . 100,771.6 83,612.4 17,159.2 11,686.3 59,933.8 29,151.4
Dec.  . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . 102,687.7 85,423.3 17,264.4 11,703.0 59,707.7 31,277.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 102,455.9 85,527.5 16,928.4 12,419.8 60,981.4 29,054.7
March  . . . . . 103,684.4 86,637.5 17,046.9 12,996.7 61,203.6 29,484.0
Apr.  . . . . . . . 105,407.4 87,642.8 17,764.6 12,664.5 61,690.6 31,052.2
May  . . . . . . . 104,593.8 86,997.3 17,596.5 12,586.4 60,809.6 31,197.8
June  . . . . . . . 108,637.5 90,199.0 18,438.5 14,702.7 61,700.5 32,234.3
July . . . . . . . . 108,694.9 89,934.1 18,760.8 13,670.6 60,471.2 34,553.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . 110,793.2 91,498.3 19,294.9 14,035.9 61,242.3 35,515.0
Sept. . . . . . . . 111,384.5 92,881.7 18,502.8 14,958.4 61,151.5 35,274.5
Oct.  . . . . . . . 111,068.9 92,207.8 18,861.1 14,024.4 61,020.5 36,024.0
Nov.  . . . . . . . 110,668.9 92,383.7 18,285.2 13,157.4 61,846.9 35,664.6
1 Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs) comprise credit institutions other than the Bank of Greece and money market funds.
2 Including (until 31 December 2001) deposits in drachmas and the other euro legacy currencies.
3 Including blocked deposits.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.3
Deposits of domestic firms and households with OMFIs,1 by currency and type
(Outstanding balances in million euro, not seasonally adjusted)
Total
deposits
By currency By type
Deposits
in euro2
Deposits
in other
currencies
Sight
deposits
Savings
deposits
Time
deposits3
End
of period
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1 Including large- and small-scale manufacturing and mining.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.4
Domestic MFI loans to domestic enterprises and households, by branch of economic activity
(Balances in million euro)
2000 . . . . . . . 59,330.0 50,065.6 9,264.4 3,884.9 11,823.7 12,374.2 11,271.9 1,814.3 5,511.3 12,649.7
2001 . . . . . . . 74,027.4 66,722.6 7,304.8 3,724.2 12,614.9 15,524.3 15,652.2 2,171.3 7,852.0 16,488.5
2002 . . . . . . . 86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2001 Jan. . . . . 59,938.1 51,062.9 8,875.2 3,809.7 11,617.1 12,370.5 11,542.8 1,851.0 5,601.0 13,146.0
Feb. . . . 60,758.1 52,131.0 8,627.1 3,723.9 11,813.8 12,374.8 11,775.0 1,894.5 5,715.7 13,460.4
March . . 62,687.0 54,138.2 8,548.8 3,869.2 11,972.1 12,731.5 12,067.4 1,946.9 5,973.5 14,126.4
Apr. . . . 63,300.2 54,967.1 8,333.1 3,957.4 11,802.2 12,716.1 12,327.2 1,998.4 6,109.2 14,389.7
May . . . 65,437.2 56,478.3 8,958.9 3,838.0 12,184.5 13,619.7 12,752.8 2,042.1 6,322.2 14,677.9
June . . . 67,191.8 58,451.6 8,740.2 3,802.5 12,493.1 14,110.5 13,053.2 2,066.5 6,577.4 15,088.6
July . . . . 67,876.5 59,419.2 8,457.3 3,807.4 12,712.7 14,014.7 13,531.7 2,055.5 6,727.6 15,026.9
Aug. . . . 68,345.9 60,214.8 8,131.1 3,767.4 12,630.0 14,031.4 13,859.7 2,040.1 6,887.2 15,130.1
Sept. . . . 69,886.2 61,843.1 8,043.1 3,821.8 12,843.6 14,456.8 14,250.8 1,990.0 7,117.5 15,405.7
Oct. . . . 70,591.5 62,887.0 7,704.5 3,735.5 12,718.4 14,510.7 14,695.7 1,992.2 7,379.6 15,559.4
Nov. . . . 72,434.1 64,675.3 7,758.8 3,666.9 12,733.1 14,755.9 15,187.6 2,007.1 7,535.4 16,548.1
Dec. . . . 74,027.4 66,722.6 7,304.8 3,724.2 12,614.9 15,524.3 15,652.2 2,171.3 7,852.0 16,488.5
2002 Jan. . . . . 73,982.0 66,648.1 7,333.9 3,230.0 12,435.1 15,174.6 16,024.7 2,236.0 7,783.7 17,097.9
Feb. . . . 75,202.2 67,723.9 7,478.3 3,030.3 12,724.5 15,846.7 16,417.5 2,267.5 7,944.7 16,971.0
March . . 76,235.3 69,080.0 7,155.3 3,139.4 13,168.1 15,788.0 16,891.9 2,316.4 8,129.8 16,801.7
Apr. . . . 76,958.0 69,886.9 7,071.1 3,196.1 12,801.1 15,939.4 17,362.1 2,341.0 8,301.2 17,017.1
May . . . 78,009.6 71,192.8 6,816.8 3,193.0 12,912.6 16,064.7 17,721.8 2,372.2 8,508.3 17,237.0
June . . . 79,960.9 73,475.3 6,485.6 3,167.7 13,360.0 16,516.2 18,194.3 2,414.5 8,678.1 17,630.1
July . . . . 81,233.9 74,622.8 6,611.1 3,167.7 13,720.8 16,570.9 18,759.9 2,411.6 8,868.0 17,735.0
Aug. . . . 82,041.4 75,311.8 6,729.6 3,191.4 13,625.4 16,580.6 19,304.9 2,399.3 8,997.7 17,942.1
Sept. . . . 82,662.6 75,930.7 6,731.9 3,212.8 13,785.6 16,059.8 19,503.8 2,560.0 9,228.1 18,312.5
Oct. . . . 83,996.1 77,164.1 6,832.0 3,221.6 13,961.2 16,161.2 19,914.7 2,635.0 9,420.9 18,681.5
Nov. . . . 85,614.8 78,732.9 6,881.9 3,167.1 14,528.2 15,663.2 20,416.6 2,761.1 9,612.9 19,465.7
Dec. . . . 86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2003 Jan. . . . . 88,241.8 81,751.6 6,490.2 2,964.2 14,529.2 16,321.5 21,599.4 2,978.4 9,884.9 19,964.2
Feb. . . . 88,787.7 82,332.2 6,455.5 2,980.5 14,485.6 16,310.3 22,062.6 3,049.0 10,023.3 19,876.4
March . . 89,363.0 83,075.2 6,287.8 2,994.0 14,422.3 16,053.5 22,366.8 3,095.5 10,247.3 20,183.6
Apr. . . . 90,770.3 84,710.6 6,059.7 3,043.0 14,565.0 16,113.4 22,747.1 3,149.2 10,344.7 20,807.9
May . . . 92,497.1 86,811.4 5,685.7 3,027.6 14,866.7 16,488.6 23,183.1 3,085.8 10,432.6 21,412.7
June . . . 94,344.1 88,447.4 5,896.7 3,062.3 15,165.2 16,139.3 23,705.7 3,201.0 10,600.9 22,469.7
July . . . . 96,253.7 90,203.0 6,050.7 3,062.9 15,674.1 16,307.5 24,267.2 3,207.5 10,871.8 22,862.7
Aug. . . . 97,350.8 91,177.5 6,173.3 3,102.1 15,681.4 16,700.8 24,573.2 3,255.1 11,075.2 22,963.0
Sept. . . . 97,747.2 91,865.5 5,881.7 3,103.0 15,544.4 16,612.9 25,043.9 3,278.1 11,301.1 22,863.8
Oct. . . . 98,403.4 92,480.6 5,922.8 3,117.3 15,481.2 16,393.0 25,559.5 3,321.0 11,670.4 22,861.0
Nov. . . . 99,829.3 94,044.9 5,784.4 3,093.6 15,780.9 16,633.3 25,808.6 3,392.4 12,063.2 23,057.3
End
of period Total
In
euro
In foreign
currency
Agricul-
ture Industry1
Branches of economic activity
Trade Housing Tourism
Consumer
credit Other
Statistical section
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T a b l e  III.5
ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates
(Percentages per annum)
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 1999 14 Jan. 11.50 9.75 12.00 13.50
4 Jan.2 2.75 3.00 3.25 21 Oct. 11.00 9.75 11.50 13.00
22 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 16 Dec. 10.25 9.25 10.75 12.25
9 Apr. 1.50 2.50 3.50 27 Dec. 10.25 9.00 10.75 11.50
5 Nov. 2.00 3.00 4.00
2000 4 Feb. 2.25 3.25 4.25 2000 27 Jan. 9.50 8.50 9.75 11.00
17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 9 March 8.75 8.00 9.25 10.25
28 Apr. 2.75 3.75 4.75 20 Apr. 8.00 7.50 8.75 9.50
9 June 3.25 4.25 5.25 29 June 7.25 – 8.25 9.00
28 June3 3.25 4.25 5.25 6 Sept. 6.50 – 7.50 8.25
1 Sept. 3.50 4.50 5.50 15 Nov. 6.00 – 7.00 7.75
6 Oct. 3.75 4.75 5.75 29 Nov. 5.50 – 6.50 7.25
13 Dec. 4.75 – 5.75 6.50
27 Dec. 3.75 – 4.75 5.75
2001 11 May 3.50 4.50 5.50 
31 Aug. 3.25 4.25 5.25 
18 Sept. 2.75 3.75 4.75
9 Nov. 2.25 3.25 4.25
2002 6 Dec. 1.75 2.75 3.75
2003 7 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
6 June 1.00 2.00 3.00
With
effect from1
1. ECB interest rates 2. Bank of Greece interest rates
Lombard
rate
14-day
intervention
rate
Overnight
deposit
facility,
second tier4
Overnight
deposit
facility,
first tier4
With
effect from
Marginal
lending
facility
Main
refinancing
operations3
Deposit
facility
1 The date refers to the deposit and marginal lending facilities. For main refinancing operations, unless otherwise indicated, changes in the rate are effective from the first
operation following the date indicated. The change on 18 September 2001 was effective on that same day.
2 On 22 December 1998 the ECB announced that, as an exception measure between 4 and 21 January 1999, a narrow corridor of 50 basis points would be applied between
the interest rate for the marginal lending facility and that for the deposit facility, aimed at facilitating the transition to the new regime by market participants.
3 Until 21 June 2000: fixed rate tenders, from 28 June 2000: minimum bid rate in variable rate tenders.
4 On 29 June 2000 the second tier of the deposit facility was abolished; the interest rate thereafter applies to the unified deposit acceptance account.
Sources: ECB and Bank of Greece.
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2000  . . . . . . . . . . . 6.22 5.99 5.98 6.05 6.10 6.26 6.35
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.08 4.28 4.58 4.82 5.30 5.51 5.76
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 3.50 4.06 4.45 4.78 5.12 5.24 5.52
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.34 2.82 3.37 3.83 4.27 4.32 4.91
2001 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 4.57 4.66 4.91 5.03 5.35 5.61 5.81
Feb.  . . . . . . . 4.59 4.66 4.90 5.04 5.35 5.56 5.78
March  . . . . . . 4.47 4.50 4.73 4.94 5.28 5.49 5.71
Apr.  . . . . . . . 4.48 4.53 4.79 4.89 5.39 5.55 5.77
May  . . . . . . . 4.52 4.59 4.89 5.01 5.54 5.70 5.92
June  . . . . . . . 4.31 4.40 4.73 4.88 5.48 5.66 5.91
July  . . . . . . . . 4.31 4.39 4.75 4.89 5.52 5.71 5.94
Aug.  . . . . . . . 4.11 4.17 4.52 4.68 5.33 5.56 5.82
Sept.  . . . . . . . 3.77 3.78 4.27 4.47 5.31 5.55 5.88
Oct.  . . . . . . . 3.37 3.40 3.97 4.20 5.07 5.30 5.64
Nov.  . . . . . . . 3.20 4.12 4.14 5.07 4.90 5.10 5.36
Dec.  . . . . . . . 3.30 4.15 4.37 4.73 5.13 5.28 5.52
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 3.48 4.27 4.51 4.95 5.24 5.36 5.55
Feb.  . . . . . . . 3.59 4.37 4.73 5.07 5.31 5.41 5.60
March  . . . . . . 3.81 4.58 5.00 5.27 5.51 5.58 5.78
Apr.  . . . . . . . 3.86 4.59 4.99 5.27 5.51 5.60 5.84
May  . . . . . . . 3.98 4.63 5.00 5.27 5.52 5.60 5.86
June  . . . . . . . 3.87 4.46 4.81 5.09 5.36 5.47 5.71
July  . . . . . . . . 3.65 4.23 4.59 4.90 5.21 5.33 5.57
Aug.  . . . . . . . 3.44 3.90 4.29 4.60 4.95 5.07 5.34
Sept.  . . . . . . . 3.24 3.59 3.98 4.33 4.73 4.86 5.18
Oct.  . . . . . . . 3.13 3.52 3.95 4.34 4.79 4.94 5.32
Nov.  . . . . . . . 3.02 3.40 3.87 4.26 4.76 4.90 5.33
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.87 3.19 3.63 4.05 4.58 4.71 5.13
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.70 2.91 3.36 3.81 4.43 4.51 4.97
Feb.  . . . . . . . 2.50 2.65 3.31 3.89 4.24 4.27 4.83
March  . . . . . . 2.41 2.82 3.38 3.83 4.26 4.33 4.90
Apr.  . . . . . . . 2.46 2.99 3.50 3.96 4.38 4.45 5.02
May  . . . . . . . 2.25 2.64 3.12 3.57 4.02 4.09 4.73
June  . . . . . . . 2.02 2.38 2.88 3.33 3.81 3.86 4.57
July  . . . . . . . . 2.08 2.62 3.18 3.65 4.12 4.16 4.83
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.28 2.98 3.51 3.91 4.29 4.34 4.90
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.26 2.91 3.47 3.91 4.32 4.37 4.96
Oct.  . . . . . . . 2.30 2.94 3.52 3.95 4.38 4.43 5.02
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.41 3.06 3.67 4.09 4.51 4.55 5.10
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.38 2.97 3.58 4.02 4.45 4.49 5.04
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.6
Greek government paper yields
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Yield on drachma government bonds
20-year15-year10-year7-year5-year3-year
Yield on
one-year
Treasury billsPeriod
Statistical section
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Period Savings depositsSight deposits
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.73 5.71 6.14 12.33 11.52 17.00 9.76
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 1.45 2.40 3.32 8.58 8.66 13.35 6.45
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.82 1.51 2.76 7.41 7.43 12.64 5.70
2001 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 1.66 2.93 3.84 9.40 9.12 14.37 7.31
Feb.  . . . . . . . 1.62 2.69 3.74 9.10 9.31 14.25 6.89
March  . . . . . . 1.60 2.70 3.71 8.78 8.99 13.93 6.70
Apr.  . . . . . . . 1.69 2.71 3.62 8.88 9.08 13.80 6.60
May  . . . . . . . 1.54 2.57 3.64 8.87 8.98 13.53 6.55
June  . . . . . . . 1.52 2.47 3.57 8.65 8.69 13.25 6.49
July  . . . . . . . . 1.42 2.46 3.55 8.64 8.61 12.97 6.50
Aug.  . . . . . . . 1.51 2.47 3.45 8.59 8.74 12.94 6.48
Sept.  . . . . . . . 1.31 2.30 3.05 8.35 8.38 13.07 6.38
Oct.  . . . . . . . 1.09 1.93 2.71 8.08 8.33 12.76 6.00
Nov.  . . . . . . . 1.28 1.90 2.51 7.87 8.00 12.68 5.77
Dec.  . . . . . . . 1.20 1.69 2.41 7.79 7.65 12.65 5.78
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 0.90 1.66 2.62 7.74 7.36 12.70 5.77
Feb.  . . . . . . . 0.79 1.68 2.63 7.66 7.81 12.89 5.77
March  . . . . . . 0.83 1.66 2.74 7.63 7.60 12.82 5.76
Apr.  . . . . . . . 0.83 1.66 2.82 7.59 7.69 12.66 5.77
May  . . . . . . . 0.79 1.62 2.87 7.52 7.78 12.69 5.74
June  . . . . . . . 0.75 1.46 2.75 7.40 7.58 12.67 5.80
July  . . . . . . . . 0.72 1.41 2.72 7.29 7.41 12.61 5.68
Aug.  . . . . . . . 0.90 1.41 2.70 7.17 7.49 12.54 5.64
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.85 1.44 2.74 7.20 7.49 12.57 5.59
Oct.  . . . . . . . 0.91 1.48 2.84 7.29 7.20 12.49 5.66
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.84 1.50 2.87 7.24 6.90 12.53 5.65
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.75 1.09 2.80 7.23 6.82 12.53 5.53
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 0.74 1.09 2.83 7.10 6.68 12.48 5.46
Feb.  . . . . . . . 0.75 1.10 2.73 7.04 6.58 12.58 5.37
March  . . . . . . 0.69 1.05 2.68 6.99 6.48 12.53 5.40
Apr.  . . . . . . . 0.73 1.04 2.70 7.00 6.58 12.61 5.44
May  . . . . . . . 0.70 1.03 2.61 6.88 6.49 12.52 5.43
June  . . . . . . . 0.55 0.81 2.44 6.76 6.36 12.30 5.42
July  . . . . . . . . 0.60 0.79 2.38 6.61 6.21 12.20 5.39
Aug.  . . . . . . . 0.52 0.79 2.29 6.59 6.14 12.17 5.20
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.55 0.80 2.30 6.57 6.12 12.25 5.20
Oct.  . . . . . . . 0.62 0.85 2.27 6.58 6.10 12.28 5.18
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.54 0.85 2.29 6.63 6.13 12.31 5.18
1 Average rate on all categories of consumer loans.
2 Average rate on variable-rate housing loans with a maturity of over 5 years.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.7
Bank deposit and lending rates in Greece
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Deposit rates Lending rates
Housing2
To households
Consumer1Long-term
To enterprises
Short-term
12-month time
deposits
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1 Central government1,2 7,812 7,102 2,377 3,452 7,690
– Government budget 7,909 6,674 3,498 4,073 9,032
(Ordinary badget)2 3,125 2,128 822 1,360 3,609
(Public investment budget) 4,784 4,546 2,676 2,713 5,423
– OPEKEPE3 –97 428 –1,121 –621 –1,342
Percentage of GDP 6,0 5,0 1,8 2,4 5,1
2 Public entities4 –2,097 –1,560 –1,902 –1,990 –2,793
– Financing of social security funds –144 45 –295 72 134
– Financing of local authorities 103 123 – 15 –19
– Financing of other entities 138 395 –105 354 37
– Liquid assets –2,194 –2,123 –1,502 –2,431 –2,945
Total (1+2)5 5,715 5,542 475 1,462 4,897
1 As shown by the movement of relevant accounts with the Bank of Greece, the Agricultural Bank of Greece and commercial banks.
2 Including the movement of public debt management accounts.
3 Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid. It replaced DICAGEP (Agricultural Markets Management Service) as of 3 September 2001.
4 Including their liabilities towards the banking system, their bank deposits and their investment in Greek government paper effected through the Bank of Greece
only; excluding other investment in securities which nevertheless affects their cash surplus.
5 Including the borrowing requirement of central government, as well as that of public entities as calculated on the basis of Bank of Greece intermediation only.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e IV.1
Borrowing requirement of central government and public entities
(Million euro)
20012002 2003*20022001
Year January-October
Statistical section
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T a b l e IV.2
Financing of borrowing requirement of central government and public entities
(Million euro)
1 Including sales of securities in the secondary market.
2 This aggregate concerns changes in the balance of government’s account with the Bank of Greece and not central bank financing.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
2001 2002 2001 2002 2003*
Year January-October
Percen-
tage
of
total Amount
Percen-
tage
of
total Amount
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
Greek government paper held by monetary
financial institutions1 1,325 23.2 –2,476 –44.7 2,679 564.0 –1,428 –97.7 –8,071 –164.8
Greek government paper held by private
savers and enterprises1 –1,855 –32.5 1,038 18.7 –542 –114.1 1,738 118.9 1,559 31.8
Loans and advances from monetary
financial institutions –191 –3.3 987 17.8 –7,079 –1,490.3 –4,113 –281.3 –1,405 –28.7
Bank of Greece2 –895 –15.7 –392 –7.1 –2,019 –425.1 –683 –46.7 –2,294 –46.8
Borrowing from non-residents 7,331 128.3 6,385 115.2 7,436 1,565.5 5,948 406.8 15,108 308.5
Total 5,715 100.0 5,542 100.0 475 100.0 1,462 100.0 4,897 100.0
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